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ABSTRACT

Process Evaluation of Terrorism Amnesty and Reintegration Program, and
Perceptions of the program within Kenya Police
by
Resila Atieno Onyango

Advisor: Professor Eric L. Piza, PhD

There are a few articles on front line officials as implementers of Countering Violent
Extremism (CVE) measures, a gap the dissertation has partly filled by exploring the Terrorism
Amnesty and Reintegration Program (ARP) in Kenya using both qualitative and quantitative
data. ARP developments have occurred in a political context wherein foreign government have
been eager to advance CVE and the Kenyan Government has more-or-less gone along with that.
The implication here is whether such policies will be effective and sustainable in Kenya.
Importantly, if we view Kenya in a regional and even global context, it is now something of a
"critical case" for CVE, given the extent of donor interest (and government effort) in advancing
CVE. In this regard, there are no doubt lessons that can and should be learned from Kenya for
those supportive of CVE in other part of Africa and the developing world. The first objective
involved a process evaluation to understand agency related factors that led to the creation of
ARP, determine if there was program integrity in its implementation, and its theoretical
similarities with focused deterrence technique (FD). Process evaluation involved a content
analysis of 150 newspapers and government-related documents. Results show that there are key
theoretical similarities between ARP and focused deterrence technique (FD) particularly the
iv

social aspect of FD and the paradigm shift from hard militarized to “soft” power counterterrorism strategies. There was program integrity on the ground but poor coordination between
security agencies and community emanating from mistrust casts doubt on the success and
sustainability of the program. The second objective involved an in-depth survey of Kenyan
Police Commanders (n=273) randomly stratified by designation (Formations or specialized
units and General Duty) to understand police perceptions of the intended effect and
appropriateness of offering amnesty to radicalized youth. Results show that officers associate
ARP with risk as majority widely think that Kenya could face more challenges because of the
burgeoning number of returnees in the program as participants can seize this opportunity to
infiltrate their ideologies into the program. Most officers not only agreed that it was difficult to
identify genuine returnees but that the program is lenient on terrorists. Arguably, if police as
implementers don’t like CVE as shown by their perceptions, then ARP will not work owing to
police culture of resistance to change and police discretion. The policy implication of the police
survey findings suggests that implementers of ARP should train all Gazetted Officers on CVE
benefits because success of CVE largely depends on perceptions and commitment of police
commanders. This dissertation has contributed to CVE literature in Africa where studies
utilizing primary data on CVE are lacking. The point of departure with previous CVE research
is the use of primary data from Kenyan Police.
Key words: terrorism amnesty, process evaluation, content analysis, reintegrating terrorists, al
Shabaab returnees, countering violent extremism, Kenya Police
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CHAPTER ONE`
Introduction
Kenya has witnessed unprecedented upsurge in frequency and magnitude of attacks from
the Somali-based Al-Shabaab terrorists. The situation escalated after Kenyan military troops
invaded Somalia in 2011 (NCTC, 2016; KNCHR, 2014). In April 2015, al Shabaab staged the
deadliest attack in Kenya in the post August 7, 1998 U.S. Embassy bombing in Nairobi. The
Garissa University College attack claimed 148 lives. As a result, President Uhuru Kenyatta
promised to respond “in the fiercest way possible” (reports, n.d.), but Al Shabaab defiantly
warned Kenya of “gruesome war” unless she withdraws her troops from Somalia (“Al Shabaab
Promises ‘Gruesome War’ in Kenya After Massacre at University | VICE News,” n.d.; AFP,
n.d.; Lough and Sheikh, 2013). This situation has pushed the country to the frontline of a
regional and global struggle against terrorist groups and violent extremists (NCTC, 2016). In
2015 ahead of a state visit by U.S. President Barrack Obama to Kenya, CNN described Kenya as
a “hotbed of terror” but soon apologized due to public demand (Mutiga, 2015).
As the nation grapples with serious threats of terrorism and violent extremism (VE), the
Government of Kenya (GK) surprisingly responded by promoting Countering Violent Extremism
(CVE) through a terrorist Amnesty and Reintegration Program (ARP) (Republic of KenyaUNDP Kenya, 2015, p.23). ARP is a novel strategy offered to radicalized youth on condition that
they voluntarily surrender to the national security agencies. It targets ex-al-Shabaab terrorists
(commonly referred to as returnees or foreign terrorist fighters) for purposes of reintegration
back into community. These include youths that are at risk of engaging in terrorist-related
activities owing to their association with al-Shabaab, youths who have fled from Al-Shabaab and
returned to Kenya, as well as radicalized youths who never left the country (p. 23). In exchange

for their surrender, youths are provided with training and social services including psychological
counseling, to assist in desistance from terrorism. From the onset, the amnesty was received with
mixed public reactions; a section of the clergy however rejected a “blanket amnesty for
terrorists” (Kibet, 2015), while some leaders from Muslim communities expressed their
skepticism in the program due to lack of an amnesty law.
The late Cabinet Secretary (CS) for Interior and Coordination of National Government,
Major General (Rtd.) Joseph Nkaissery announced the 10-days amnesty on April 14, 2015
(Ombati, n.d.; “Amnesty | Define Amnesty at Dictionary.com,” n.d.; “Church opposes amnesty
for Al Shabaab followers :: Kenya - The Standard,” n.d.; “Nkaissery extends amnesty for
Shabaab youths by 2 weeks » Capital News,” 2015; “Kenya extends amnesty period for alShabaab recruits,” n.d.). Nkaissery directly and repeatedly warned that failure to surrender will
attract the full force of law, because they will be deemed ‘aware and condone, or are party to the
terrorist attendant with criminal consequences’ (Ombati, 2015).
What is puzzling about ARP is the radical paradigm shift from the country’s heavyhanded, militaristic anti-terrorism strategies to the “soft” power CVE approach. No doubt, CVE
has expanded rapidly in the last decade and many countries have embraced despite the
uncertainty about its effectiveness. Romaniuk (2015) has argued that CVE is a “field that has
risen to prominence in a manner disproportional to its achievements”.
Notably, Kenya joined efforts with other nations through global CVE meetings seeking
solutions to VE defined here as “radicalised individuals who are prepared to engage in, or
actively support, acts of violence in furtherance of radically illiberal, undemocratic political
systems or ideologies” (NCTC, 2016, p. V). During the February 2015 White House Summit on
Countering Violent Extremism where Kenya participated, Ministers “reaffirmed that intelligence
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gathering, military force, and law enforcement alone will not solve-and when misused can in fact
exacerbate-the problem of violent extremism” (“The White House Summit to Counter Violent
Extremism Ministerial Meeting Statement,” n.d., p. 1). They emphasized that CVE requires a
multi-agency approach including provision of economic opportunities, expanding role of youth,
promote community policing, and counter extremist narratives, and collaboration between state
and non-state actors especially civil society and religious leaders. The U.S. Department of State
in its 2017 “Annual Report of Assistance Related to International Terrorism Fiscal Year 2014”
states that
CVE programs aim to deny terrorism new recruits by reducing sympathy and support
within communities for VE by: (1) building resilience among those at-risk of recruitment
and radicalization to violence; (2) countering violent extremist narratives and messaging;
and (3) developing partner-nation and civil-society capacity and political will to CVE.
Clearly, APR was modelled alongside the recommendations from such CVE conferences.
In this regard, the present study views ARP as a reintegration program. GK defines reintegration
as “actions that support the social, ideological, psychological, and economic wellbeing of
rehabilitated individuals as they return to live with their families and communities, and that
ensure that they remain peaceful and law-abiding in the long run” (NCTC, 2016). As a
reintegration program, ARP reflects a policy intervention that is based on focused deterrence
technique (FD). The author argued that ARP shares key theoretical similarities with FD
particularly, the social aspect of FD and paradigm shift from hard to “soft” approach. In FD
implementers focus on high-risk offenders by directly engaging in dialogue with the participants
to disrupt/deter violence, and engage in direct communication with potential offenders vial a
two-prolonged message from security agents and the community. Likewise, in ARP, the National
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Counter-Terrorism Centre, a multi-agency of national security agencies, provides returnees with
social and psychological counselling services.
While there are a few articles on front line officials as implementers of CVE measures,
the dearth of literature on ARP limits our understanding of the program. There were hardly two
studies about ARP. Widely cited was a joint report by International Organization of Migration
(IOM), [Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims] SUPKEM, and Ministry of Interior. The study
based on an interview with 148 returnees found that at least 700 returnees were in Kenya (“500
Al-Shabab”, 2016; “Al-Shabab recruits return”, 2015; “700 Al-Shabab recruits, 2015). Besides,
BRICS East Africa pilot programme examined the success and effectiveness of the amnesty offer
and the cooperation between the County and National Government in CVE activities. The study
found that 48 returnees were undergoing reintegration in Coast Region. They further observed
that the program was marred with poor coordination between security agencies and the
community, and lacked transparency and information (“BRICS East Africa - Project Proposal March 2016.pdf,” n.d.) .
Justification of Study
It is not clear whether young democracies like Kenya are under donor pressure to
embrace CVE policies considering the significant donor funding of CVE in Africa. Notably,
ARP developments have occurred in a political context wherein foreign government have been
eager to advance CVE and the Kenyan Government has more-or-less gone along with that. The
implication here is whether such policies will be effective and sustainable in Kenya. Importantly,
if we view Kenya in a regional and even global context, it is now something of a "critical case"
for CVE, given the extent of donor interest (and government effort) in advancing CVE. In this
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regard, there are no doubt lessons that can and should be learned from Kenya for those
supportive of CVE in other part of Africa and the developing world.
Kenya thus makes a good case selection for three reasons. Primarily, Kenya has witnessed
an unprecedented upsurge of terrorist attacks since 2011 after KDF invaded Somalia to fight the
militia (Government of Kenya-UNDP, 2015; KNCHR, 2014). The situation has been escalating
by the ongoing countrywide radicalization and recruitment of youths into al-Shabaab, which no
longer targets Kenyan Somalis but youths from all backgrounds (Jones, 2013). As such, the need
for evidence-based research to inform government policy and practice on counter-terrorism and
CVE in Kenya cannot be gainsaid.
Previous research evaluating effectiveness of counter-terrorism strategies suggests that we
do not know whether they work or do not work (Lum, Kennedy and Sherley, 2006). Moreover,
there is plenty of research on CVE but they predominantly feature developed countries, yet “CVE
is context specific” (Farsight, 2016; Romaniuk, 2015; Holmer, 2013; Denoeux and Carter, 2009).
As such, “studies have yet to identify a single tactic which can work in all countries and cultures”
(Adrich, 2014) or which CT policy is effective (Pillar, 2001).
Central to the dissertation is the relatively biased focus of terrorism research on terrorists
compared to law enforcement, despite the critical role of police in the Global War on Terrorism
(GWOT) and their expertise in their job. A Campbell Collaboration systematic review found much
fewer peer-reviewed and empirical studies based on law enforcement response to terrorism
compared to causes of terrorism or impacts of terrorism (Lum, Kennedy & Sherley, 2006). As
Jenkins (2015) asserted, inclusion of police practitioners-as-authors in research may increase the
quality of police scholarship because “police are the experts in their areas” (p. 508; also see Sytsma
and Piza, 2017). Likewise, Spalek has argued that rather than concentrating on role of communities
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in CVE, it is important to examine role of individual “connectors” whether they are police officers,
youth workers or community members (Spalek, 2014, p. 837). Stewart & Morris emphasized that
“sound policy that will affect local law enforcement cannot exist without the indispensable insight
of police administrators” (p. 292). This dissertation has partly filled this gap by examining
perception of Kenyan Police Officers about CVE because understanding police perceptions about
ARP is important for determining the utility of government youth intervention programs for
terrorism and policy improvement in CT/CVE.
From a theoretical perspective, previous studies have examined application of FD to
controlling gun and gang offenders and concluded that it is a “promising” strategy (Kennedy,
2011). Essentially, “promising strategies to refer to “programs for which the levels of certainty
from available evidence is too low to support generalizable conclusions, but for which there is
some empirical basis for predicting that further research could support such conclusions
(Sherman et al., 1998, p. 7).
Very little is known however about feasibility of pulling levers when applied to different
contexts and diverse groups of offenders (Corsaro et al., 2012) or different crime problems
(Kennedy, 2006), a gap that the dissertation has partly filled by examining theoretical similarities
between FD and ARP through a process evaluation.
Within this context, the purpose of this study was twofold; the first objective was to offer
a process evaluation of ARP to see if there is program integrity in its implementation process,
and theoretical similarities with FD framework. The second objective was to do an-in-depth
survey assessing perception of senior police officers (Gazetted Officers) (GOs) to understand
their thoughts as implementers, about the appropriateness of amnesty-driven CVE as a counterterrorism strategy.
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Research Questions
The author asked, what does the Amnesty and Reintegration Program in Kenya entail?
The objective of this qualitative question was to understand the motivations for instituting ARP,
level of “program integrity” on the ground, and see if it shares patterns with FD framework. The
dependent variable was implementation. Program integrity was reported if ARP was delivered as
intended in theory (FD framework) and design of Kenya’s national CVE plan - National Strategy
to Counter Violent Extremism (NCTC, 2016). In so doing, a process evaluation was conducted
using content analysis. Content analysis is the “systematic reading of a body of texts, images,
and symbolic matter, not necessary from an author’s or user’s perspective” (Krippendorff, 1989,
p.403).
Butts explains that process evaluation is used to “assesses the conceptualization, design,
delivery, and measurement of client interventions before those interventions are subjected to a
more rigorous outcome evaluation” (Butts, 2011, p. 10). It helps in establishing “whether the
program is implemented in a way which ensures that the mechanism is able to operate” (Butts,
2011, p. 6; also see Chapman & Hough, 1998). Process evaluation framework was the lens used
to assess the ongoing process of Kenya's move from hard to “soft” power using the amnesty
policy as a case study. In other words, if FD is the mechanism that makes it work, how does the
on-the-ground implementation of ARP measure up to the CVE model for Kenya, and what
barriers stand in the way of its broader acceptance by the police doing the work? This led to the
second research question.
The second question was quantitative in nature and asked, what is the perception of
police officers regarding countering violent extremism as a counter-terrorism strategy? The
dependent variable was police perception/what implementers think about the CVE. Perception

7

was operationalized as pessimism, optimism, risk, preparedness, and autonomy/discretion. This
approach was previously used by Stewart and Morris (2009) and Lurigio and Skogan (1994).
Assessing police perception was important because as Lurigio and Skogan (1994) argued, “the
success of community policing depends on the [Chicago] police officers who are responsible for
implementing the programs” (p. 315). As such, “their attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors must
be substantially changed before [community policing] can be put into practice” (p. 315).
Likewise, if police as implementers do not like CVE/ARP, then it will not work largely
due to their culture of resistance to change (Skogan, 2008; Lurigio & Skogan, 1994). The success
and sustainability of ARP will largely depend on police perceptions of the program. Police work
is dangerous, and officers exercise enormous discretion in their decision-making. As a
paramilitary organization, they remain isolated from the public and maintain an “us vs. them”
mentality due to mistrust in the members of public. These factors associated are nuanced, making
it necessary for policy makers and practitioners within NCTC to understand perception of police
commanders, if they want to realize the success of ARP because this is a police-community
based intervention.
To the best of my knowledge, this was the first attempt to independently assess
implementation process and police perceptions about ARP. This was a departure from the
previous CVE studies predominantly focused on ex-terrorists and donor-driven. The dissertation
has contributed to literature in Africa where studies utilizing primary data on CVE, especially
from police are lacking. This is particularly so considering that amnesty-driven approaches as
terrorism-prevention strategy are yet to be implemented on a widespread basis. It provides a
great deal of guidance to both practitioners and researchers interested in such strategies. In
conclusion, qualitative aspect of the study has demonstrated that there are theoretical similarities
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between the program and FD particularly the social aspect of FD and the paradigm shift from
hard militarized to “soft” power counter-terrorism strategies. The quantitative aspect of this
study has demonstrated that specialized police units were supportive of CVE than General Duty
were. This implies that policy makers and practitioners should train all police commanders
irrespective of their designations about the potential benefits of CVE otherwise police
perceptions will most likely hinder success and sustainability of CVE owing to police culture.
The dissertation includes six chapters. Chapter 1 is the introduction laying down the
objectives of the study, its justification, research questions and study implication. Chapter 2 is
the literature review on the background of the National Police Service, counter-terrorism
strategies in Kenya, ARP as a case study, previous research on CVE, and lessons from AmnestyDriven CVEs to inform the present study and identify the gap in literature. Chapter 3 is the
conceptual framework including explanations of radicalization and disengagement processes,
police perception studies, and focused deterrence technique. Methodology is in chapter four.
Results are in chapter 5, and includes ethical considerations, data quality issues, limitations,
contribution to policy and practice, and future research. Finally, Chapter 6 entails discussion and
conclusion.
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CHAPTER TWO
Literature Review
Selection of literature was based on relevance to inform the dissertation and identify gap
in the literature. American Psychological Association (APA) states that “when summarizing
earlier works, avoid nonessential details; instead, literature review should emphasize pertinent
findings, relevant methodological issues, and major conclusions” (American Psychological
Association, 2010, p. 28). Unfortunately, there is scarcity in literature about ARP. There were no
publicly available primary data about ARP, other than media reports. The reviewed literature
thus included online media content, secondary data sources including books, scholarly peer
reviewed articles, and organizational reports and websites. The review covers four key areas
namely; counter-terrorism strategies in Kenya; Amnesty and Reintegration Program as a case
study; previous research on CVE; and lessons from Amnesty-Driven CVEs.
To begin with, the National Police Service (NPS) is established under Article 243 of the
Constitution of Kenya 2010 which saw the merger of Kenya Police Service (KPS or Kenya
Police) and Administration Police Service (APS or AP). NPS falls under the Ministry of Interior
and Coordination of National Government (hereafter Ministry of Interior). NPS is a centralized
organization. It is commanded by an Inspector General of Police (IG), who is supported by two
Deputy IGs (D-IG) in charge of each of the two services. There is also Director of Directorate of
Criminal Investigation (DCI) who reports directly to the IG per the NPS Act No. 30 of 2011
(“No. 30 of 2012,” n.d.). The current study is focused on KPS defined here as Kenya Police and
DCI per the Force Standing Orders (Government of Kenya, 2001 [1962]). The history of Kenya
Police dates to the period between 1887–1902 when police served the Imperial British East
Africa Company (I.B.E.A) under Sir William McKinnon. Their duty was to protect the I.B.E.A
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business along the Kenyan Coast. Until 1907, the Kenya Police was organized along military
lines having been modeled after Sir Robert Peel’s London “Bobbies”.

Source: Dowd, C. (2015, August 7). Al Shabaab in Kenya: Emerging Dynamics and Shifts. Retrieved
January 25, 2018, from https://www.acleddata.com/2015/08/07/al-shabaab-in-kenya-august-2015-update/

Since its inception, KPS has expanded tremendously to a bureaucratic organization with
roles broadly designated into either specialized units or General Duty/Regular Police (for details,
see “Kenya Police Service,” n.d.; ). KPS is a paramilitary organization with the General Service
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Unit as its official paramilitary unit. After 9/11, Kenya joined the Global War on Terrorism
(GWOT) and established the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) in 2002. ATPU was meant to
increase the capabilities of Kenya to identify, arrest, detain, and prosecute terrorist suspects
(Republic of Kenya, 2013). In 2016, there were approximately 90,000 NPS officers charged with
the security of the near 45 million Kenyans. Out of this, 40,000 are in Kenya Police as per the
NPS Annual Report FY 2014-15 (see “Downloads - Downloads,” n.d.). There were
approximately 1,200 Gazetted Officers (GOs) 1in KPS in December 2016. Gazetted Officers are
senior officers at the management level. In the Force Standing Orders (FSO), they included the
ranks of Acting Superintendent (now Assistant Superintendent) and above (see Government of
Kenya, 2018; Government of Kenya, 2001; “No. 11A of 2011,” n.d.). NPS supports the National
Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) in counter-terrorism operations. CT operations have typically
targeted three regions vulnerable to terrorist attacks namely North Eastern, Coast and Nairobi
regions as shown in Figure 1.
Counter-terrorism strategies in Kenya
In August 7, 1998, the Al Qaeda terrorist group bombed the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi
killing over 200 Kenyans, 12 Americans, and injuring 5,000 others (Republic of Kenya, 2013;
Whitaker, 2008; Barkan, 2004). In November 28, 2002, they bombed an Israeli-owned Paradise
Hotel in Mombasa, and attempted to bring down an El Al plane with shoulder-fired SA-7
missiles (Barkan, 2004). As one of America’s strongest allies in East Africa on CT, Kenya
received [and continues to receive] massive financial support (Prestholdt, 2011; Whitaker, 2008)
including training of some 500 security officers (Barkan, 2014) in CT. Apart from the 1998
bombing, terror threat in the country remained relatively low. In February 2003, the government

1

Assistant Superintendent Rank replaced acting Superintendent Rank in 2011.
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announced that al Qaeda cell was in Mombasa. America too warned of possible terrorist attack in
the country and together with the UK, issued travel advisories to their citizens not to visit Kenya
(Krause and Otenyo, 2005; Barkan, 2004). The situation fed into Al-Shabaab’s propaganda that
“Kenya is now officially a war zone and as such any tourists visiting the country do so at their
own peril” (“Kenya is a war zone, warns al-Shabaab after Somali Islamists massacre 48 | World
news | The Guardian,” n.d.). These travel advisories had far-reaching impact on Kenya’s
economy. Tourism earnings declined to 84.6 billion Kenyan Shillings in 2015 from KSh 87.1
billion in 2014, while international visitor arrivals declined by 12.6% in 2015 (Kenya National
Bureau of Statistics, 2016).
However, the threat situation increased from 2011. On October 1, 2011, Marie Dedieu, a
disabled French woman was kidnapped from her home in Manda Island in Coast Region
(Republic of Kenya, 2013). On October 13, 2011, al Shabaab kidnapped two female Spanish
Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) aid workers from Dadaab refugee camp and took them to
Somalia (Republic of Kenya, 2013). For a country where tourism is a major foreign exchange
earner, it became incumbent upon the government to take immediate action to protect
sovereignty and avert further victimization (kidnappings) of foreigners. Consequently, in
October 14, 2011, Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) invaded Somalia under Operation Linda Nchi
(Protect the Nation) to fight al Shabaab (GK and UNDP Kenya, 2015; Republic of Kenya, 2013).
Their strategy was to create a buffer zone along the Kenya-Somali border to prevent further
cross-border attacks (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2016). KDF later joined the African
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2012 and together liberated key areas in Somalia from
al-Shabaab (Atta-Asamoah, 2015).
The backlash of Linda Nchi however has been catastrophic. There has been an increase of
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major attacks on Kenya including Mpeketoni in Coast where 48 people were killed in 2014
(Cilliers, 2015), Westgate Mall siege in Nairobi that claimed 67 lives in 2013 (Williams, 2015),
Garissa University College attack in 2015 that claimed 148 lives (UNDP Kenya, 2015), and El
Adde in Somalia where unknown number of Kenyan soldiers died in 2016 (“Somalia’s al-Shabab
killed ‘180 Kenyan troops’ in el-Ade - BBC News,” n.d.; “Kenya covers up military massacre CNN,” n.d.). Some argue that Linda Nchi “effectively made the country a prime target for AlShabaab and its sympathizers” (Atta-Asamoah, 2015, p. 2). Regardless, former Chief of Defence
Forces, General Julius Karangi in 2011 emphasized that KDF must ensure ‘highly degraded Alshabaab capacity’ before leaving (“State offers amnesty to Kenyans in terror group - Daily
Nation,” n.d.; (“Army will leave Somalia when border is safe, says Karangi - Daily Nation,”
n.d.).
Whether KDF should withdraw from the 22,000 UN backed AMISOM to avert the socalled “retaliatory attacks” (Metre, 2016; Menkaush, 2014; Bruton and Williams, 2014) is a
contentious political issue beyond the scope of this study. Here is the paradox nonetheless:
besides the July 2010 attack that claimed 74 lives of World Cup football fans in Uganda, the
militia has victimized no other AMISOM member country more than Kenya outside its base in
Somalia (Republic of Kenya, 2013). Interestingly, Uganda has contributed the largest contingent
to AMISON (over 6,000 troops) compared to the about 4,000 troops from Kenya (“Uganda UPDFUganda - UPDFUganda - UPDF,” n.d.). Likewise, in May 2016, High Court Judge
Alphonse Owiny Dollo of Uganda sentenced five convicts of the Kampala bombing ( (“Five
jailed for life in Uganda for al Shabaab World Cup bombings | Reuters,” n.d.; “Four Kenyans
jailed for life in Uganda for al Shabaab World Cup bombings,” n.d.). While no country deserves
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victimization, the prevailing discrepancies depict an unclear cause of hostility of al Shabaab
against Kenya.
In the meantime, military operations have continued alongside police crackdowns in
“hotspots” (areas considered vulnerable or at high risk to radicalization and terrorist attacks)
including Nairobi, Coast (Kilifi, Kwale, Tana, Lamu and Mombasa) and North-Eastern regions
(Garissa, Mandera, Wajir) (NCTC, 2016; “strengthening community’s resilience
againstradicalization and violent extremism,” n.d.; David, n.d.) . The aim is to mop up illegal
immigrants suspected to be involved in youth indoctrination or planning terrorism (Republic of
Kenya-UNDP, 2015, p. 7). It is a strategy informed by situational crime prevention theories of
crime, the argument that crime is not evenly distributed across the geographic landscape. In like
manner, terrorism studies suggest that terrorism concentrates in certain areas. Per the Global
Terrorism Index (2014) for instance, 80% of terrorist attacks occurred in five countries including
Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Syria. Likewise, from 2007, 12% of al-Shabaab attacks
were against Kenyan hotspots (Jones, 2013).
The fact that these “hotspots” happen to be predominantly Muslim neighborhoods has
always presented a challenge to place-based counter-terrorism approach in Kenya. An example is
Eastleigh estate in Nairobi which is typically dominated by people of Somali origin. Nicknamed
“Little Mogadishu” (“Little Mogadishu | Hurst Publishers,” n.d.), law enforcement perceive
Eastleigh areas (Muslim Youth Centre (MYC)/ Pumwani Muslim Youth) as a hideout for illegal
immigrants (IPOA, 2014) and recruitment grounds of al-Shabaab members (UN Security
Council, 2011). While addressing Parliament in 2011, the late Assistant Minister for Internal
Security and Provincial Administration, Orwa Ojode maintained that " this [al-Shabaab] is a big
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animal with its head in Eastleigh, Nairobi and the tail in Somalia" (“Minister says Eastleigh the
next target in hunt for Al Shabaab militants :: Kenya - The Standard,” n.d.) .
Consequently, in May 2015, GK conducted a major crackdown dubbed “Operation Sanitization
of Eastleigh” or “Usalama Watch” (Safety Watch) in Eastleigh. The operation involving over
6,000 NPS officers was meant to flush out al-Shabaab adherents/aliens and search for weapons
and explosive, and deter terrorism (IPOA, 2014). As a result, 4,000 people were arrested during
the operation, 557 deported, and 730 sent back to refugee camps (Republic of Kenya-UNDP,
2015, p. 7).
Ironically, operations were extended to Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps that host
over 600,000 refugees (UNHCR, 2014). The Asman Kamama-led Parliamentary Committee on
National Security described Dadaab as a “nursery for terrorists” and “conducive for
radicalization/ recruitment” (MKAWALE, n.d.; NCTC, 2016; “report of the joint committee"
n.d.). In 2016, GK began plans to close Daadab, the world’s largest refugee camp after its 25
years of existence, amidst humanitarian concerns from the UN. Somalia government however
warned that ‘the move will make the threat of terrorism worse” (“Closing Dadaab refugee camp
will worsen terrorism, Somalia tells Kenya,” n.d.). The matter is yet to be resolved. The problem
with geographical-focused crackdowns is that, they evoke public criticisms that police are
violating civil liberties compared to offense-specific crackdowns (Sherman, 1990) In Eastleigh,
critics argued that police “antagonized a segment of the local community” (IPOA, 2014, p. 7)
used excessive measures (Republic of Kenya-UNDP, 2015, p. 7) and “targeted swoop operations
which are over-securitized and over-militarized” (Atta-Asamoah, 2015, p.13).
Interestingly, public perception about terrorism has equally evolved over time. Initially,
the August 7, 1998 attack was viewed as a “collateral damage” on Kenya in the war against
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terrorism between Al-Qaeda and either America or Israel (Republic of Kenya, 2013; Lind and
Howell, 2010; Whitaker, 2008; Barkan, 2004). Thus, America faced “resistance” from GK which
accused the Bush Administration of preoccupation with the GWOT at the expense of the
HIV/AIDS pandemic and criminality that had plagued Kenya (Whitaker, 2008; Krause and
Otenyo, 2005; Barkan, 2004). Until recently, Kenyan Government Officials equally dismissed
the involvement of Kenyans in extremist groups (Botha, 2014; Whitaker, 2008). In the aftermath
of the Mpeketoni attack for instance, the militants claimed responsibility for the attack (Lind,
Mutahi and Ooserom, 2015; Flood, 2014) but President Kenyatta maintained that it ‘was not an
al-Shabaab attack [rather] local political networks were involved in the planning and execution
of a heinous crime’ (Flood and Omar, 2014). Scholars too associated terrorism with SomaliaKenyans and al-Shabaab as a Somalia-based problem. Rosenau (2005) concluded that Kenya and
Tanzania were “unpromising grounds” for recruitment to global jihad. Taken into historical
context, such perceptions were sensible considering the relatively long-term political stability of
Kenya in a conflict-ridden East Africa. Not anymore. Today, there is a relative consensus that alShabaab insurgency is the source of terrorism in the country (Republic of Kenya, 2013).
Al-Shabaab or Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahideen (Cilliers, 2015; Menkhaus, 2014;
Republic of Kenya, 2013; “Al Shabaab in Somalia”, n.d.) means the “The Youth”. Al-Shabaab
was designated on March 18, 2008 by the US Secretary of State as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“Designation of alShabaab,” n.d.) ). It emerged around 2006 as a faction from the Islamic Union and the Islamic
Courts Union to establish a fundamentalist Islamic state in Somali (Gartenstein-Ross, 2009) and
the Horn of Africa (Calliers, 2015). Initially, it had tremendous support from the local Somali
clans that preferred its local administration to the otherwise corrupt and exploitative Somali
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warlords (“Al Shabaab in Somalia,” n.d.); Marchal, 2012). Between 2007 and 2008, it launched
armed conflict against an Ethiopian military occupation of southern Somalia (Menkaush, 2014)
thereby eliciting claims that it was a product of Ethiopian invasion. However, Stig Hansen
explains that al-Shabaab was organized prior to the Ethiopian invasion (“Al Shabaab in
Somalia,” n.d.). The UN Monitoring Group that reports on the implementation of multilateral
sanctions against Somalia and Eritrea equally reported that it has a military wing with a clear
chain of command, discipline and well-defined communication structures (UN Security Council,
2011).
This includes their secret police unit, Amniyat which is a major threat to AMISOM and
Somali government due to its intelligence capabilities (Menkhaus, 2014). Brutal and lethal, the
group is akin to the Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi led Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and Boko
Haram in Nigeria because they all provide a form of justice through strict Sharia laws (Zenn,
2014; Jones, 2013; Walker, 2012) including stoning of women accused of committing adultery.
They have thousands of fighters including FTFs, with al-Shabaab having over 14,000 in 2011
(Republic of Kenya, 2013), over 20, 000 fighters in ISIS (Barrett, 2014; UN Security Council,
2014), and over 15,000 in Boko Haram (Zenn, 2014). Harnisch (2010) said that about 100 young
graduate students from Britain joined al-Shabaab, while Jones (2013) found that FTFs in alShabaab mainly came from the U.S. between 2001 and 2010.
ISIS and al-Shabaab engage in “taxation” and extortion for their survival (Menkhaus,
2014; UN Security Council, 2011). Reports indicate that from 2012, over 4 million sacks of
charcoal valued at US$ 60 million were discovered in Kismayo and Barawe region suspected to
be belonging to the militia (Keatinge, 2014). In 2011, the group had annual revenue of $70-100
million (Keatinge, 2014) compared to the daily revenue from crude oil ranging from $846,000 to
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$ 1,645,000 for ISIS (UN Security Council, 2014). In Kenya, its franchise, the Al Hijra (Muslim
Youth Centre) is responsible for recruitment (Lind, Mutahi & Oosterom, 2015; Menkhaus,
2014). The franchise generates funds from its ownership of rental land (plots) in Majengo slum
and Gikomba Market near Eastleigh, and money from the Gulf African Bank owned by
Pumwani Riyadha Mosque Committee (UN Security Council, 2011).
With globalization, online networking for terrorist groups to enhance their radicalization
and recruitment has become easy (NCTC, 2016; Cilliers, 2015; Briggs and Feve, 2013;
Sageman, 2008; Silber and Bhatt, 2007) which presents another threat to Kenya. In fact, “Al
Shabaab in Somalia” (n.d.) indicates that Boko Haram and al-Shabaab are “somehow liaising
with each other” after 70 Boko Haram members received training in Somalia. From March 2015,
Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram’s leader pledged his group’s allegiance to ISIS (Cilliers, 2015, p.
18; Lind and Dowd, 2015). Rift Valley Institute reported that from 2010, Al Shabaab “leaders
harboured aspirations to establish a regional presence and recruit fighters from across countries
in eastern Africa who had an understanding of their respective countries’ vulnerabilities” (
(“Violent Extremism and Community Resilience | Rift Valley Institute,” n.d.)(“Violent
Extremism in Kenya | Rift Valley Institute,” n.d.) p.2). Notably, ISIS has not succeeded in
winning the support of the al-Qaeda affiliated al-Shabaab which has instead warned it to “back
off from East Africa” (“Al-Shabab wants IS to back off in East Africa - BBC News,” n.d.).
Arguably, this supremacy stalemate may soon be thing of the past.
Regardless, Al-Shabaab under the leadership of Ahmad Umar Abu Ubaidah (Ahmed
Diriye) has shown renewed “capabilities” (Menkhaus, 2014) including commando-style ambush
and sparing Muslims while killing Christians as was the case during Westgate and Marsabit bus
massacres (see “Al-Shabab massacres 28 Kenyan bus passengers”, 2014; Nairobi, 2014). Despite
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its internal power wrangles rising from their inter-clan feuds (Cilliers, 2015; Hansen, 2014), Al
Shabaab has transcended its predicted downfall by Somali President who observed that the death
of Godane in a U.S. strike on September 1, 2014 meant “Al-Shabaab was collapsing” ( “U.S.
confirms death of al Shabaab leader Godane in Somalia strike,” n.d.). Instead, the group remains
“both weaker and more dangerous” (Menkhaus, 2014), resilient (“Al Shabaab in Somalia,” n.d.),
lethal (Jones, 2013) and a serious threat to Kenya (NCTC, 2016; “U.N. report,” n.d.; “U.S.
confirms death of al Shabaab leader Godane in Somalia strike,” n.d.).
In summary, militarized CT are important will continue despite there being CVE
programs in Kenya (“Rehab for ex-combatants,” n.d.). However, military operation alone is not
sufficient for tackling al-Shabaab. CT operations may in fact increase the risk of VE activity,
undermine community resilience (Metre, 2016) or may be exploited by Al-Shabaab for further
recruitment. The African Union (2015) observation that “There are no easy solutions to a
guerrilla type asymmetrical warfare [but] a multipronged and multi-stakeholder approach” (p. 5)
is the entry point of the amnesty-driven CVE in Kenya. Likewise, the ICCT the Hague observed
that “rehabilitation and reintegration is a complex field and it is important to have a crossdisciplinary team involved” (“ICCT/UNICRI Conference on Rehabilitation and Reintegration:
Executive Summary and Good Practices Document now available online | ICCT,” n.d.)
Case Study: Amnesty and Reintegration Program
Amnesty, a pardon for political offenders by the government in lieu of criminal
prosecution is not a new phenomenon, but nonetheless rare in Kenya. In the 1950s during the
struggle for independence from the British Colonization, media reports indicated that
The [British] Government will offer the terrorists safety from prosecution for offenses
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carrying the death penalty if they surrender voluntarily to the security forces. These
offenses include membership in a Mau Mau gang, aiding the Mau Mau and illegal
possession of arms. Terrorists already wanted for, murder and other atrocities are still
liable for prosecution (British Hopes Rise for Peace in Kenya, 1953, para. 1).
Following the 2004 signing of the Nairobi Protocol on the Prevention, Control and
Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa,
and the 2005 Nairobi Protocol Best Practice Guidelines, GK extended amnesty to illicit firearm
holders in bandit prone areas as part of its Disarmament Operation. The aim of the operation was
to curb the proliferation of illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons flooding the country through
the porous borders and under policed Kenya-Somalia border (ISSAfrica.org, 2010. Result has
been the massive public destructions of illicit firearms such as the 8,000 firearms burned in 2007
(“Kenya burns illegal weapons haul”, 2007). Critics contend that the disarmament operation is
marred with human rights violations by national security agencies, which has hindered
involvement of the affected communities (Institute of Security Studies, 2010).
While Kenya previously extended amnesty to al Shabaab in 2011 after Operation Linda
Nchi began in Somalia, the launch of ARP in April 14, 2015 was puzzling. Put into context, the
amnesty was announced at a time when the country was yet to internalize the effects of the
deadly Garissa University College attack, and the Westgate Mall siege both of which led to
massive loss of innocent lives. However, the government was in a dilemma of how to deal with
the increasing numbers of returnees estimated to 1,500 already in the country. This led to the
radical decision to shift from hard-militarized CT including raids/crackdowns (see “Kenya police
find explosives in mosque raids | News | Al Jazeera,” n.d.; “Kenyan police arrest 109 at mosques,
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seize explosives,” n.d.; “Kenya police seize weapons in Mombasa mosques raid - BBC News,”
n.d.) to “soft” amnesty-driven CVE.
While announcing the ARP, General Nkaissery directed that ‘all who had gone to
Somalia for training and wished to disassociate with terrorism should report to the National
Government offices’ in Nairobi, Mombasa and Garissa (Ombati, 2015). He warned, ‘those who
fail to heed this call within the prescribed time frame will be treated as criminals and will face
the full force of the law’. In so doing, he urged parents or guardians with missing children, or
who suspect that their children have been radicalized or killed in Somalia to report to police. He
further warned, “Failure to report will lead to presumption that they are aware and condone or
are party to the terrorist training with attendant criminal consequences”. In response, the
National Council of Churches of Kenya argued that “Any blanket amnesty is ridiculous and an
affirmation that the Government is officially abetting terrorism," (Kibet, 2015), whiles some
Muslim leaders expressed their skepticism in the amnesty citing lack of an amnesty law.
ARP was offered to radicalized youth on condition that they voluntarily surrender to the
national security agencies including County Commissioners and Police, for purposes of
reintegration. In exchange for their surrender, youths are provided with training, psychological
counselling, and social services to assist them in their desistance from VE. The program is
implemented by the National Counter-Terrorism Centre, a multi-agency of the national security
forces which are pulling levers with non-state actors like donors and community/religious
leaders. To prevent recidivism and infiltration of the program by insincere returnees, NCTC
subjects returnees to a vetting process and continued monitoring before and after reintegration.
Reformed returnees are also provided with “reintegration kits” which includes items like sowing
machines to aid in the reintegration process. There is no amnesty law. GK estimates that close to
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300 returnees surrendered for the reintegration process. Due to lack of empirical study about it
that is publicly available, previous CVE research were reviewed to understand some of the
opportunities and challenges in CVE.
Previous Research on CVE
CVE has become a buzz word in terrorism studies over the last decade. It originates
within terrorism scholarship but lacks consensus in its definition. Terrorism itself lacks a
universal definition (Tilly, 2004; Ganor, 2002; Hmoud, 2006; Jackson, 2008; Schmid, 2012).
Definition of terrorism takes many dimensions including moral argument (Jackson, 2008),
normative argument (Tilly, 2004; Ganor, 2002; Ward, 2003), rational choice theory (Altran,
2012) and social bond theory (Sageman, 2008). In Kenya, the Prevention of Terrorism Act of
2012 does not define the term terrorism but rather defines a “terrorist act as,
an act or threat of action a) which involves the use of violence against person, endangers
the life of a person, other than the person committing the action, results in serious
damage to property, involves the use of firearms or explosives, prejudices national
security or public safety, and, b) which is carried out with the aim of intimidating or
causing fear amongst members of the public or a section of the public (p. 6-7).
Whether definition of terrorism is “impossible” (Jackson, 2008) or necessary remains
debatable. In agreement with Jackson (2008), the dissertation retained the term terrorism, to
reflect the definition in POTA. Elsewhere, Holmer defined CVE as “a realm of policy, programs,
interventions designed to prevent individuals from engaging in violence associated with radical
political, social, cultural, and religious ideologies and groups” (Holmer, 2013, p. 2). McCants
and Watts (2012) defined it as measures to “reduce the number of terrorist group supporters
through non-coercive means.” Both definitions reflect the purpose of ARP.
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As already aforementioned, CVE programs take a community-based and multistakeholder approach. The U.S. Department of State identifies four key areas of CVE
programming. They include capacity building of government and civil society to engage in CVE
plans, strengthening CVE efforts by local actors, enhancing the role of civil society in CVE
efforts, counter-messaging to change the narratives of radicalized youths, and addressing
radicalization through the criminal justice system through police-community engagement
(“Programs and Initiatives”, n.d.).
Evidently, CVE has expanded around the world, since 2003 when the UK Government
initiated its CVE strategy dubbed CONTEST. The aim of CONTEST was to deal with the Al
Qa’ida terrorism threats. CONTEST entailed four pillars namely; Prevent, Pursue, Protect and
Prepare. Prevent pillar matches ARP. Prevent which meant to “stop and prevent people from
becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism” (Carlile, 2011, p. 39). It had three objectives;
ideological challenge, supporting vulnerable people, and working with key sectors with risks of
radicalization (Carlile, 2011). Evaluators argued that it improved cooperation between police and
communities on security matters, despite criticisms that Prevent led to “greater mistrust of the
police” (Klausen, 2009), greater marginalization of Muslim communities (Awan, 2012), and
labelling/spying of Muslims as ‘suspect communities’ (Choudhury and Fenwick, 2011) or
susceptible to terrorist involvement (Thomas, 2010). Notably, Prevent was reviewed in 2011 but
found no evidence of spying Muslims (Denoeux and Carter, 2009). Reviewers however
cautioned “Prevent is not a police program and it must not become one” (Carlile, 2011, p. 10).
The U.S. CVE strategy - Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism- was
initiated in 2011. Like Prevent, it took a community-based approach. It aims at “preventing
violent extremists and their supporters from inspiring, radicalizing, financing, or recruiting
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individuals or groups in the U.S. to commit acts of violence” (“Empowering Local Partners to
Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States | Homeland Security,” n.d., p. 3). U.S. Strategy
focuses on three key areas; 1) “enhancing federal engagement with and support to local
communities that may be targeted by VE” 2) capacity building for law enforcement through
continuous research on VE, and 3) countering VE propaganda while promoting the American
ideals (p. 6). Experts however suggest that the U.S. government to stop the focus on vulnerable
populations, reduce sympathy for terrorist organizations to reduce support, offer amnesty for
criminals, and that CVE should be implemented by one lead agency (McCants &Watts, 2012).
France however rejected collaborating with Muslim communities in CT and continued with
arrests and extradition (Klausen, 2008). Romaniuk (2015) found that Burkina Faso is vulnerable
to VE though the threat was not looming due to their resilience. He stressed the need to “avoid
stigmatizing communities, send clear messages about what CVE is, and [foster] relationships
between government agencies and civil society groups” (p. 17-19).
CVE garnered increasing attention in Kenya since 2011. The USAID Office of Transition
Initiatives (OTI)’s Kenya Transition Initiative (KTI) was a pilot CVE program launched between
2011 and 2013 in Eastleigh and later, to Lamu, Kilifi, Kwale, Malindi and Mombasa (Khalil &
Zeuthen, 2014). Individuals and groups that participated in the program received small grants to
support activities like counselling for post-traumatic stress disorder. Critics however felt that
America was interfering with religious affairs after U.S. engaged in pedagogical training for
madrasas (Khalil & Zeuthen, 2014).
Reviewers noted “some grants failed to access the most vulnerable” (p. 41). They
reiterated that the program would have benefited from a more comprehensive understanding of
VE in the local context. Zeuthen (2015) examined Strengthening Resilience to Violent
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Extremism Horn of Africa programme (STRIVE HoA), a pilot CVE project implemented in
Nairobi by Royal United Services Institute from January 2014-January 2017 (also see Union,
2016). It focused on four key areas; capacity building for law enforcement, strengthening
capacity of women in CVE, role of Diaspora Somalis, and increasing the understanding of the
drivers of radicalization among youth in Kenya (Zeuthen, 2015). Results showed that all youths
are vulnerable to extremism. The sample however was bias as it focused on women leaders and
excluded women that were directly affected by the violence.
Lessons from Amnesty-Driven CVEs
As aforementioned, there is scarcity of empirical evidence about ARP but lessons from
other countries with similar CVE programs were reviewed to inform the author (“Lessons from
other countries | The Star, Kenya,” n.d.). In the 1990s, Uganda granted public demand for an
amnesty for Joseph Kony and his Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) (“Undermining the LRA,”
2012). LRA rebels have ruled Northern Uganda for over twenty years. The amnesty was meant
to facilitate national reconciliation and cohesion.
It was legislated in Uganda Amnesty Act of 2000, and implemented by the Uganda
Amnesty Commission. It focused on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. It
required the rebels (reporters or returnees) to renounce the insurgency by downing their arms,
and surrendering to the army or police voluntarily (Ssenyonjo, 2005). Approximately 20,000
reporters surrendered, and received reinsertion kits to aid in their reintegration (Ssenyonjo,
2005). In May 2012, the government eliminated the wholesale amnesty through a legal
amendment (“Undermining the LRA,” 2012; Agger, 2012). Ssenyonjo (2005) observes that
LRA members deserved amnesty because they were children at the time they were coerced or
kidnapped into joining LRA. Interestingly, the public demanded for the amnesty but that did not
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prevent returnees from facing stigmatization upon reintegration (Fleming, 2006). Notably, none
of the top five LRA commanders surrendered.
In 2014, Somalia Government initially offered Al-Shabaab terrorists 45 days’ amnesty to
surrender to enhance peace and reconciliation process (“Somalia offers al-Shabab members
amnesty,” 2014); (“Somalia offers amnesty to al-Shabab fighters - Al Jazeera English,” n.d.) ).
Somalia President Sheikh Mohamud explained that defectors undergo a process of ‘monitoring
by Somali security forces to prevent recidivism (Billow and Joseph, 2015). Observers however,
felt that the screening process was weak, and that Al-Shabaab were taking advantage to infiltrate
the security forces (“Giving Extremists a Second Chance | Inter Press Service,” n.d.).
After initially failed attempts to grant amnesty to Boko Haram militants, Nigerian
government in 2011 set up the Presidential Committee which proposed amnesty to members of
Boko Haram willing to surrender and a comprehensive socio-economic strategy to address
people’s needs (ISSAfrica.org, 2011). Critics however were skeptical that it would not succeed
due to the radical views of Boko Haram. Likewise, former Nigerian President Jonathan
Goodluck observed that the amnesty for the Niger Delta militants was poorly timed and
repentant militants continued to surrender beyond the deadline, nearly rendering the program
endless (“President Jonathan On Two-Day Working Visit to Borno, Yobe States, Rules Out
Amnesty for Terrorists,” n.d.).
Most recently in 2016, the Colombian Government extended amnesty to the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) rebels to end the rebellion that dates to the
1960s, and has claimed over 260,000 lives (“Colombia signs peace deal with FARC - CNN,”
n.d.; Casey, 2016). The amnesty exempts FARC guerrilla rebels accused of minor crimes who
surrender from prosecution. The initial peace deal was rejected in a popular vote in October 2,
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2016 by those who viewed it as lenient before it was ratified by Congress on 1 December
(“Colombia,” n.d.). The new deal is based on transitional justice requiring FARC members to
declare and return their assets for compensation of their victims. The deal is not enshrined in the
Colombia's Constitution.
In brief, CVE is context-specific (Romaniuk, 2015; European Commission, 2015; Khalil
& Zeuthen, 2014; Holmer, 2013) but we do not know whether they work or don’t work
(Romaniuk, 2015). While CVE is a community-based strategy, application of community
policing strategy to CVE has not always translated into winning hearts and minds of
communities to collaborate with security agencies in CVE due to mistrust. Instead, the exclusive
implementation of CVE in Muslim dominated communities creates the impression that Muslims
are discriminatively targeted as the potential terrorists. Amnesty-driven CVEs are subject to key
challenges including the risk of infiltration by insincere returnees, mistrust among stakeholders,
risk of recidivism, insecurity of returnees which directly influence the extent to which police
may support CVE programs.
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CHAPTER THREE
Conceptual Framework
Conceptual framework helps the researcher to figure out what and why could be going on
in the intended study. As Maxwell (2013) puts it, it is “a tentative theory of the phenomena that
you are investigating” (p. 39). Maxwell (2013) suggests four ways to construct a conceptual
framework: your experiential knowledge, existing theory and research, your pilot and
exploratory research; and thought experiments. The study did not test any criminological theory.
Instead, process evaluation utilized FD framework as a lens for assessing theoretical similarities
between FD and ARP. Also included were theoretical explanations of radicalization and police
perception studies to understand some of the challenges of CVE.
Theoretical Explanations of Radicalization and Disengagement
After 9/11, terrorism scholars began to shift focus from “causes of terrorism” to
radicalization process, a concept defined as “change in beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in
directions that increasingly justify intergroup violence” (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, p.
428). Though not criminal, radicalization is a precursor to VE participation (Berger, 2016).
Radicalization within al-Shabaab has changed substantially from targeting ethnic Somali
community, to rendering all youths from marginalized parts of Kenya vulnerable to
radicalization (Patterson, 2015; Botha, 2014; UN Security Council, 2011).
National Television (NTV) Kenya, found that the militia is “aggressively recruiting and
the criteria had since expanded from young Somalis and Arabs to just about anyone who was
committed to the cause -- from any background” (“How al Shabaab recruitment agents lure
Kenyans - Daily Nation,” n.d.) Indeed, most of the terrorist attacks in Kenya including Westgate
were perpetrated by ethnic Kenyans (GK & UNDP, 2015; Patterson, 2015; Menkhaus, 2014).
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Precisely, Kenya’s Military spokesman, Major Emmanuel Chirchir, confirmed via Twitter that
the Westgate attackers were “Abu Baara al-Sudani, Omar Nabhan, Khattab al-Kene and Umayr”
(“Al-Shabab’s Capabilities Post-Westgate,” 2014; “Four Kenya attack suspects named,” n.d.). In
October 2011, Elgiva Bwire Oliacha, a native Muslim Kenyan and a member of al-Shabaab also
killed six people in Nairobi. The UN reported that Kenyans “constitute the largest and most
structurally organized non-Somali group within Al-Shabaab” (UN Security Council, 2011, p.
24). In this regard, Botha and Abdile (2014) argues Kenya should “move away from the
perception that only Somalis and Somali-Kenyans are involved with al-Shabaab” (p. 16).
Explanations or drivers for radicalization process include push and pull factors.
The USAID Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism describes “push factors” as those
characteristics of the societal environment that allegedly help thrust vulnerable individuals onto
the path of violence) (USAID, 2009, p. 9). USAID identified repressive regimes with records of
gross violations of human rights, and poorly governed or ungoverned borders, and denial of basic
political rights as some of the push factors to VE. USAID also explains that “pull factors may be
financial such as the “many and diverse rewards which membership in a group or movement, and
participation in its activities, may confer” (p. 9).
McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) presented twelve mechanisms of radicalization
process but concluded that there is no single pathway to the process. Marc Sageman in
Leaderless Jihad, coined the “bunch of guys theory” to argue that today’s global salafis are
formed via the web. The web offers a platform for radicalization due to loose-knit social bonds
found in kinships and friendship (Sageman, 2008). It is his argument that social bonds usually
precede any ideological commitment. Critiques however contend that that his data that expanded
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from 172 jihadists to 500 profiles is “vaguely identified” (Hoffman, 2008) and lack a control
group (Kundnani, 2012).
Like Sageman, a New York Police Department (NYPD) study concluded that jihadiSalafi ideology is the key driver of radicalization in the West. Frustrated individuals “seek other
like-minded individuals and form a loose-knit group or social network” (Silber and Bhatt, p.16).
NYPD identified four stages of radicalization beginning with “pre-radicalization”. Next is “selfidentification” where they begin to explore Salafi Islam and associate themselves with likeminded individuals”. Third is “indoctrination” phase when an “individual progressively
intensifies his beliefs and wholly adopts jihadi-Salafi ideology”. The final state is “jihadization”
phase in which the “members accept their individual duty to participate in jihad” (Silber & Bhatt,
p. 6). NYPD posits that one must complete the four phases to engage in the planning or
implementation of a terrorist act. While the authors argue that these stages can predict
radicalization, others maintain that predictability is not possible (Denoeux and Carter, 2009;
Holmer, 2013).
A 2016 report by the National Institute for Justice comparing 119 lone-wolf terrorists/
lone actors with other kinds of mass murderers for example found no profile of lone-actor
terrorists (“Video Transcript,” n.d.). Instead, results revealed a wide ideological diversity among
the group namely, religious lone wolves, extreme right-wing lone wolves who are antigovernment, and single-issue terrorists. In 2017, UNDP Africa examined root causes of
extremism in Africa based on 350 interviews with former violent extremists in African countries
including Kenya (Yahya, 2017). Preliminary results suggest that extremist groups tailor their
message for potential recruits owing to their vulnerability for example, job offers for the poor
(Yahya, 2017).
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Many scholars agree that key drivers to radicalization and VE in Kenya are salafi
ideology, marginalization, youth unemployment, and porous Kenyan-Somali Border (NCTC,
2016; Villa-Vicencio et al., 2016; Metre, 2016; UNDP Kenya, 2015; Menkhaus, 2015; Patterson,
2015; Khalil & Zeuthen, 2014; KNCHR, 2014; Republic of Kenya, 2013; Ranstorp and
Hyllengren, 2013; Barkan, 2004). Patterson (2015) explained that unemployment pushed many
Muslims to Saudi Arabia in the 1970s and 80s during the oil boom. They later returned with
stricter (‘pure’) interpretations of Islam that conflicted with the Islamic faith in Kenya (Patterson,
2005) which they in turn transmitted to the youth in mosques and madrassas (Villa-Vicencio,
Buchanan-Clarke and Humphrey, 2016).
In her fieldwork in East Africa, Anneli Botha interviewed 238 members of four militant
and terrorist groups (al-Shabaab, the Mombasa Republican Council, the Allied Democratic
Forces and the Lord’s Resistance Army) as well as 47 close family members to generate their
biographical profiles (Schmid, 2015). Her point of departure was the question of one mother why
one of her sons became a policeman and the other a terrorist. Her variables included primary
(family, friends, school) and secondary (e.g. media) socialization agents and their influence on
the development of radicalisation in Uganda and Kenya. She argued that “those who joined
militant organisations had lost trust in the fairness of the political system and had often
experienced at close quarters instances of indiscriminate repression (mass arrests, torture) from
the security forces” (Schmid, 2015).
Notably, in 2008, Kenya had over two million youths (individuals aged between 18 to
less than 35) without formal jobs thereby increasing vulnerability of youths to radicalization and
recruitment (KNCHR, 2014; Waki Report, 2008). Of course, “correlations between structural
development factors like high unemployment and terrorism are unclear” (Berger, 2016). It is also
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factual that poverty does not cause terrorism because there are many poor people who never
resort to violence (Metre, 2016; Khalil & Zeuthen, 2014; Venhaus, 2010). Instead, terrorists such
as the cyberjihadist Younis Tsouli, the son of a Moroccan diplomat in London had middle-class
backgrounds (Denoeux and Carter, 2009; Sageman, 2008).
Marginalization has been blamed for the emergence of Mombasa Republican Council
(MRC), a radical group that has been agitating for the secession of Coast from Kenya under the
slogan, “Pwani Si Kenya” (Coast is not Kenya) (Willis and Chome, 2014). In 2013, they
threatened to disrupt the general elections citing their historical grievances over access to land
and employment (Willis & Gona, 2013). Lind & Dowd (2015) observed that despite there being
no link between MRC and Al-Shabaab, historical under-development has rendered the region
conducive to the spread of violence. Donors have equally reiterated that GK should address
inequality such as difficulty to obtain national identity cards, land issues, and marginalization
(European Commission, 2015; UNDP, 2016; (“SUPKEM Countering Violent Extremism
Workshop,” 2016) in its effort to address VE.
Considering that, not all terrorists remain engaged to terrorist organizations for life, CVE
interventions such as ARP target individual terrorists who might chose to walk away from the
militant groups. Criminologists are familiar with rational choice theory, the argument that
offenders are rational thinkers capable of weighing the cost-benefits of their criminal behavior
(Jacobs, 2010; Stafford & Warr, 1993). In like manner, proponents of disengagement programs
assume that individual terrorists can reach a turning point in their violent life when they
rationally weigh the merits versus demerits of their continued involvement in VE and may
choose to disengage “leave a terrorist organization” when they are provided with better
alternative means to life. However, leaving terrorism does not always mean that the person is
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‘deradicalized’ (Horgan, 2014; Horgan and Braddock, 2010). This opportunity to drift between
VE and non-VE behavior presents a challenge to ARP due to possibility of being infiltrated by
insincere returnees.
As Horgan & Altier (2012) observed, physical or psychological disengagement from
terrorism can be either voluntary or involuntary, but we do not know how many terrorists
disengage because of being apprehended, and how many volunteer for help. They argued,
“repentant and voluntary disengaged terrorist” can help counter VE by reducing the attraction of
new terrorists (p. 84). There are “push” and “pull” factors to disengagement but there is no single
cause of disengagement (Altier, 2017; Horgan et al., 2016; Horgan, 2008). In this regard, Horgan
(2008) noted that individual disengagement from terrorism may be the result of an individual or
collective process (or combination of both). Disengagement is sometimes attributed to
experiences including role change and attitudinal shift (p. 5). Altier (2017) also asserted that
disillusionment, disagreements within the group, dissatisfaction with one’s role, and burnout are
common drivers to disengagement.
According to Horgan (2008), individuals can disengage voluntarily when they no longer
find value to continue being a member of terrorist group, or involuntarily like when an individual
is forced to leave due to external pressure such as the reality of decommissioning or some new
legislative initiative (p. 5). Elsewhere, Barrelle has coined the term “natural disengagement” to
argue that most extremists naturally and successfully, without any help, disengage from
extremism albeit their struggles with transition back to society. Barrelle argues that sustained
disengagement is dependent on how well the person engages with the society afterwards.
(Barrelle, 2014).
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Notably, many Kenyan youths were falsely lured to join Al Shabaab by financial
promises as much as 40,000 Kenyan Shillings (400 USD) per month (Amble and MeleagrouHitchens, 2014). The result is the return of at least 700 returnees in Kenya. The International
Center for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence (ICSR) established, that either they
mainly defected due to disillusionment as the money they were promised, was in vain or alShabaab teachings contradicted Islamic beliefs (“ICSR Insight - Al-Shabaab,” 2012). In short,
definition of radicalization itself is problematic or “a source of confusion” as Sedgwick (2010)
puts it. Whether radicalization differs for women and men, or whether it can be predicted is also
contentious. Radicalization is however context-specific.
Police Perceptions Perspectives
CVE programs are ambitious and expanding tremendously around the world. Despite
there being no conclusive evidence about their effectiveness, many governments have adopted
CVE. Of course, the donor contribution to CVE interventions is significant, and that raises
concern as to whether countries including Kenya, are embracing CVE due to donor pressure
(“Programs and Initiatives”, n.d.; “BRICS_Calls_for_Concepts_-__OCT2016.pdf,” n.d.;
“BRICS East Africa - Project Proposal - March 2016.pdf,” n.d.; Union, 2016). The US
Department of State for instance endeavors to “strengthen the capabilities of government and
non-governmental actors to …promote the rehabilitation and reintegration of individuals caught
in the cycle of radicalization to violence” (“Programs and Initiatives”, n.d). Thus, there is need to
understand perception of police officers on various aspects of CVE is critical. Understanding
police perception about CVE programs is important because they are key players in
implementation of CVE. Arguably, if police do not like CVE, then CVE won’t work.
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Considering police subculture, officers can be resistant, suspicious and skeptical towards
organizational changes such as CVE interventions (Skogan, 2008).
Lurigio and Skogan (1994) assessed perceptions of police officers regarding community
policing (CP) in Chicago Police Department (CPD). They measured perception before and after
the implementation of Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) in 1993. They measured
perception in terms of officers’ job satisfaction, their relationships with peers and supervisors,
and their opinions regarding CP (Lurigio & Skogan, 1994). Surveys were handed to the
participants during training sessions. On top of each survey, was a letter from CPD’s
Superintendent stating his support for the evaluation and reassuring officers of the confidentiality
of their responses. They argued “the success of community policing depends on the police
officers who are responsible for implementing the programs. Their attitudes, perceptions, and
behaviors, must be substantially changed before [CP] can be put into practice (p. 315).
Elsewhere, Stewart and Morris (2009) surveyed 208 Texas Police Chiefs about their
perceptions of Homeland Security as the dominant police strategy, and the factors that influence
those perceptions. The primary source of data involved self-administered surveys of police chiefs
attending the Texas Police Chief Leadership Series (TPCLS) and the New Chief Development
Program (NCDP). Police perception was measured as risk, preparedness, agency type, and
agency size, based on 4-point Likert scale. They found that Chiefs of very small departments are
more likely to report homeland security as their dominant strategy compared to chiefs of larger
departments. The present study replicated their measure of perception. While their study
incorporated one cadre (police chiefs), the dissertation improved on it by incorporating five
police ranks and two designations of Kenya Police (specialized units/Formations and General
Duty).
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Elsewhere, Poteyeva and Sun (2009) reviewed 33 studies that examined police attitudes
from 1990-2006. Most of the studies showed no gender difference in attitudes toward various
police practices such as community policing, arrest or use of force. They argued that
“occupational socialization is more powerful in molding officers’ traits and attitudes than gender
predisposition” (Poteyeva & Sun, 2009). Their review included multivariate regression analyses
but no qualitative study. The present study has thus incorporated both qualitative and quantitative
studies.
Most recently, Sytsma and Piza (2017) surveyed 178 Toronto Police Officers. They
compared a specialized community-oriented policing (COP) unit to a reactive unit on officer
perceptions of public contact and officer perceptions of job performance. They also compared
bicycle patrol officers to motor vehicle patrol officers within these units. Findings suggest that
“officers within a COP unit” and are more likely to rate higher on perceptions of performing job
duties in a procedurally just manner compared to the reactive unit. They stressed the importance
of upper management communicating the benefits of community driven policing to rank-and-file
police officers delivering these services. Methodologically, they used purposive sample that
hindered generalizability of their findings. The dissertation improved on this by using a
probability sample.
Focused Deterrence Technique
Deterrence theory posits that for punishment to be effective, it must be “swift, severe, and
certain” (Beccaria, 2009; Stafford and Warr, 1993). Deterrence (whether specific or general)
presumes that crime is a choice and offenders are rational people capable of weighing the costbenefits of their criminal behavior (Jacobs, 2010; Stafford & Warr, 1993). FD/pulling levers
strategy thus seeks to maximize the effect of deterrence theory by directly tailoring the message
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to a relatively small group of chronic offenders and ensuring punishment swiftness and certainty
(Braga & Weisburd, 2012). FD involves directly communicating incentives and disincentives to
the targeted offenders (Braga, Apel &Welsh, 2013).
David Kennedy in Police Innovations explains that pulling levers “strategies deploy
enforcement, services, the moral voice of communities, and deliberate communication in order to
create a powerful deterrent to particular behavior by particular offenders” (Kennedy, 2006, p.
156). Implementers of FD directly and clearly warn targeted offenders that violence will no
longer be tolerated. Offenders are offered new standards of behavior that they must comply with
failure of which they are assured of swift and certain action involving criminal justice system
agents. FD thus involves combining both hard and soft language from security agencies to
criminal offenders (Braga & Weisburd, 2012, p. 7).
FD strategies have been applied to high-risk offenders, especially street gangs and overt
drug markets in America (Braga & Weisburd, 2012, p. 21). It was first applied to the Boston Gun
Project initiated in 1996 to address gun violence in Boston (Braga, Kennedy, Piehl and Waring,
2001). This was a joint effort of criminal justice agents and Harvard University researchers. It
was based on Problem-Oriented Policing utilizing the SARA Model (scanning, analysis,
response, and assessment) and pulling levers strategy involving probation, police officers,
streetworkers, clergy, and community-based organizations (Braga et al., 2001, p. 2). The Gun
Project initiated the Operation Ceasefire which implemented the Project. Police sent direct
message warning the targeted offenders during call-in meetings or fora, that violence will no
longer be tolerated, and that those who violate the law, will be dealt swiftly by the criminal
justice agents all pulling levers. Results showed that the project led to significant reductions in
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youth victimization, 32% decrease in shots-fired calls for service per month, and 25% decrease
in gun assault incidents in Boston (Braga et al., 2001).
FD relates to Cure Violence Health Model, a strategy that treats violence as a contagious
health problem that can be treated. Cure Models like the Chicago-CeaseFire or Peace TXT
project in Nairobi Kenya, are based on three elements: 1) detect and distrupt potentially violent
conflicts; 2) identify and treat highest risk for involvement in violence; and 3) mobilize the
community to change norms (“Essential Elements | Cure Violence,” n.d.; “PeaceTXT: Cure
Violence Collaboration in Kenya,” n.d.; “Kenya covers up military massacre - CNN,” n.d.).
Although proponents argued that TXT project was associated with low election violence in the
Kariobangi slums during the 2013 general elections, the 2013 elections were peaceful
countrywide. These models inherently suffer from lack of involvement from faith-based
community organizations and community embeddedness” (Butts, Roman, Bostwick and Porter,
2015, p. 45).
In summary, ARP and FD differ in their implementation process but share key theoretical
similarities. It is the social service aspect part of FD that relates to ARP. RAND researchers
evaluated FD interventions using linear logic model to exam inputs (implementation processes,
context and environment, and costs) and their relationship with short-term outputs, such as
fidelity to the model, program implementation, engagement and support of the community
(Saunders, Ober, Kilmer, and Greathouse, 2016, p.2). They concluded that without commitment
from leadership within the local law enforcement department and the prosecutor’s office, it may
not be possible to implement FD interventions (Saunders et al., 2016). Notably, little is known
about application of FD to other crimes or settings, a gap that this dissertation has partly filled by
examining similarities between FD and ARP.
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CHAPTER FOUR
METHODOLOGY
The study site for the dissertation was Kenya and John Jay College for purposes of data
collection and storage respectively. There were three scientific and ethical justifications for
conducting this study in a foreign setting per CUNY research standards. First, the author is a
Senior Superintendent of Police in the Kenya Police Service, a position that leveraged her access
to rich data sources for the analysis, besides her knowledge of the local regulations of the NPS
and Kenya (Appendix E). In March 2017, she passed the Collaborative Institutional Training
Initiative (CITI) regarding protection of human subjects in research (Appendix K). As a PhD
student, with a Master of Science in Criminology from the University of Pennsylvania (Penn),
she had adequate training in research methods. Besides, she attended a qualitative data analysis
workshop on the use of Atlas.ti, at the Graduate Center in May 2017. Moreover, Mr. Eric
Kiraithe, who was part of the author’s supervisory committee, is an Assistant Inspector General
at NPS and audited the dissertation to ensure confirmability of data. The structure for the
dissertation included both qualitative and quantitative data.
Qualitative Study Design
This was an exploratory case study of the ARP. A case study is a “research strategy in
which the researcher’s attention centers on an in-depth examination of one or a few cases on
many dimensions” (Maxfield & Babbie, 2011, p. 447). The “investigator explores a bounded
system (a case) or cases over time through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple
sources of information (e.g. interviews, documents and reports) and reports a case description
and case-based themes” (Creswell, 2006, p. 73). The term case study was used “not as a
methodological choice but a choice of what is to be studied” in this case, ARP as a single case
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(Stake, 2005). Case study is “noninterventive [as] “we try not to disturb the ordinary activity of
the case, not to test, nor even to interview, if we can get the information we want by observation
or examination of records” (Stake, 1995, p. 12). Considering the sensitivity of ARP, the author
neither sought identifying information about the returnees nor interviewed returnees. Although
Sageman (2008) contends that literature on terrorism over relies on narrowly exploratory case
studies and government sources, government remains the most reliable source of terrorism data
in Kenya.
The qualitative research question asked, what does the Amnesty and Reintegration
Program in Kenya entail? The objective was to conduct a process evaluation to understand the
motivations for instituting ARP, level of “program integrity” on the ground, and see if it shares
patterns with FD framework. Notably, a process evaluation helps in establishing “whether the
program is implemented in a way which ensures that the mechanism is able to operate” (Butts,
2011, p. 6; also see Chapman & Hough, 1998). Process evaluation framework was the lens used
to assess the ongoing process of Kenya's move from hard to “soft” power using the amnesty
policy as a case study. In other words, if FD is the mechanism that makes it work, how does the
on-the-ground implementation of ARP measure up to the CVE model for Kenya, and what
barriers stand in the way of its broader acceptance by the police doing the work?
Therefore, program integrity was reported if ARP was delivered as intended in theory and
design using National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism as the process evaluation
framework/model (NCTC, 2016). To assess if there was program integrity therefore, the model
was coded into five themes namely problem identification, pulling levers, conducting research,
reintegration services, communication. In details, the national CVE plan requires that the
government develop a legislative and policy framework covering returnees (problem
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identification), launch a national Disengagement and Reintegration initiative, and monitor
returnees to ensure that violent extremists do not penetrate the initiative (conducting research).
Moreover, there should be coordination of training and capacity building at the local level by
partner GK agencies (pulling levers). There must be psychological support and counselling
programmes put in place to support returnees and their families (reintegration services). Further,
the government must ensure that there is effective information sharing between government
agencies about status of returnees (communication) and set up a training clearinghouse at the
NCTC for security and GK agencies engaged in CT and CVE (Model 1).
Table 1: Process Evaluation Models
MODEL 1: KENYA’S NATIONAL CVE PLAN
(NCTC, 2016)
•
•

•
•
•
•

Develop a legislative and policy framework
covering returnees.
Launch a national Disengagement and
Reintegration initiative and monitoring to
ensure that this initiative is not penetrated by
violent extremists.
Coordination of training and capacity building
at the local level by partner GK agencies.
Psychological support and counselling
programmes to returnees and their families.
Effective information sharing between
government agencies about status of returnees.
A training clearinghouse at the NCTC for
security and GK agencies engaged in CT and
CVE.

•
•
•
•

•
•

MODEL 2: FOCUSED DETERRENCE
FRAMEWORK
(Kennedy, 2006, p. 156).
Selection of a particular crime problem
Pulling together an interagency enforcement group
(police, probation, parole, state and federal
prosecutors
Conducting research by police officers to identify
key offenders.
Framing of a special enforcement operation
directed at those offenders and groups of
offenders….using any and all legal tools (or
levers) to sanction groups.
Matching of enforcement operations with parallel
efforts to direct services and the moral voices of
the affected communities
Communicating directly and repeatedly with
offenders and groups to let them know that they
are under particular scrutiny, and what they can do
to avoid enforcement action

In addition, theoretical similarities between ARP and FD was assessed using FD
framework provided by Kennedy (2006). The dissertation thus coded the framework into five the
themes (problem identification, conducting research, pulling levers, reintegration services, and
communication). Precisely, Kennedy describes FD framework that begins with the selection of a
particular crime problem (coded as “problem identification”), followed by convening an
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interagency working group of law enforcement practitioners, who then conduct research to
identify chronic offenders or groups of offenders (“conducting research”). Then, they frame a
response to offenders and groups of offenders using all available tools for sanctions (“pulling
levers”) to stop their continued engagement in violent behavior. After this, you focus social
services and community resources on targeted offenders and groups to match law enforcement
prevention efforts (“reintegration services”). Finally, implementers must directly and repeatedly
communicate with the offenders so that they may understand why they are receiving this special
attending and the consequences if their subsequent behavior or misbehavior (“communication”)
(p. 156).
Process evaluation was achieved through content analysis, which is the systematic study
of messages and their meanings (see Graneheim & Lundman, 2003). Content analysis is
appropriate for answering what, to whom, why, how, which formed the bulk of this study. It also
reduces data, is systematic, and very flexible because it is applicable to qualitative, quantitative
or mixed-methods studies or used in inductive and deductive analysis (Carley 1993). A previous
study that used content analysis in police studies include Maguire, Uchida and Hassell (2010)
that analyzed 753 police cases reports. They coded the cases/content into six measures of
Problem-Oriented Policing (POP): the scope and the type of the problem, how it was nominated,
how it was resolved, what agencies were involved, and how closely the officers followed the
SARA process (p. 76).
Overall, qualitative research helps in “understanding the process by which events and
actions take place” (Maxwell, 2013, p.30) or “exploring new issues, and investigating hard-tostudy groups” in this case, security agents (Bachman & Schutt, 2011, p. 300). Jenkins (2015)
suggests that “qualitative methods can improve the external validity of police research findings
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and enhance the research relationships of police academics and practitioners” (p. 502).
Importantly, qualitative research can “integrate quantitative survey data to offer a holistic
understanding of the phenomenon being studied” (Baster & Jack, 2008). Figure 2 is an
interactive model showing the qualitative research design for the dissertation (Maxwell, 2013).
Figure 2: Interactive Qualitative Research Design

•
•
•

GOALS
Process evaluation of
terrorism Amnesty and
Reintegration Program
To determine program
integrity
To determine theoretical
similarities of amnesty
program and focused
deterrence technique

•
•
•

CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORK
Own background in
policing
Literature on previous
amnesty-driven CVEs
Focused deterrence
technique/pulling
levers strategy

RESEARCH QUESTION
What does the amnesty and
reintegration program in Kenya
entail?

•
•
•
•
•

METHODS
Survey, open-ended
questionnaires
Content analysis (Media
content and government
documents)
Qualitative research
Inductive & iterative
analysis
Thematic coding

•
•
•
•
•

VALIDITY
Triangulation of
sources, methods
Member checks
Researcher Bias
Auditing
Confirmability

The two sources of qualitative data were Content analysis and “NCTC Sample” Survey.
Data collection for the documents to be used in the content analysis began in 2016. Precisely,
From December 21, 2016 to January 9, 2017, the researcher visited Kenya on a trip funded by
Dr. James Fyfe Fellowship to facilitate preliminary data collection of official GK documents on
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ARP, and gain insight into the program. It had become impossible to discuss details of the
amnesty program via phone due to the sensitivity of terrorism making the trip necessary. During
the visit, the author learnt that contrary to the previous claims that Anti-Terrorist Police Unit
(ATPU) implemented ARP, NCTC was the implementer. As a result, it became clear that
obtaining primary documents from NCTC would be difficult which led to the decision to
incorporate newspapers.
These included online newspapers from the Standard Digital, The Star, Daily Nation,
AllAfrica, Aljazeera, Capital Blog, and Strategic Intelligence Service. In addition, GK document
were retrieved from its ministerial websites namely the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of
National Government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Kenya News Agency. The rest of the data
were collected from websites of foreign embassies and agencies that have some working
relationship with GK. These included United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Kenya,
International Centre for Counter-terrorism (ICCT)-The Hague, U.S. Department of State, U.S.
Embassy Nairobi, BRICS East Africa, Center for Human Rights and Policy Studies (CHRIPS),
European Commission, Catham House, and Rift Valley Institute.
The leading search engine was Google. A few primary documents came from the Kenya
Police. Besides, a journalist (Dominic Wabala) from The Star newspaper was surveyed due to his
familiarity with ARP based on his previous interview with the NCTC Director, Ambassador
Julius Kimani (“The war against terror will define our generation - Kimani | The Star, Kenya,”
n.d.). He completed an open-ended questionnaire, which later became part of the Primary
Documents. Although Wabala completed a non-signature consent form to ensure his anonymity,
he later permitted the author via WhatsApp text to acknowledge him by name in the dissertation.
Key search words for the online documents included terrorist amnesty Kenya, Nkaissery
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amnesty, Karanja Kibicho amnesty, Al-shabaab reintegration, al Shabaab returnees, CVE
Conference Kenya, rehabilitating terrorists Kenya, foreign fighters Kenya. The advantage of data
from agency records is that they do not require direct interaction with research subjects and are
useful in exploratory studies (Maxfiled & Babbie, 2011). Although internet makes data
collection from open sources easy (Parkin and Green, 2016), data collection process for the
Media Content was time consuming as it involved the “copy and paste” of each article with their
respective references prior to saving on the computer. The data collected were in text format
such as articles, interviews or reports. However, all Word documents were all “Saved As” Rich
Text Format to be compatible with Atlas.ti. While there was no capping on the numbers, 150
documents (n=150) were analyzed.
The second source of data was an in-depth survey of security personnel from the National
Counter-terrorism Centre (NCTC) who are familiar with the program, and Gazetted Officers
from KPS. This became the “NCTC Sample”. This was selected through convenience sampling
because it was a hard-to-reach group. As Maxwell (2013) suggests, “selection decisions should
also consider the feasibility of access and researcher relationship with study participants” (p. 99).
Teddlie & Tashakkori (2009) explain that “convenience sampling involves drawing samples that
are both easily accessible and willing to participate in a study yet may not be the most
appropriate to answer the research questions” (p. 170). This sample was to offer primary data for
a comparative analysis of how perceptions of NCTC and GOs vary on certain aspects of ARP
such as the appropriateness of granting amnesty to different targeted groups of returnees, and
determine the implementation feasibility of ARP. There was neither limitation on the size of
“NCTC Sample” nor authorization letter obtained for this group.
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Considering that the “NCTC Sample” was more conservative than the police, an NCTC
officer whom remains anonymous to protect his job, was the RA for this group, while the
investigator surveyed the GOs. IRB permitted the author to obtain oral/internet based consent'
(without signature) for this group because the research was minimal risk. This strategy was also
meant to increase their confidence in the study, so that they might more credible responses. Their
survey was expected to last 20-30 minutes. Potential NCTC participants were contacted via
phone by the investigator and RA. Interested participants then received emailed recruitment
letters, the consent script and survey. For this group, a computer survey was preferred compared
to paper survey. Participants received open-ended questionnaires. Out of the 20 questionnaires
that were emailed to potential participants, only 4 responded. The response rate was too low to
allow any comparative analysis.
Quantitative Study Design: Police Survey
The third data source was quantitative in nature and came from a police survey. This was
an in-depth survey. Survey was preferred due to their low cost and ease of distribution. They are
also reliable and generalizable (Maxfield & Babbie, 2011). A matrix format closed-ended
questionnaire with 28 fixed questions was used. As Maxfield and Babbie (2011), suggests, the
questionnaire was “uncluttered” to avoid the false impression that it is short. While matrix
questionnaire makes it easy for respondents to answer questions, it may also encourage
respondents to develop a pattern of agreeing or disagreeing with all the statements without
understanding the questions (Maxfield & Babbie, 2011, p. 266).
Considering that “research contexts are often complex social systems with their own
norms, expectations, interpersonal dynamics, and insider-outsider boundaries” (Teddlie &
Tashakkori, 2009, p. 202), there were three local approvals obtained for the study. These
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included KPS approval, Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval from the City University of
New York (CUNY) and Research Permit from National Commission for Science, Technology,
and Innovation (NACOSTI) in Kenya. There was no difficulty in gaining entry to Kenya Police
considering that the author is an “insider” familiar with the chain of command and
communication structure within the police. In September 2016, the researcher emailed a data
collection request to the Deputy Inspector General – KPS. The Principal Assistant to the D-IG
became the gatekeeper. The D-IG granted the permission in October 2016 (appendix G).
Upon receipt of the D-IG’s approval, the survey was conducted in two phases. The first
phase lasted from March to May 2017. Police commanders of various jurisdictions acted as
gatekeepers and research assistants (RAs) in administering the survey. The investigator first
made phone calls to the potential RAs to explain the survey and make the request to administer
the same. It was only when the commanders accepted the request, that they received an email
with instructions together with the survey and consent forms. In some cases, they received
printed surveys delivered by either police riders or local security courier services at the
researcher’s cost. Some of the RAs received tokens between US $30-100 (3,000-10,000 Kenyan
Shillings) plus cost of printing paper when needed. Questionnaires were distributed to individual
officers within police premises except police quarters (residential areas).
RAs were advised to obtain voluntary informed consent of all respondents (Maxfield &
Babbie, 2001; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). The approval letter from the D-IG was attached on
top of each questionnaire to give the respondents confidence in the study, an approach previously
used by Lurigio & Skogan (1994) in their survey of Chicago Police Officers. The police survey
was designed to last between 5-10 minutes. In the consent forms, participants were informed that
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their participation was voluntary, that they were free to withdraw their consent, and skip
questions that they did not want to answer.
Those surveyed during this period included a (Higher Training Course (HTC) class at
KPC which was surveyed by a Chief Inspector. A Master in Strategic Leadership and Command
Course No. 3/2017 assembled at Kenya Police Staff College in Nairobi was surveyed with the
help of the Commandant of the college. Finally, the Regional Commander Nyanza assisted with
the survey of a Staff Flag Meeting in Nyanza Region. These four were group-administered
surveys, which resulted into a high response rate. Of course, the flipside of having Police
Commanders administer the survey to their juniors is that respondents may feel coerced to
participate thus less likely to answer questions honestly (Bachman & Schutt, 2011).
In addition, Formations directly surveyed during this phase included Kenya Airport
Police Unit (KAPU) accessed through their Commandant. Traffic Headquarters in Nairobi,
Kenya Police Airwing, Vigilance House, and National Police Service were surveyed with the
help of GOs in each jurisdiction. The second phase of the survey was administered during
summer 2017 from May to September. This included a second HTC class at KPC which was
surveyed with the help of the Director of Studies at Senior Training Wing. In Rift Valley Region,
a Corporal working in the Operations Room was the RA. The Regional Operations Room being a
centralized workstation, resulted in high response rate owing to the strategic inflow of GOs into
the OPS room. Also polled during this phase was Vigilance House, NPS Headquarters, and
Nyeri County.
Two police constables based in Nairobi were responsible for printing, distribution and
collection of the survey to and from all the commanders. All completed forms in the custody of
the RAs were sealed before being sent to the Officer Commanding Police Division (OCPD)
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Gigiri in Nairobi with the help of KPS riders. The OCPD Gigiri then mailed the first batch of
survey to the researcher at John Jay using US Postal Services when he came to Texas in April
2017. Point of disclaimer; the OCPD Gigiri is the researcher’s brother but there was no conflict
of interest. The remaining survey was sent directly from Kenya by DHL courier services in
September 2017. While some regions or Formations were not directly accessible due to logistics,
officers from those regions/Formations were nonetheless surveyed in the colleges because HTC
classes are usually diversified and representatives from regions and units (designation).
The quantitative research question asked; what are the perceptions of Kenyan Police
Officers regarding countering violent extremism as a counter-terrorism strategy? The dependent
variable was police perception (what implementers think about the CVE). Independent variables
included rank, gender, designation, education and length of service. Perception was measured as
pessimism, optimism, risk, preparedness, and autonomy/discretion (see Lurigio & Skogan, 1994;
Stewart & Morris, 2009). Assessing police perceptions is important because previous studies
have shown that police have an organizational culture of resistance to change within their
departments. Researchers argue that attitudes must first be positively changed if new
interventions are expected to be successful and sustainable in police departments (Skogan, 2008;
Lurigio & Skogan, 1994;). In this regard, if police as implementers do not like CVE, then it will
not work mainly due to police culture. Individual police officers were the units of analysis for the
survey.
Firebaugh (“Sample Chapter for Firebaugh, G.: Seven Rules for Social Research.,” n.d.)
has argued, “how cases are selected is more important than how many cases are selected; and
you might need to stratify your sample” (p. 23). As such, the present study utilized stratified
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random sampling based on designation2 (nature of deployment) resulting into two strata; General
Duty and Formation (specialized units) commanders because the nature of deployment in Kenya
Police falls into these two categories (Figure 3). Essentially, stratified random sampling begins
by “distinguishing all elements in the population based on the relevant characteristic which then
forms the sampling strata” (Bachman & Schutt, 2011, p. 123). The “ultimate function of
stratification is to organize the population into homogeneous subsets (with heterogeneity
between subsets) and to select the appropriate number of elements from each” stratum (Maxfield
& Babbie, 2011, p. 231).
To be eligible for inclusion in the survey, participants had to be Gazetted Officers (GOs)
from KPS. In this study, KPS means KPS and Directorate of Criminal Investigation (DCI)
(formerly Criminal Investigations Department (CID)) as defined in the Force Standing Orders
(Government of Kenya, 2001) (Figure 4). Service Standing Order (Government of Kenya, 2018)
recently replaced FSO after the data for the dissertation was completed. Otherwise, DCI and
ATPU are synonymous with KPS because they have traditionally been Formations under KPS
prior to the Promulgation of the Constitution of Kenya in 2010 (“Const2010,” n.d.). KPS and
DCI have equally continued with joint trainings at either Kenya Police College or DCI Academy
(formerly CID Training School). In fact, the official uniform for DCI is the KPS uniform.
Gazetted Officers included officers from the rank of Assistant Superintendent of Police (ASP)
upwards to the Inspector General (Appendix C). Though not GOs in the FSO, Chief Inspectors
attending HTC were included because HTC is a 6-month promotional course for officers that are
due for promotion to the ASP rank. However, Administration Police Service were excluded
because they do not conduct criminal investigation.

2

The Kenya Police Service is a bureaucratic organization. In broad terms, assignment in KPS falls into two broad
categories; either General Duty or Formations (Specialized Units).
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The sampling frame (list of personnel) obtained from Police Headquarters in December
2016 while the population of DCI was confirmed via a phone call to Police Headquarters
Personnel Office. Overall, KPS had a population, N, of 1,267 GOs (540 in GD and 725 in
Formations) (Table 2). A random stratified sample based on a 20% selection of either subset of
the designations was conducted to give each element in the population an equal chance of being
selected, and ensure representativeness. This resulted into a sample size, n = 273, that is (160 GD
and 108 Formation). There were 5 missing data for designation which were coded as 99). The
large sample size and homogeneity of this population presumably reduced sampling error
(Bachman & Schutt, 2011).
Table 2: Population of Gazetted Officers in Kenya Police in 2016
RANK
Assistant Inspector General
Commissioner of Police
Senior Superintendent of Police
Superintendent of Police
Assistant Superintendent of Police
Directorate of Criminal Investigations
TOTAL
GRAND TOTAL

GENERAL DUTY
9
65
299
52
115
0
540
1,267

FORMATIONS
33
59
91
42
102
401
727

Figure 3. Designation in National Police Service
National Police
Service

Kenya Police
Service

General Duty

Directorate of
Criminal
Investigation

Administration
Police Service

Formations
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CHAPTER FIVE
RESULTS
Qualitative Analysis (Content Analysis)
This exploratory case study was about the terrorism Amnesty and Reintegration Policy in
Kenya. Analytic approach in case study, Yin says, involves a detailed description of the case,
and the setting of the case within contextual conditions. This being a qualitative study, data
collection and analysis for the qualitative study occurred concurrently to avoid piling up of
documents (Baxter & Jack, 2008). There was no fixed pre-determined theory that was tested.
Instead, the analysis was inductive and iterative in nature to ascertain themes set by the
researcher before analysis began. Inductive data, Teddlie & Tashakkori (2009) explain,
“Involves arguing from particular facts or data to a general theme or conclusion” (p. 251). As
such, the author closely read and re-read each of the documents before analysis began.
The qualitative research question asked; what does the Amnesty and Reintegration
program in Kenya entail. The objective here was to offer a process evaluation of ARP to see if
there is program integrity in its implementation process, and theoretical similarities with FD
framework. Process evaluation was achieved through a content analysis of 150 online Media
Content (newspapers and government reports), and 4 survey questionnaires completed by
officers from NCTC and GOs from KPS. In this regard, program integrity was reported if ARP
was implemented in accordance with the national CVE model for Kenya (NSCVE) (Table 1).
As stated in NSCVE, the government should develop a legislative and policy framework
covering returnees (“problem identification”), launch a national Disengagement and
Reintegration initiative, and monitor returnees to ensure that the initiative is not penetrated by
violent extremists (“conduct research”). Moreover, there should be coordination of training and
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capacity building at the local level by partner GK agencies (“pulling levers”. There must be
psychological support and counselling programmes put in place to support returnees and their
families (“reintegration services”). It must also ensure that there is effective information sharing
between government agencies about status of returnees (“communication”), and set up a training
clearinghouse at the NCTC for security and GK agencies engaged in CT and CVE (Model 1).
Besides, Maxfield & Babbie (2001) asserts that in content analysis, oral or written
communication should be coded using a conceptual framework. Due to lack of standard
procedure for FD process that has been systematically documented in the literature or using
empirical research, content analysis was coded using FD framework provided by Kennedy into
five themes as follows (Kennedy, 2006, p. 156).
According to Kennedy, FD framework involves selection of a particular crime problem
(“problem identification”); convening an interagency working group of law enforcement
practitioners, who then conduct research to identify chronic offenders or groups of offenders
(“conducting research”). Then, they frame a response to offenders and groups of offenders using
all available tools for sanctions (“pulling levers”) to stop their continued engagement in violent
behavior. After this, you focus social services and community resources on targeted offenders
and groups to match law enforcement prevention efforts (“reintegration services”). Finally,
implementers must directly and repeatedly communicate with the offenders so that they may
understand why they are receiving this special attending and the consequences if their
subsequent behavior or misbehavior (“communication”) (Kennedy, 2006, p. 156).
Based on this background, text management software, Atlas.ti version 7 was used for the
content analysis because it is the version installed on the computers at the CUNY Graduate
Center. Atlas.ti can be used to analyze textual or video data clips or photos in formats like txt,
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.doc, or pdf (Friese, 2015). It also allows the coder to import surveys to analyze answers to openended questions. Importantly, it allows the coder to highlight passages, naming those codes and
then assigning them to similar concepts in the Primary Documents (PDs) after uploading
documents in the Hermeneutic Unit (HU). In fact, coding in Atlas.ti is “the process of assigning
categories, concepts, or ‘codes’ to segments of information that are of interest to your research
objectives” (Friese, 2015, p. 24; Friese, n.d., p. 7)).
There is however no "right way" to code in Atlas.ti because researchers from different
disciplines code in their own unique ways. Thus, the author used Code-by-List to create the
codes then applied them as appropriate to the marked segments of the PDs. In addition, PD
Families were used to cluster PDs based on data types. This resulted into “GK-related’ and
“Newspapers” Document Families. There were 5 codes created before the coding began, and 18
sub codes that emerged during the coding process (Table 3). Atlas.ti and its Copy Bundle was
saved in personal computer and backed in a USB flash drive. This was a precautionary measure
to prevent accidental data loss and allow easy working on the same data at the Graduate Center
computers.
TABLE 3
CODES-PRIMARY-DOCUMENTS-TABLE (CELL=Q-FREQ)
Report created by Super - 08/19/2017 09:14:29 PM
"HU: [C:\Users\USER\Desktop\ATLAS.TI\Dissertation Atlas.hpr7]"
Code-Filter: All [23]
PD-Filter: All [150]
Quotation-Filter: All [593]
--------------------------------------------------------------PRIMARY DOCUMENTS
CODES
GK-RELATED
NEWSPAPERS
Totals
--------------------------------------------------------------COMMUNICATION
16
118
134
CONDUCT RESEARCH
72
64
136
PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION
55
226
281
PULLING LEVERS
84
67
151
REINTEGRATION
57
99
156
--------------------------------------------------------------Totals
284
574
858
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TABLE 4
CODES-PRIMARY-DOCUMENTS-TABLE (CELL=Q-FREQ)
Report created by Super - 08/19/2017 09:26:10 PM
"HU: [C:\Users\USER\Desktop\ATLAS.TI\Dissertation Atlas.hpr7]"
Code-Filter: All [23]
PD-Filter: All [150]
Quotation-Filter: All [593]
--------------------------------------------------------------PRIMARY DOCUMENTS
CODES
GK-RELATED
NEWSPAPERS
Totals
--------------------------------------------------------------agency receiving returne
0
3
3
aim of amnesty
0
4
4
amnesty announcement
3
63
66
cause for return
2
43
45
challenges
15
65
80
communication
5
26
31
conduct research
58
26
84
conferences
39
22
61
data type collected
1
4
5
follow-up
0
6
6
legal framework
21
26
47
number of returnees
5
79
84
opportunities
2
19
21
problem id
11
12
23
pulling levers
84
57
141
reintegration
44
68
112
reintegration kit
0
5
5
role of community/religi
2
9
11
role of police
2
16
18
specific phone numbers
0
3
3
target areas
7
11
18
timing
1
40
41
where
6
15
21
--------------------------------------------------------------Totals
308
622

930

Table 3 is a Codes Primary Document Table (CPDT) containing frequency of codes
across documents, generated for Code Families (the five themes). Document Families, that is,
“Newspapers” and “GK-related” documents, defined the Scope. While these statistics do not tell
much in a qualitative study, it makes it easy to visualize how quotations for each theme are
distributed. This tells us the significance of each theme. There were 150 PDs analyzed as shown
by the PD-Filter. Results indicate that out of 858 quotations, 284 quotations were in the “GKrelated” documents and majority (574) in “Newspapers”. Similarly, there were 64 quotations
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about “Conduct Research” Code Family compared with 118 such quotations for
“Communication” in the “Newspapers” category (Table 3). The most important theme in the
entire data was “Problem identification” with 281 quotations assigned to it. The “Conduct
Research” theme is the least important with 64 quotations in the “Newspaper Document Family,
while “Problem Identification” is the most important theme in “Newspapers” with 226
quotations assigned to it. Table 4 is a CPDT showing all the 23 codes. These are individual
codes, not themes. Notably, there were 930 quotations (308 in the “GK-related” and 622 in
“Newspapers”). The most important code in the “Newspapers” is “reintegration” with 68
quotations. Overall, the most quoted code is “pulling levers” with 141 quotations while the least
is “problem identification” with 23 quotations.

Figure 4: Quotations per Theme in GK-related
Documents.
COMMUNICATI
REHABILITATIO
CONDUCT
ON
N
RESEARCH
6%
20%
25%
PROBLEM
PULLING
IDENTIFICATIO
LEVERS
N
30%
19%

Table 3 was then opened in Excel Spreadsheet to generate pie charts (Figures 4 and 5) showing
the distribution of quotations per theme in “GK-related documents” and “Newspapers”
respectively. From Figure 4, we see that “Conduct Research” theme accounts for 25% of
quotations in the “GK-related” and 11% in the “Newspapers” while “Pulling Levers” Code
Family (theme) had 30% of quotations assigned to it in “GK-related” and 12% in “Newspapers”.
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In addition, “Communication” with just 6% of the quotations in the “GK-related” documents is
the least important theme in this CF. Below are the Atlas.ti results presented using the format
previously adopted by Friese (2011) by highlighting the output results using quotation marks.
Figure 5: Quotations per Theme in Newspapers
REHABILITATI
ON
17%

COMMUNICAT
ION
21%

PULLING
LEVERS
12%
PROBLEM
IDENTIFICATI
ON
39%

CONDUCT
RESEARCH
11%

Problem Identification
Problem identification is a key component of FD framework because FD interventions
target few chronic offenders. In FD, police know that concentrating their crime control efforts
chronic offenders can prevent crime. As informed by criminology theories, situational crime
prevention strategies posit that repeat offenders account for most crimes, and that crime is
concentrated in hotspots of crime (few places or neighborhoods). Kennedy (2006) suggests that
FD starts with the “selection of a particular crime problem, such as youth homicide or
street drug dealing”, in this case, violent extremism. This statement was coded as “problem
identification”. To asses this theme, a Boolean operator was applied in the Query Tool to retrieve
information combining theme by theme (code families). As Friese (2015) noted, a query is a
search expression built from operands (codes and code families) and operators (AND, OR.) that
define the conditions that a quotation must meet to be retrieved. The “OR” operator retrieves all
data segments (quotations) that are coded with any of the codes used in the expression (p. 238).
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Therefore, a Boolean Operator queried the themes “conduct research” OR “problem
identification”. This generated 109 quotations in “GK-related” documents and 263 quotations in
“Newspapers”. Friese (2011) explained that the numbers behind the codes in Atlas.ti indicate the
frequency and the linkages to other codes (p.9). The generated query outputs were then used to
answer various questions that assessed “problem identification” as follows;
When was the amnesty/reintegration program initiated? What is the aim of the amnesty
and the reintegration program? These questions were coded as “timing” and “aim of amnesty”
respectively. Findings suggest that Kenya was in a dilemma, of how to deal with the increasing
population of returnees in the country. This was evident in P76:17 (Primary Document # 76,
quotation # 17) which is report on Second National Workshop on Implementation of Security
Council Resolutions 1624 (2005) and 2178 (2014) held in Kwale, Kenya from January 20-22,
2015. The document states, “The state is however left in a difficult position because arresting the
returnees may also cause uprising amongst their communities but ignoring that they are there
remains a problem in itself”. (“Second National Workshop on Implementation of Security
Council Resolutions 1624 (2005) and 2178 (2014) in Kenya | ICCT,” n.d.), [P76:17].
On the same vein, the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) advised
the government to grant unconditional amnesty to Kenyans who joined Al-Shabaab terror group
and denounced VE (Republic of Kenya & UNDP Kenya, 2015, p. 23). The NCIC officer
[Sharamo] reported
“we also have had calls from the coastal political and religious leaders to have an
amnesty so that the youths stranded in Somalia and fearing to come back can return to
their homes” (“Government exploring giving amnesty to Kenyan youth in Al-shabaab |
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Kenya News Agency,” n.d.) [P49:4]. Sharamo however clarified that ‘Only the president
[of Kenya] can grant such an amnesty’ [P49:6].
Is the amnesty timed? If yes, for how long is the amnesty expected to last? Was any
formal announcement made publicly about the commencement of the Amnesty and Reintegration
program? These questions were coded as “timing” and “amnesty announcement” respectively.
While publicly announcing the amnesty on April 14, 2015, the Interior Cabinet Secretary,
General (Rtd.) Nkaissery urged radicalised youth to voluntarily surrender to the National
Government in lieu of criminal prosecution. A Geeska Africa Online article noted that
“Kenya has offered a ten-day amnesty to youngsters who have joined Al-Shabaab.
Interior Cabinet Secretary Joseph Nkaissery said on Tuesday (April 14) that the
Government called upon all individuals who went to Somalia for training and now wish
to disassociate themselves from terrorism to report to National government offices, to the
County Commissioners in Nairobi, Mombasa and Garissa. He said the Government
would consider granting amnesty and appropriate reintegration support” (geeskadmin,
n.d.) [P48:1].
Initially timed for 10 days, the amnesty was later extended by 14 days, and then
indefinately Goldberg (2015) showed that “Kenya has extended the amnesty period it had
granted the already radicalized Muslim youth in Somalia by 14 days after the 10-day amnesty
period lapsed on Thursday” [P30:1], while “Coast regional coordinator Nelson Marwa [said] that
government will continue rehabilitating the returnees indefinitely” (“Kenya extends amnesty
period for al-Shabaab recruits,” n.d.) [P95:1].
Did you hold any meetings to brainstorm before the program was initiated? This was
coded as “conduct research”. From the analysis, it is impossible to say with certainty why GK
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made the announcement in the wake of the Garissa University College attack. There is however
evidence that GK began seeking solutions to the VE menace since 2011 through its participation
in global CVE conferences.
In your opinion or based on your experience so far, what do you think influenced their
return into the country? For instance, did the announcement influence their return? Was it after
hearing the announcement or before? Why do you think they are surrendering the way they do?
These were each coded as “cause of return”. Results indicate that majority of returnees were
already in the country by the time amnesty was initiated, but the amnesty was also meant to
attract militants who were still in Somalia to return and surrender. Perhaps a credible source of
data was a study dubbed the Socio-economic and Survey of Kenya by the International
Organization of Immigration, SUPKEM and the Ministry of Interior interviewed 185
respondents of the returnees in Coast (“700 al Shabaab recruits return to Kenya - IOM,” n.d.)
[P84:4]. They found that “At least 700 Kenyans have returned home from Somalia after quitting
the al-Shabaab terror group and Islamic State” (“700 al Shabaab recruits return to Kenya - IOM,”
n.d) [P7:1].
It was however impossible to establish the number that returned from Somalia before or
after the annoncement but they were clearly in their hundreds (“1500 Kenyans Radicalized Into
Al Shabaab Surrendered As First Batch Complete De-Radicalization-Rehabilitation Program –
Strategic Intelligence Service,” n.d.; (“700 al Shabaab recruits return to Kenya - IOM,” n.d.;
Service, 2015). Speaking at the Government Training Institute in Kwale, the Permanent
Secretary for the Ministry of Interior, Karanja Kibicho said that ‘these [returnees] are among the
1,000 who responded to the amnesty call by the Ministry of Interior sometime back and the
number has since increased to 1,500’ [P1:3]. Clearly, they returned after getting dissolutioned by
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either unfulfilled financial promises or distorted Islamic teachings. As reported by Goldberg
(2015),
“Most of the returnees’ narratives are characterized with a promise for a good pay…The
promises were just empty as they underwent military training and would go for months
without any pay” [P10:3].
Evidence further suggests that some returnees heeded the call to return to Kenya from
Somalia. As GK asserts, “there was a rapid mass disengagement from Al Shabaab following the
2014 government amnesty with hundreds of Kenyans leaving the ranks of Al Shabaab to return
to Kenya or to their civilian lives” (NCTC, 2016) [P71:20]. Notably, most of the returnees came
from “hotspots”, areas where youths were at high risk of radicalization and recruitment including
Coast, North Eastern and Nairobi Regions. A United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
Kenya project report stated that,
“The Project targets epicenter, spillover and at-risk communities where youth and
women are at risk of both radicalization and are victims of violent extremist acts. These
communities include: The Northern Kenya border regions (Garissa, Mandera, and Wajir);
the Coastline border region of Kenya (Kilifi, Kwale, Tana River, Lamu, Mombasa) and
parts of Nairobi County” (UNDP Kenya, n.d.) [P45:2].
Furthermore, scanty evidence indicate that reintegration is implemented within custodial
facilities/ prisons within the “hotspots” areas. As indicated in the “National Workshop on
Countering Incitement and Violent Extremism in Kenya | ICCT,” n.d.), “part of the activities
could also be targeted towards convicted violent extremists in prison to ensure rehabilitation and
a good reintegration into society upon their release” [P39:12]. Likewise, from 20-22 January
2015, a national CVE workshop was held in Mombasa Kenya where it was agreed that
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rehabilitation “could either take place directly, or first within a detention program, before the
next stage of reintegration into society takes place” (“Second National Workshop on
Implementation of Security Council Resolutions 1624 (2005) and 2178 (2014) in Kenya | ICCT,”
n.d.) [P76:14]. The Kenya - European Union Partnership project proposal budgeted at EUR
5,000,000 for the operationalization of the NSCVE equally projected that “The Centre [NCTC]
[will] support effective disengagement and rehabilitation of returning FTFs in prisons” (“KenyaEU Partnership for the implementation of the Kenya CVE Strategy,” 2017; also see “opcompresentation-kenya-nctc_en.pdf,” n.d.) [P72:3].
In your estimate, how many have surrendered so far since the amnesty was announced?
Coded as “number of returnees”, it was not possible to conclude with certainty, the exact number
of returnees that surrendered for reintegration since the government has remained conservative
with the statistics. Reports indicated that
“The surrender of the youths is confidential in a bid to reduce their stigmatization and
even possible assassination” (“Amnesty Period For Radicalized Youth Extended By 14
Days – Strategic Intelligence Service,” n.d.) [P30:2].
Evidence however indicates that hundreds of returnees have surrendered for the
reintegration process (“Kenya’s new counter-terrorism strategies paying off - Geeska Afrika
Online,” n.d.; “85 youths heed amnesty to quit terror groups » Capital News,” 2015; “700 al
Shabaab recruits return to Kenya - IOM,” n.d). A more credible document was a joint report by
Kenya and UNDP which suggested that over “250 Kenyan youths have denounced Al-Shabaab
and handed themselves to Kenyan authorities” (Republic of Kenya-UNDP Kenya, 2015, p.23).
The low turn-out is partly attributed to fear and insecurity among returnees. A project proposal
by BRICS East Africa entitled Working with the Counties and National Government to Address
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Violent Extremism in the Coast Region of Kenya revealed that returnees in Lamu County are
gripped in fear, to the extent that they only managed to interview one returnee
(“BRICS_Calls_for_Concepts_-__OCT2016.pdf,” n.d.; “BRICS East Africa - Project Proposal March 2016.pdf,” n.d.). Similar sentiments were echoed by Kwale County Commissioner, Evans
Achoki that “returnees have been skeptical about the government’s initiative, but are slowly
coming out after they were assured of their security” (“Al Shabaab still a major security threat to
Kenya - returnees,” n.d., p. 62) [P19:6].
During the interview, what kind of data do you collect? Am thinking of data such as
where they were recruited from, how they travelled, when they left and returned to the country,
their demographic factors etc. These two questions were each coded as “data type collected”).
Who identifies/picks returnees or groups of offenders? Which government agency receives the
returnees? In other words, whom do they surrender to? The last three questions were coded as
“pulling levers”. In this regard, the codes “data type collected” and “follow-up” were queried to
determine what the vetting process entails.
Results show that during the Conference on Reintegration and Rehabilitation of Violent
Extremist Offenders, participants suggested that law enforcement and intelligence agents can
“collect information from detainees without undermining the rehabilitation process” (“National
Workshop on Countering Incitement and Violent Extremism in Kenya | ICCT,” n.d.) [P44:4].
Furthermore, those who surrender go through a vetting process by NCTC especially AntiTerrorist Police Unit and National Intelligence Service, to determine their suitability for
inclusion, ensure continuous monitoring to prevent recidivism or joining new extremist
networks. Results show that Kenya was advised during the National Workshop on Countering
Incitement and Violent Extremism in Kenya “to identify the profiles, and background information
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of why people joined” (“National Workshop on Countering Incitement and Violent Extremism in
Kenya | ICCT,” n.d.), [P39:12]. Similarly, during the Second National Workshop on
Implementation of Security Council Resolutions 1624 (2005) and 2178 (2014) in Kenya, it was
agreed that reintegration program for Kenya should be designed as follows;
“Identify the group and identities of the former fighters; Develop an understanding of
their levels of engagement and responsibility when they were engaged in terrorism.
The state will be charged with vetting them, that is, finding out the reasons why they
joined the group and when they joined, the training they went through and why they have
decided to leave and reform themselves” (“Second National Workshop on
Implementation of Security Council Resolutions 1624 (2005) and 2178 (2014) in Kenya |
ICCT,” n.d.), [P76:18].
According to the Daily Nation, “the counter-terrorism centre would try to understand
what drove the youth to their position” (“Amnesty yields 85 radicalised youths - Daily Nation,”
n.d.), [P91:4]. Domnic Wabala, a journalist surveyed for this dissertation also asserted that
“Once they surrender returnees are vetted to gauge the level of radicalization before they
undergo debriefing” [P145:20].
What aspects of the program do you consider difficult to implement? This question was
coded as “challenge”. Do you know whether they have changed or not? How do you feel about
the policy overall? In your observation, what are some of the key opportunities in this program?
What are the main challenges of this program? This was also coded as “challenges”. Is there
anything you feel should be done to improve the program? The rest of the questions here were
each coded as “opportunities”.
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To explore the issue of challenge to the returnees, “challenges” OR “opportunities”
codes were queried which generated 77 quotations in the “Newspapers”. Some of the key
challenges facing the implementation of ARP were insecurity of returnees and those involved in
the implementation, and poor coordination between security agencies and the communities
involved. There was also evidence of skepticism in the program among both police and members
of public. Results show that participants in the Second National CVE Workshop held in Kenya
from May 7-9, 2014 at the UN Office observed that “They [returnees] might fear retaliation from
Al Shabaab, but also from the community which they re-enter.” (“Second National Workshop on
Implementation of Security Council Resolutions 1624 (2005) and 2178 (2014) in Kenya | ICCT,”
n.d.), [P39:14]. Likewise, “He [Achoki] said returnees have to be vetted and profiled and their
details shared among the security agents so that they are not arrested or shot down by security
officers” (“Al Shabaab still a major security threat to Kenya - returnees,” n.d.) [P19:8]. As Kotia
and Abdalla (2016) reported, America cautioned that
“while the return of the radical persons presents an opportunity for Kenyan authorities to
elicit important information as a way of designing counter-terrorism and de-radicalization
strategies, there is also apprehension that, if proper reintegration measures are not
adopted, the returnees might constitute a security threat… to the country (Kotia &
Abdalla, 2016, p. 89)” [P4:2].
Dominic Wabala equally observed that “hundreds of youth have so far been integrated
but the security agencies keep a tight cap on the numbers and identities because of fear of
revenge by cells still operating in the country who might target the returnees considered traitors”
[P145:6]. The murder of Subira Mwangole who was a reformed returnee murdered after his
reintegration in 2016, and that Abdulkarim Mzee, and Nyumba Kumi, all elicited public concerns
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about the safety of returnees elders (“Three Nyumba Kumi officials killed by gunmen | The Star,
Kenya,” n.d.; “Kwale in shock as three Nyumba Kumi officials killed in one night - Daily
Nation,” n.d.; “Reformed Al Shabaab militant is shot dead :: Kenya - The Standard,” n.d.). The
returnees were killed after they surrendered to the State in response to the amnesty. As such,
many felt that the incidents would cause fear among other returnees to refrain from surrendering.
Precisely, reports indicated that
“Police in Kwale County launched manhunt operation to find killers of a reformed AlShabab member. Subira Sudi Mwangole who had joined Al-Shabaab in 2008, went to
Somalia for training before returning to Kenya in 2009. Following government amnesty
offer, Sudi surrendered himself to the Kenya government on February 2016. Sudi gave
insights on how Al-Shabaab operates. He was shot dead last week in Ukunda and the
killers fled with his motorcycle” (“Police Manhunt Operation for Killers of Reformed AlShabaab Launched in Kwale – Strategic Intelligence Service,” n.d.) [P12:2].
Pwani University Professors Hassan Mwakimako and Halim Shauri concluded that
returnees don’t trust the amnesty and fear reporting to the police due to lack of “clear guidelines
on how they would be treated” (“Kenya: County Urges Shabaab Returnees to Surrender for
Rehabilitation - allAfrica.com,” n.d.). Similar observation was made by BRICS East Africa pilot
program which stressed that lack of stronger involvement of the County Government and local
communities at the heart of the deradicalization casts doubt on the sustainability of the program
(“BRICS_Calls_for_Concepts_-__OCT2016.pdf,” n.d.; “BRICS East Africa - Project Proposal March 2016.pdf,” n.d.).
The government has nonetheless dismissed alleged involvement of security agencies in
the disappearances of returnees amidst such speculations. Instead, GK has blamed “jihadists
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trying to scare young people and prevent fighters surrendering to the government” (“IRIN | How
Kenya’s al-Shabab amnesty is a loaded gun,” n.d) [P92:4]. In this regard,
“The CS has however cautioned police officers from mishandling those who wish to
denounce the Al-Qaeda linked terror group. He also says that investigations were
ongoing over alleged forceful disappearance of youths by a section of Muslim leaders
and human rights defenders. ‘We want to get to the bottom of the allegation…the security
organs are there to provide security to the citizens,’ he said. Already the National Police
Service has strongly dismissed claims that police were behind forceful disappearance of
terror suspects. Rights defenders and political leaders have made allegations of
disappearances in Northern Kenya, the coastal region and Nairobi.” (“Government
extends terror amnesty to youths » Capital News,” n.d.) [P54:2].
In their conservative culture, police are equally suspicious that some of the returnees
might be spies camouflaging as returnees in need of assistance. Indeed, recidivism and the
challenge of how to deal with insincere participants in CVE programs are genuine concerns to
implementers of CVE (Horgan and Braddock, 2010). One returnee alluded to IRIN News:
‘There is nothing like amnesty. It’s a trap,” he insisted. ‘What they mean is they send
someone to follow you, and you have days to live.’ The former fighter believes his only
option is to go back to Somalia” (“IRIN | How Kenya’s al-Shabab amnesty is a loaded
gun,” n.d) [P92:5].
Thus, experts have cautioned that
“all should be wary of not making the rehab and reintegration programs too attractive,
thereby becoming an incentive on its own in joining Al Shabaab, and next returning and
becoming eligible for reintegration programs with mentoring and job opportunities”
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(“National Workshop on Countering Incitement and Violent Extremism in Kenya |
ICCT,” n.d.), [P39:14].
Evidence further suggests that program significantly suffers from poor coordination
between security agencies and the community, and lack of transparency and information largely
due to mistrust (“BRICS East Africa - Project Proposal - March 2016.pdf,” n.d.) . From the time
of its announcement, the amnesty elicited public debate. A section of the church, led by the
National Council of Churches of Kenya Secretary General Canon Peter Karanja rejected on
claims that ‘any blanket amnesty is ridiculous and an affirmation that the Government is
officially abetting terrorism’ (Kibet, 2015) [P35:2]. NCIC Commissioner Morris Dzoro however
underscored the importance of the amnesty saying that
“pardon was needed for reformed radicalized youth because some of them were duped
into joining the outlawed militia group [and] needed government machinery to offer them
income generating activities as a way of integrating them back into society” (Mwangeka,
n.d.), [P25:1].
Precisely, “The commissioner said lack of cooperation between security agencies and
locals has however hindered efforts to enlist the Al-Shabaab returnees”, particularly in Lamu
where “Mr Kanyiri said family members were unwilling to surrender the returnees to the relevant
authorities” (“Al-Shabaab recruits return to Lamu - Daily Nation,” n.d.), [P22:1]. Reports
indicate that
“The NCTC…emphasized the challenges that exist, such as budgetary and legal
constraints, and the lack of sectoral ownership of both state and non-state actors and the
coordination of activities” “National Workshop on Countering Incitement and Violent
Extremism in Kenya | ICCT,” n.d.), [P39:6]. A pilot study by BRICS East Africa
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examined the effectiveness of the ARP and cooperation between County and National
Government in CVE activities in Coast.
BRICS East Africa report further concluded that
“a pilot amnesty program was going on in Kwale County where about 48 returnees were
receiving livelihood support from the International Organization for Migration (IOM)
They added that the program was also being criticized as being haphazard, lacking
transparency and information on the amnesty package, and not coordinating well with
stakeholders. Thus, the program though promising was not succeeding as expected (
“BRICS_Calls_for_Concepts_-__OCT2016.pdf,” n.d.; “BRICS East Africa - Project
Proposal - March 2016.pdf,” n.d.; “BRICS East Africa - Project Proposal - March
2016.pdf,” n.d.) [P33:3].
Regardless of the challenges, GK has touted the program as “successful” in consideration of the
250 returnees that have so far surrendered (Republic of Kenya-UNDP Kenya, 2016).
Is there a written implementation plan?
This variable was coded as “legal framework”. To establish if there was a written plan for
the policy, a Boolean operator queried “legal framework” OR “aim of amnesty” codes resulting
into 51 quotations. Findings suggest that lack of a legal framework to support ARP was another
contentious issue among the Muslim communities who are demanding for the enactment of an
amnesty law. Some Coast politicians dismissed the amnesty as a meagre public gimmick, while
some Sheikhs told returnees willing to surrender to instead report to them for reintegration, as
opposed to the government (“Sheikhs tell Shabaab deserters to go to them, not govt » Capital
News,” n.d.). Mvita legislator Abdulswamad Nassir
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“urged the government to first gazette the amnesty, saying he is skeptical about it. ‘I
know government communication is through gazette notices,’” (“Al Shabaab still a major
security threat to Kenya - returnees,” n.d.), [P147:1].
IRIN News added that
“there’s a big problem: it’s not working as advertised. There is no law, policy” (“IRIN |
How Kenya’s al-Shabab amnesty is a loaded gun,” n.d.) [P92:3].
Moreover, the U.S. Department of State in its Country Reports: Africa Overview for 2015
acknowledged that
“The [Kenyan] government also undertook some small-scale efforts to rehabilitate and
reintegrate former al-Shabaab fighters, facilitators and sympathizers, but efforts were
constrained by the lack of a defined strategy, clear legal framework, or supportive public
messaging” (“Country Reports on Terrorism 2015 Africa Overview,” n.d.) [P24:5].
Parliament is yet to pass an amnesty law. Nevertheless, on September 2, 2016, President
Kenyatta launched a written implementation plan for CVE - the National Strategy for Counter
Violent Extremism (Kiraithe, n.d.; “President Kenyatta Launches Strategy on Countering Violent
Extremism,” 2016) (“resident Kenyatta launches new strategy to fight extremism, terror –
Presidency,” n.d.); “BRICS_Calls_for_Concepts_-__OCT2016.pdf,” n.d.),. During the launch,
the President stated,
“At the core of the strategy is a need to address the challenge of individuals who have
already been radicalised and some who have gone as far as joining terrorist groups that
will be dealt with at the local level action and the national level action.
The objectives of the strategy include reducing support and recruitment into terrorist
organisations, countering extremist propaganda and ideology, rehabilitating violent
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extremists among others” (P122:2; also see P73:4).
The strategy outlines nine pillars for implementing CVE at both national and local levels.
Central to the dissertation are pillars that address the social aspect which reflect FD. They
include the Legal and Policy Pillar to ensure that “relevant laws and policy frameworks must
support CVE” (NCTC, 2016) [P71:8], the Faith Based and Ideological Pillar to ‘immunise’ the
Kenyan population to VE ideologies. There is also Psychosocial Pillar meant to offer
psychological and mental health support for affected individuals, promote reconciliation efforts
through dialogue with the affected individuals and communities, and help in identifying skills
necessary for the reintegration of reformed returnees, and finally, the Security Pillar to ensure
that radicalization is met with the full force of law. No doubt, NSCVE leaves police with
autonomy/discretion on how to deal with returnees. These include discretion to arrest returnees
that fail to surrender. Others are Education Pillar, Political Pillar, Training and Capacity Building
Pillar, Arts and Culture Pillar, and Media and Online Pillar (p. 11).
Pulling Levers
In FD, implementers normally focus on high-risk offenders by directly engaging in
dialogue with the participants to disrupt/deter violence, and engage in direct communication with
potential offenders vial a two-prolonged message from security agents and the community.
Kennedy writes, FD framework involves “pulling together an interagency enforcement group,
typically including police, probation, parole, state and federal prosecutors, and sometimes federal
enforcement agencies” (Kennedy 2006, p. 156). Thus, this statement was coded as “pulling
levers”. A Boolean operator generated 130 quotations for “Pulling levers” OR “Reintegration”
themes in the “GK-related” data. These were used to answer three questions as follows;
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What agencies are involved in implementation of the program? Coded as “pulling
levers”, evidence shows that NCTC is the implementer of ARP (NCTC, 2016) [P71:12]. NCTC
is a multi-agency involving security agencies, but collaborates with non-state agencies including
NGOs, donors and community leaders. According to the Security Laws Amendment Act 2014,
NCTC consists of the National Intelligence Service, Kenya Defence Forces, NPS, and such other
agencies as may be determined by the National Security Council (Republic of Kenya, 2014)
[P9:4]. Key donors of CVE in Kenya since 2014 include Denmark, the EU, the Netherlands,
Norway, the UK, Australia, Canada, and the United States. As reported by the “ICCT/UNICRI
Conference on Rehabilitation and Reintegration: Executive Summary and Good Practices
Document now available online | ICCT,” n.d.),
“The meeting addressed… how various professionals such as psychologists, social
workers and religious scholars should be most effectively integrated into a rehabilitation
programme, how law enforcement and intelligence agents can collect information from
detainees without undermining the rehabilitation process, the importance of a robust
aftercare programme, how to best involve other key stakeholders in this process, such as
victims and former extremists” [P44:4].
In its Country Report on Africa, the U.S. Department of State also acknowledged that,
“During 2015, the Kenyan government improved its engagement with civil society,
particularly communities at risk of radicalization in the northeast of the country. It also
increased its efforts and coordination with international partners to advance CVE efforts,
including prevention of radicalization, counter-messaging, and the reintegration of
foreign terrorist fighter returnees” “Country Reports on Terrorism 2015 Africa
Overview,” n.d., [P24:4].
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How regularly, if any, does the team hold meetings? This was coded as “conduct
research”. It was impossible to ascertain this question from the content analysis. What is the
advantage of pulling levers (involving all these government agencies?). This variable was coded
as “pulling levers”. It was not clear, what advantage “pulling levers” or this multi-agency
approach has provided. Ideally, the logic behind pulling levers is to ensure swift and certain
punishment for offenders that go against the set rules and standards for inclusion in the program.
Nkaissery, “asked the courts to process deal with terrorism cases ‘swiftly and firmly’ so as to
secure the country from terror activities” (“MOMBASA: Nkaissery seeks judiciary’s help to
fight terrorism - Daily Nation,” n.d.), [P51:4].
Conducting Research
In FD, Kennedy asserts, “implementers usually relying heavily on the field experience of
front-line police offices, to identify key offenders-and frequently groups of offenders, such as
street gangs, drug crews, and the like- and the context of their behavior” (Kennedy, 2006, p. 1567). The dissertation thus coded this variable as “conducting research”. In this regard, two
questions were raised:
What is the role, if any, of the police in the program? This was coded as “role of police”. A
Codes Primary Documents Table was opened in Excel Spreadsheet to show the distribution of
quotations for five codes (communication, conduct research, pulling levers, reintegration and
problem identification) across all PDs. Thereafter, all columns with total number of quotations
less than 5 were deleted from the table to remove unnecessary details, and allow for ease
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visualization. Next, a graph (Figure 8) was then generated showing the number of quotations for
the “Conduct research” code, across various Primary Documents.
In Figure 6, P44 (Primary Document #44) is the Executive Summary: Conference on
Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders 2011 report (“ICCT/UNICRI
Conference on Rehabilitation and Reintegration: Executive Summary and Good Practices
Document now available online | ICCT,” n.d.). It had the highest number of quotations (11)
about “conduct research” code. Upon query, the analysis generated 16 quotations about “role of
police” in the “Newspapers” and 2 in “GK-related” documents. Evidently, NCTC is monitoring
returnees to ensure that they are enrolled into the program.

No. of Quotations

Figure 6: No. of Quotations of Conduct Research Code in
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Results also show that police, Directorate of Criminal Investigations and National
Intelligence Service officers receive and interrogate returnees as part of the vetting and data
collection process. As reported in the “Six Shabaab returnees surrender in Mombasa | The Star,
Kenya,” n.d.,
“Police are holding six suspected al Shabaab returnees who surrendered following the 10day amnesty issued by government. The six suspects surrendered to police in Mombasa
this week. They are being interrogated by officers from different security agencies,
including the Anti-Terror Police Unit and National Intelligence Service... the youth are
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supposed to surrender to Nairobi, Mombasa and Garissa county commissioners” (“Six
Shabaab returnees surrender in Mombasa | The Star, Kenya,” n.d.), [P150:1; also see
P150:2].
Coast Police boss, Mr. [Henry] Ondiek explained that the six “will be handed over to the
anti-terrorism police officers for further interrogation” (Onsarigo & Wabala, 2015) [P32:2].
According to Wabala, “Police are the first to receive the returnees and play a crucial role in
identifying, apprehending and monitoring the returnees as they go through the reintegration
program” [P145:18]. Likewise, AllAfrica suggested that “The Lamu County administration has
appealed on all returnees who had been recruited to join Al-Shabaab to surrender and register
themselves at security offices… such as county commissioners' to be registered and later
rehabilitated” (“Kenya: County Urges Shabaab Returnees to Surrender for Rehabilitation allAfrica.com,” n.d.) [P148:1]. The Center for Human Rights and Policy Studies (CHRIPS) has
however cautioned that rehabilitation strategy “should not be wholly led by security agencies”
(“Preventing Violent Extremism in Kenya,” n.d.) [P38:3].
Elsewhere, a Boolean operator generated 102 quotations associated with “conferences”
OR “conduct research” codes to determine if there were any deliberations among stakeholders
prior to the launch of ARP. As evidence has shown, GK participated in high stake global CVE
conferences before the launch of the amnesty program. Results indicate that “On 6 – 9 December
2011…The initial event was convened by UNICRI in Lucca, Italy in May, 2011”
(“ICCT/UNICRI Conference on Rehabilitation and Reintegration: Executive Summary and
Good Practices Document now available online | ICCT,” n.d.) [P44:1]. There was another CVE
conference held “from 20-22 January 2015 in Kwale, as a follow-up meeting to the first National
Workshop on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1624 (2005), which was held in
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Nairobi from 7-9 May 2014” (“CTED-ICCT-1624-Workshop-Report-7-9-May-2014-Commentsby-Participants.pdf,” n.d.; “National Workshop on Countering Incitement and Violent
Extremism in Kenya | ICCT,” n.d.). [P76:2].
Kenya also participated in the February 2015 White House Summit on Countering
Violent Extremism meeting in Washington, DC where nations were urged to “develop a
comprehensive, multi-stakeholder action agenda against violent extremism” (“The White House
Summit to Counter Violent Extremism Ministerial Meeting Statement,” n.d.) [P82:2]. Thereafter
according to the U.S. Department of State, Kenya hosted the follow-up CVE meeting - “The
Regional CVE Conference in Nairobi, Kenya on 25th- 28th June 2015 under the theme
Deepening Cooperation in Countering Violent Extremism” [P40:1]. ICCT-The Hague noted that
participants in the conference stressed the need to set up mechanism for vetting procedure to
distinguish between “those who committed international crimes and those who may be eligible
for amnesty” (“National Workshop on Countering Incitement and Violent Extremism in Kenya |
ICCT,” n.d.) [P39:10]. To establish how Kenya defines its target area, the author queried
"rehabilitation" | "target areas" using a Boolean Operator which found 126 quotations.
Findings suggest that during the National Workshop on Countering Incitement and
Violent Extremism in Kenya from May 7-9 at the United Nations Office in Nairobi, the
government was advised to target various groups of youths including,
“young people who became involved or vulnerable for recruitment because of their direct
circumstances and economic grievances,…[those] approached by recruiters, but who did
not yield, and those who were acting as the facilitators of extremist organizations by
doing some tasks, or worked as recruiters, actual fighters, or those that were in leadership
positions” (“National Workshop on Countering Incitement and Violent Extremism in
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Kenya | ICCT,” n.d.), [P39:11].
How do you define your target area that qualifies as returnees? This was coded as
“target area” to mean NCTC’s definition of returnees that qualify for inclusion in the program.
Results showed that ARP targets youths that have either left the country and joined Al-Shabaab
in Somalia and returneed to the country, or youths who have never left the country but had been
radicalized (“President Kenyatta Launches Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism,” 2016).
According to “IRIN | How Kenya’s al-Shabab amnesty is a loaded gun,” n.d, Interior Ministry
spokesman Mwenda Njoka said that “those who have been directly involved in terror activities
against Kenya, or Kenya’s interests” will be criminally prosecuted [P92:2]. With the unveiling of
NSCVE in 2016, Kenya defined target area as returnees who have joined terrorist groups,
whether they are within or outside the country. In details, returnees who qualify for ARP as
outlined in the NSCVE include:
“1. Those that are radicalised and on the brink of joining violent extremist organisations;
2. Members of violent extremist organisations who have not committed or facilitated
violent attacks in Kenya or abroad….
3. Individuals who have voluntarily left violent extremist and terrorist organisations …
and those who have left such groups in response to an amnesty offer;
4. Individuals convicted of terrorist-related crimes and who pose a risk of radicalising
fellow inmates or who voluntarily seek to assist de-radicalisation efforts while serving
their sentences” (NCTC, 2016) [P71:21].
5. Individuals ordered by courts to participate in de-radicalisation and reintegration
efforts” (NCTC, 2016), [P71:22].
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Reintegration Services
In FD framework, Kennedy (2006) suggests that once you frame a special enforcement
operation directed at the targeted chronic offenders or groups of offenders, you match those
enforcement operations with parallel efforts to direct services and the moral voices of affected
communities to those same offenders and groups (p. 157). To assess whether there is actual
reintegration going on on the ground, including provision of counselling and psychological
support to returnees during reintegration process, Boolean Operation queried the “Pulling Levers
OR Reintegration” Code Families (themes) and found 130 quotations in the “GK-related” and
151 quotes in the “Newspapers” categories. The query report was used to answer questions under
this theme as follows.
What is the waiting period if any, do the returnees meet before they can be placed in a
reintegration center? This was coded as “reintegration”. Based on the analysis, it was not
possible to ascertain if there was a waiting period that returnees must meet before being inducted
into the program though returnees are clearly vetted first before they are admitted into the
amnesty program. CVE experts cautioned that “When implementing de-radicalisation or
rehabilitation programs it is crucial to understand the behaviour and attitudes of the programme’s
subjects [because], the inmate should demonstrate a willingness and motivation to change”
(“ICCT/UNICRI Conference on Rehabilitation and Reintegration: Executive Summary and
Good Practices Document now available online | ICCT,” n.d.), [P44:7].
A 2015 US Department of State country report confirms, “The government [GK] also
undertook some small-scale efforts to rehabilitate and reintegrate former al-Shabaab fighters,
facilitators and sympathizers” (“Country Reports on Terrorism 2015 Africa Overview,” n.d.),
[P24:5]. Likewise, in the “1500 Kenyans Radicalized Into Al Shabaab Surrendered As First
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Batch Complete De-Radicalization-Rehabilitation Program – Strategic Intelligence Service,”
n.d., “Kenyan government sponsored a de-radicalization and rehabilitation program for the youth
with the first batch of 19 unveiled by the interior Principal Secretary Karanja Kibicho” [P13:4].
The media reported that there is “reintegration kit” offered to the returnees, what does
the kit entail? This was coded as “reintegration kit”. Evidence suggests that returnees that have
gone through the reintegration training are provided with the reintegration kit including tools
necessary to enable reformed returnees to lead a productive life upon their reintegration back in
the society. While unveiling some of the returnees that had gone through the reintegration
program in Coast, Interior PS Karanja Kibicho on February 22 while at the Government Training
Institute in Kwale, reported that 19 out of 48 returnees had gone through the reintegration
training by the government. According to the PS,
“The 19 [reformed returnees] were then handed what was termed as a reintegration kit,
which included motorbikes, handcarts, together with carpentry, sewing and cooking
equipment. The PS said through a Government-private sector partnership, they had
tailored programmes to normalise the youths. ‘The tutors studied each of them and
looked at the depth of their minds to remove the philosophy that caused youths to
disregard life and property,’ he added” (1,500 Kenyan youths recruited by Al Shabaab
have surrendered. (n.d.), P1:5; also see P1:4; P93:5].
What are the rules for inclusion in the program? Coded as “target area”. The rules for
inclusion and the description of “target areas” were synonymous as already detailed under the
“conduct research” theme and was not discussed any further here.
Once they surrender, what happens next? Coded as “reintegration”, results indicate that
once they surrender, they are subjected to a vetting process to determine their suitability for
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inclusion in the program. As presented in the National Workshop on the Implementation of
Security Council Resolution 1624 (2005), rehabilitation entails “improvement of the ‘vetting
procedure’, demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) programs, as well as
provision of counselling programs” (“National Workshop on Countering Incitement and Violent
Extremism in Kenya | ICCT,” n.d.) [P39:10].
Results further indicate that a couple of returnees were reintegrated. During reintegration
training, returnees receives psychological support from professional counsellors. According to
The Standard Digital of February 23, 2016
“The PS said through a Government-private sector partnership, they had tailored
programmes to normalise the youths. “The tutors studied each of them and looked at the
depth of their minds to remove the philosophy that caused youths to disregard life and
property,” he added. The PS said the State has in place a monitoring and evaluation
mechanism to ensure the returnees do not fall back (see 1,500 Kenyan youths recruited
by Al Shabaab have surrendered, declares State :: Kenya - The Standard. (n.d.), P93:6).
What kind of role does the community/religious play if any, in the implementation of the
program? Please explain. Coded as “role of community/religious leaders”, there were 16
Quotations found for query "role of community/religious leaders" | "rehabilitation kit".
There were indications that the government engaged with civil societies in implementing
ARP. As shown by joint study by the International Organization of Migration (IOM), Supreme
Council of Kenya Muslims, and Ministry of Interior about the returnees in Coast. Ideally, NCTC
expects members of the affected communities including religious leaders to report their missing
children whom they suspect might have joined Al-Shabaab to them, but parents are generally
uncooperative. According to the Daily Nation of May 29,2015,
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Mr Nkaissery has since asked parents and families who have missing children suspected
to have crossed over to Somalia or are being radicalised in the country to report to the
police to help track them down (“Amnesty yields 85 radicalised youths - Daily Nation,”
n.d.), P91:6.
In another Capital Blog entitled “Amnesty for youths misled to join Al Shabaab - Capital Blog,”
n.d., it further indicated that,
“Similarly, any parent or guardian whose child has either gone missing, suspects that the
child has been radicalized, or suspects the child to have been killed in Somalia is also
called upon to report the same. Failure to report will lead to presumption that they are
aware and condone or are party to the terrorist training with attendant criminal
consequences.” (P28:6).
Communication
Communication is a key aspect of FD intervention because it calls sending both hard and
soft messages to the offenders, by the implementers. Kennedy (2006) states that FD involves
“Communicating directly and repeatedly with offenders and groups to let them know that they
are under particular scrutiny, what acts (such as shootings) will get special attention, when that
has in fact happened to particular offenders and groups, and what they can do to avoid
enforcement action” (p.157). This statement was coded as “communication”. A Boolean
Operator queried “communication XOR reintegration” and generated 57 quotations in the “GKrelated” documents. The XOR operator asks that "EXACTLY one of the conditions must be met
(Friese, 2015, p. 238). In this regard, the following questions were used to explore the nature of
communication in ARP.
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What warning message, if any, do you emphasize in your communication with the
returnees? For example, do you tell them to stop it? Do you warn them of swift and certain
prosecution? Results show that, Kenyan government officials have been warning returnees who
fail to surrender that they will face the full force of law. According to “Amnesty,” (2015) “He
[Nkaissery] warned that “those who fail to heed this call within the prescribed time frame will be
treated as criminals and will face the full force of the law” [P48:1].
Do you have any specific cadre of security officers that are authorized to receive
information from returnees? Please expound. While returnees report to security agencies
including County Commissioners, NCTC (National Intelligence Service and ATPU) for
subsequent vetting and interrogation before they are admitted into ARP, it was not clear if there
were specific cadre of security officers that were authorized to receive or collect their data.
Do you communicate with the returnees through meetings or phone? Are there any
specific phone numbers assigned to returnees to call? Do you make any direct communication
with the returnees warning them of the consequences of breaking the reintegration rules? If
affirmative, what is the message you send them? There were specific phone contacts that were
provided for those willing to surrender (“Amnesty for youths misled to join Al Shabaab Capital Blog,” n.d.) with the government urging returnees
“to report to County Commissioner Nairobi; County Commissioner Mombasa and
County Commissioner Garissa, or ...confidentially report through the following contacts:
– 0701632432, 0701632643, 0701632443 or infoken247@gmail.com” [P28:4].
According to The Star,
“Police are holding six suspected al Shabaab returnees who surrendered following the 10day amnesty issued by government. The six suspects surrendered to police in Mombasa

83

this week. They are being interrogated by officers from different security agencies,
including the Anti-Terror Police Unit and National Intelligence Service... the youth are
supposed to surrender to Nairobi, Mombasa and Garissa county commissioners” (“Six
Shabaab returnees surrender in Mombasa | The Star, Kenya,” n.d.), [P150:1].
What kind of follow-up, if any, do members of the Working Team make with the returnees
in the program? There was no sufficient data to demonstrate the kind of follow-up made on the
returnees, even though NCTC is charged with monitoring returnees before and after
reintegration. It is however clear that some hundreds of returnees surrendered to NCTC, were
interrogated before being absorbed into the program.
Besides, the “NCTC Sample” received an in-depth survey and results were analyzed
using Atlas.ti. This sample was meant to offer primary data for a comparative analysis of how
perceptions of NCTC and GOs vary on certain aspects of ARP. The researcher argued that their
perceptions influences the implementation feasibility of ARP. Due to the low response rate from
this sample, it was not possible to offer proper comparison. There were 12 quotations for
“challenge” OR “timing” codes. Besides, 4 quotations were generated for “number” OR “legal
framework” to determine the number of returnees that surrendered, and whether there is a legal
framework supporting the amnesty program.
Results show that lack of amnesty policy law, mistrust between community and the
security agencies, as well as insecurity of returnees as main challenges in implementation of
ARP. P2 is an NCTC respondent and indicated that; “The amnesty was just a press statement.
There was no evidence that the amnesty was backed by a policy framework, gazette notice or
legislation.” [P2:2]. Besides, P1 estimated that 100-150 returnees have so far surrendered [P1:3].
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P3 is an NCTC respondent, and added that “Many have surrendered; the exact number is hard to
tell because they do so in confidentiality/discretion.” [P3:6].
P4 is a police respondent for police and indicated that “Well [the numbers are] not really
well documented” [P4:6]. Elsewhere, there were 7 quotations found for “data type collected” OR
“improvement”. Asked about the kind of data they collect during the interview, an NCTC
respondent, cited demographic factors, “including who was their contact person, times of their
meetings and the kind of training they were trained and in which language” [P1:7]. They also
gather information about “The time spent in Alshabaab, and the type of training they got during
their service to Alshabaab” [P2:11]. Another NCTC respondent added, the data collected
include,
“who recruited them, why they decided to join the group and why they left. More so,
their leaders, where they trained and for how long, operations involved in, strength of the
enemy in terms of personnel and weapons.” [P3:11]
Asked about what they feel should be done to improve the program, the emerging themes
were trust and security of returnees. An NCTC personnel wrote, “Security agencies should first
establish a good working rapport and build trust with Kenyans” [P1:11]. One NCTC respondent
said, “enough financial support [and]” [P2:15], while another added “providing their security”
[P3:17]. In contrast, a police respondent said, “couple it with aggressive law enforcement, heavy
detection and very deterrent measures for those apprehended. This will make peaceful surrender a
real option” [P4:13]. Besides, they generally agreed that it is important to gather information from
the returnees. An NCTC respondent indicated, “Getting vital information about the returnees
encounters in Somalia, which is important in spearheading de-radicalization campaigns.” [P2:13].
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Another NCTC personnel added that “The program can be exploited more to gather critical
intelligence on AS [Al Shabaab] future plans” [P3:15].
Finally, there were 9 quotations found for “role of community/religious leaders” OR
“role of police” to determine the role of police and community/religious leaders in the program.
Evidently, ccommunity/religious leaders help by “Reporting missing youths suspected to have
joined AS to security agents.” [P3:23]. As another NCTC added, “Parents/guardians volunteer
information about their missing kin to security forces on one hand, while on the other, security
agents have a database of facilitators/sympathizers and youths who are suspected to have joined
the terror group” [P3:9].
Quantitative Analysis
To assess perception of Kenyan Police officers regarding countering violent extremism as
a counter-terrorism strategy, the dependent variable, police perception of CVE was measured as
resistance, skepticism, risk assessment, and autonomy/discretion, preparedness. Independent
variables including rank, education, gender, and, designation, length of service were coded using
a sheet containing closed-ended questions as follows; Gender was a binary variable coded as 1
(male), 0 (female). Education was a nominal variable coded to reflect the highest level of
education an officer had attained as follows; 1 (secondary/high school), 2 (diploma/higher
diploma), 3 (bachelor degree), 4 (post graduate studies). Rank was an ordinal variable coded on a
Likert Scale from 1 to 5, with the highest digit indicating the highest rank as follows; 5
(Assistant Inspector General), 4 (Commissioner of Police), 3 (Senior Superintendent of Police), 2
(Superintendent of Police), and 1 (Assistant Superintendent of Police). Designation (nature of
deployment) was a categorical variable coded as 1 (General Duty), 0 (Formations). Finally,
Length of Service reflecting the field experience of officers was coded into interval level ranging

86

from 1 (lowest) to 4 (longest) based on a Likert Scale, precisely, 1 (<10 years), 2 (10-15 years), 3
(16-10 years) and 4 (>20 years). Thus, the dissertation tested 14 hypotheses.
Hypotheses
Resistance
H1: Gender and perception about proportionality of amnesty to terrorists are related.
H2: Designation and perceptions on whether amnesty should solely be handled by NCTC are
independent of each other.
Skepticism
H3: Education and optimism that amnesty is helpful in disengaging or rehabilitating terrorists
have a significant relationship.
H4: There is no significant Mean (μ) difference among various lengths of service for police
officers and their optimism that amnesty can be helpful in disengaging or rehabilitating terrorists
(μ1= μ2= μ3= μ4).
H5: There is an independent relationship between designation and challenges facing the
implementation of ARP.
Discretion/Autonomy
H6: There no statistically significant Mean difference between GD and Formation commanders
regarding their perception of how ARP is changing their decision-making at work.
Preparedness
The theme preparedness was assessed using descriptive statistics only.
Risk assessment
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H7: There is no significant relationship between designation and “infiltration” (whether police
should worry that participants can seize this opportunity to infiltrate their ideologies into the
program participants by strengthening their ideologies to go back to terrorism.
H8: There is no significant relationship between rank and “radicalization” (the extent, if any, it
concerns police officers that the amnesty can be a platform for convergence of like-minded
suspects to further their terrorist schemes.
H9: There is no significant relationship between “designation and “recruitment” (whether this
soft power approach could lead to less recruitment by Al-Shabaab within Kenya).
H10: Gender and “implementation” (aspects of the program that police officers consider difficult
to implement) are independent of each other.
H11: Designation and “motivation” (factors that motivate returnees to surrender to the police)
are not related.
H12: Gender and “motivation” (factors that motivate returnees to surrender to the police) are not
related.
H13: There is no statistically significant Mean difference between perceptions of GD and
Formation commanders regarding “appropriateness” (proportionality of amnesty to terrorist
offences considering that amnesty has been applied to illicit firearm holders).
H14: There is no significant association between designation and “reform” (officer’s perceptions
on whether it is possible to know if returnees have changed/reformed).
Survey data were entered onto Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS)
software then analyzed using descriptive statistics, Chi-Squares, T-Tests, and ANOVA. Notably,
confidence of 95% and alpha level of .05 were used to determine statistical significance of all the
tests. Important to note is that although data collection for the survey began before obtaining IRB
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clearance, quantitative analysis was postponed until the investigator received the IRB approval in
compliance with the CUNY research regulations.
Based on descriptive statistics, majority (220 or 81%) were male compared with 51 or
19% female officers. There were three missing data for gender variable and were coded as 99.
GD were the majority (160 or 60%) compared with 108 or 40% from Formations. Senior
Superintendents accounted for (36%), followed by Assistant Superintendents (34%),
Commissioner of Police (15%) and Superintendents (13%). AIG were the fewest (2%). Out of
271 participants, 43% were secondary/high school leavers (HS) which is sensible because the
minimum academic qualification for enlistment in the police is HS certificate. There were
Bachelor Degree holders (25%), Diploma/Higher Diploma (Dip) (equivalent to a two-year
college in the US) (23%), and Post-Graduates were 9%. Majority had long service record
spanning > 20 years (73.2%), 14.3% had served for 16-20 years, 11.4% had served for 10-15
years while 1% had served for < a decade. Results are presented under the six themes per
following discussion.
Resistance
Assessing police perceptions to determine their level of resistance to ARP was important
because ARP deviates from the traditional hard CT operations by KPS. That presents a point of
conflict, and police as an organization may be resistant to change to such a “soft” CVE approach.
Two questions were used to assess resistance defined here as the extent to which officers are
dismissive in their perceptions about ARP or not.
What is your view of amnesty for terrorists in terms of proportionality to terrorism? This
was coded as “proportionality” and its responses coded as 1 (lenient), 0 (not lenient).
Descriptive statistics show that most officers (65.2%) view the program as “Lenient” on
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terrorism while 34.8% think it is “not lenient” (table not shown). As shown in Figure 7, among
male cops, majority (174 or 64.68%) think it is lenient compared with 46 (17.1%) who think it is
not lenient. Nearly all (48) female cops think it is not lenient compared to 1 female that think it is
lenient.

Count

Figure 7: Perception about proportionality of ARP by
Gender
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Do you think this program should be handled solely by NCTC? The question was coded
as “implementer” it being nominal variables with responses coded as 1 (yes, because it is a
multi-agency), 2 (yes, they are better trained and prepared to implement the program), 3 (yes,
they are likely to be trusted by the public). The responses to this question however were
incomplete as there was no provision for negative response. Figure 8 shows that GD and
Formation commanders hold divergent perceptions about whether NCTC should be the sole
implementer of the ARP. The association between “designation” and “implementer” was
statistically significant, χ2(2, N=251) = 55.624, p < .05. Overall, Formation commanders highly
think that NCTC should be the sole implementer of ARP because “they are better trained and
prepared to implement the program”, while GD officers agree because “it is a multi-agency”.
Among General Duty, 100 officers think ARP should be handled solely by NCTC because “it is
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a mulit-agency” compared with 42 respondents who think so because “they are better trained and
preapred to implement the program”.
Figure 8: Do you think the Amnesty Program should be
handled solely by NCTC?
Yes, they are likely to be trusted by the public
Yes, they are better trained and prepared to implement the program

Designation

Yes, because it is a multi-agency
General Duty
Formation

5

42
17
65
22
Number of Officers

100

Skepticism
Culturally, police officers are very suspicious. As such, police are more likely to be
dismissive of initiatives that deviate from their traditional crime prevention strategies. In this
regard, understanding the extent to which police are skeptical about various aspects of ARP is
important because the level of their skepticism influences the extent to which they will support
CVE. Presumably, officers would mostly be skeptical (optimistic or pessimistic) about the
benefit of ARP depending on the opportunities and challenges associated with the
implementation of the program.
A previous study that measured police perception in terms of skepticism was Lurigio and
Skogan’s evaluation of Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) when Community
Policing was introduced in the Chicago Police Department. Lurigio & Skogan (1994) measured
police “Optimistic about CAPS-traditional”. Respondents scored these questions on a scale from
1 (less likely) to 3 (more likely) to rate the likelihood that a variety of positive changes in
traditional police services would occur after CAPS was implemented.
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They found that Sergeants and above were more optimistic than patrol officers (p<.05);
and older Officers (age 50 and over) were more optimistic than officers in their 40s, 30s and 20s
(p<.05) (p.327). They also measured Pessimistic about CAPS, and officers rated the likelihood
that negative changes would occur after CAPS. Over 70% believed that community groups
would place more unreasonable demands on police (73%) and that there would be greater citizen
demands placed on police resources (72%) after CAPS (p. 327). In like manner, the present study
assessed skepticism about ARP using the following questions;
How confident are you that this program will reduce terror attacks? The question was
coded as ordinal variable “confidence”, with responses ranging from 2 (confident) to 0 (not
confident). Results show a fair balance between officers that felt either confident or somehow
confident. Statistics indicate that 45% feel “confident”, 42% feel “somehow confident”, and 13%
“not confident” that the program will reduce terror attack. In general, officers were confident that
ARP can reduce terror attacks in the country.
To what extent are you optimistic that the amnesty is helpful in disengaging or
rehabilitating terrorists? This was coded as “optimism”, an ordinal variable with responses
ranging from 4 (very optimistic) to 0 (not optimistic). A Chi-Square test of independence
between “education” and “optimism” is statistically significant; χ2 (9, N=265) = 105.959, p <
.001. Though strong, the relationship was negative.
In other words, the higher the level of education of an officer, the less likely an officer
will be “optimistic” that the program is helpful in disengating or rehabilitating terrorists.
Furthermore, a One-Way ANOVA tested the hypothesis that there is no mean difference in
“optimism” (police perception on whether the amnesty is helpful in disengaging or rehabilitating
returnees) among four categories of length of service.
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Table 5: One Way ANOVA showing Optimism by Length of Service
Descriptives
To what extent are you optimistic amnesty is helpful in
disengaging or rehabilitating terrorists?
Length of Service N
Mean
Std. Deviation
<10 years
3
2.3333
1.15
10-15 years
31
2.5806
.62
16-20 years
38
1.8947
.72
>20 years
194
1.6495
.68
Total
266
1.8008
.748
Results (Table 5) show that for officers that have served for “10-15 years”, M=2.58,
SD=.62. For officers that have served for “21 years and above”, M=1.65 (rounded off), SD=.68.
ANOVA output (Table 6) shows that F (3, 262) =17.248, p=.001 which is statistically
significant. This implies that at least one Mean is statistically significantly different from the rest.
However, the F test is not telling us where exactly those Mean differences exist which calls for
the interpretation of Post-Hoc (Tukey HSD) results (Table 7).
Table 6: ANOVA
To what extent are you optimistic that the amnesty is
helpful in disengaging or rehabilitating?
Sum of
df
Mean
F
Sig.
Squares
Square
Between Groups 24.481
3
8.160
17.248 .000
Within Groups
123.958
262
.473
Total
148.440
265
The Tukey post hoc test (Table 7) shows that there is a statistically significant difference
in Mean length of service between the group that served for “21 years and above” and “10-15
years” (p=.001), and between the “16-20 years” and “10-15 years” groups (p=.001). However,
there were no statistically significant mean differences between the groups that served “21 years
and above” and less than 10 years (p=.321). There is 95% confidence that the Mean differences
are not due to chance. The Tukey post hoc test revealed that the officers’ optimism that ARP is
helpful in disengaging or rehabilitating terrorists was statistically significantly lower after
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serving longer than 10-15 years (2.58 ± .62 years, p = .001), 16-20 years (1.89 ± .73 years, p =
.001) and >20 years (1.65 ± .68 years, p = .001) (Table 7).
Table 7: Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable: To what extent are you optimistic that the amnesty is helpful in disengaging
or rehabilitating terrorists?
Tukey HSD
(I)What is your length of (J) What is your length of Mean Difference (I-J) Sig.
service?
service?
10-15 years
<10 years
.24731
.934
16-20 years
.68591*
.000
>20 years
.93116*
.000
16-20 years
<10 years
-.43860
.712
10-15 years
-.68591*
.000
>20 years
.24525
.187
>20 years
<10 years
-.68385
.321
10-15 years
-.93116*
.000
16-20 years
-.24525
.187
To what extent are you pessimistic that the amnesty is helpful in disengaging or
rehabilitating terrorists? Coded as “pessimistic” with responses ranging from 2 (less
pessimistic) to 0 (not pessimistic), results show that there was a tie between officers that were
“pessimistic” (43%) and those that were “less pessimistic” (43%) (Frequency Table not shown).
What are the main opportunities in this program? The question was coded as
“opportunities” which was a nominal variable measured as follows; 1 (makes surveillance of
terrorism easy), 2 (reintegration of terrorists prevents terror), 3 (corporation with other agencies),
4 (moral obligation of community to help reformed returnees to desist from terrorism). As shown
in Figure 9, approximately 34% of the respondents identified “moral obligation of community to
help reformed returnees to desist from terrorism”, followed by 25% who felt that “reintegration
of terrorists prevents terror”. Approximately 21% of the respondents said that the program
provides opportunity for “corporation with other agencies”, while the remaining 20% said that
the program “makes surveillance of terrorism easy”.
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Figure 9: Opportunities in Amnesty and Reintegration
Program
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What are the key challenges in this program? Coded as “challenges”, this was a nominal
variable with four responses as follows, 1 (insecurity of the returnees); 2 (death of reformed
returnees causes fear and prevents other returnees from surrendering); 3 (recidivism/reoffending
of reformed returnees who fail to reintegrate in the society); 4 (difficulty to authenticate the
sincerity of returnees that surrender). Descriptive statistics (frequency table not shown) show that
40% of officers said that the main challenge is “difficulty to authentic the sincerity of returnees”.
Likewise, 32% of the respondents believe “insecurity of the returnees from other terrorists is
high”, while 16% and 12% identified “recidivism/re-offending of reformed returnees who fail to
reintegrate in the society”, and “death of reformed returnees causes as a cause of fear and
prevention of other returnees from surrendering” respectively. There was a fair balance between
GD (9) and Formations (7) that “recidivism/reoffending of reformed returnees who fail to
reintegrate in the society”.
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Challenges of the Program

Figure 10: Challenges of Amnesty and Reintegration Program?
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A Chi-square test of Independence examined if there is any relationship between
designation and “challenges”. Figure 10 demonstrates that more GD officers (25%) think that
“insecurity of returnees from other terrorists is high” compared with just 6% of Formation
commanders that see this as the key challenge. In contrast, more Formation commanders (25%)
believe that “difficulty to authenicate the sincerity of returnees” is the challenge in the program
compared with 15% of GD officers that see this as the key challenge to the program.
Is there anything you feel should be done to improve the program? This coded as
“improvement”, a nominal variable with two responses; 1 (police should have a much direct
involvement in the implementation); 2 (there should be a legal framework to work with). Results
show that over half of the respondents (56%) felt that “there should be a legal framework to
work with” while 44% of the respondents felt that “police should have a much direct
involvement in the implementation” (frequency table not shown).
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Discretion/Autonomy
Samuel Walker views discretion as a central problem in the US criminal justice system
(see Walker, 2010; Walker, 1993). Arguably, police have enormous discretion in executing their
official duties especially in the streets. Discretion allows police to make legally acceptable
choices like whether to arrest or not, and the type of charges to prefer on criminal suspects which
in turn can mean selective law enforcement. Walker observed, “The problem is not discretion
itself, but its misuse” (Walker 1993, p. 4). In other words, despite discretion being a good thing
for police work, it can be abused if it is not controlled.
Despite there being police regulations, Skolnick argued that police officers are usually
under “production pressures” to achieve high clearance rates which sometimes forces them to
report any ambiguous cases as being suspicious circumstance (Skolnick, 1966). Likewise, due to
isolation and “occupational solidarity’, officers tend to protect themselves not only from public
attacks but also from fellow officers. In this manner, junior police officers tend to protect their
fellow junior officers engaged in professional misconduct to evade any reprisal from their
seniors (Skolinick, 1994). Police officers have no flexibility because they must obey the
commands from their seniors. Even if the supervisors are seen to be strict on enforcing the
administrative policies, junior officers are dealing with returnees in the streets, and the
supervisors cannot always be present to monitor activities of their juniors. It is therefore likely
that police, either at individual or organizational level would be concerned about interventions
that may limit their discretionary powers or autonomy. Lurigio & Skogan (1994) defined job
autonomy as “the degree to which employees believe that their jobs afford them discretion and
independence” (p. 321) and this dissertation, discretion and autonomy are used interchangeably.
In this sense, the dissertation raised three questions.
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How do you think the program is changing things especially decision making at work?
This question was coded as “discretion/autonomy”, and was ordinal variable. Respondents
scored each of the three responses on discretion/autonomy on a scale of 0 (does no limit police
discretion/autonomy) to 2 (highly limits discretion/autonomy).
Table 8: Independent Sample T-test between discretion and designation

How do you think
the amnesty and
reintegration
program is
changing things
especially decision
making at work?

Independent Samples Test
t-test for Equality of Means
t
df
Sig. (2tailed)
Equal variances -4.213 262
.000
assumed
-4.155 214.429 .000
Equal variances
not assumed

Mean
Difference
-.36279
-.36279

An Independent Sample T-Test for the association between “discretion” and
“designation” was conducted (Table 8). In other words, is there a mean difference between
Formation and GD commanders regarding their perception of how ARP is changing
discretion/decision making at work? The null hypothesis assumed that there is no difference
between the two Means, that is, (µ1= µ2). Results indicate a statistically significant difference in
perceptions for Formation (M=.82, S. D=.71) and GD (M=1.18, S. D=.67) designations; t (262)
=-4.213, p = <.001. Because Formation commanders have a lesser Mean (.8) compared to GD,
they were less likely to say that the amnesty program is limiting their discretion. The results
suggest that designation influences perception of police officers regarding how the amnesty is
changing their decision making at. Specifically, when designation is taken into consideration,
perceptions of police officers regarding how ARP is changing decision-making differs. Besides,
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other than Assistant Inspector Generals, all other officers regardless of rank, believe that ARP
“somehow limits discretion”.
How does it change if any, the way you are seeing or would treat terror suspects? This
question was coded as “treatment”, a nominal variable with three response outcomes namely 2
(positively), 1 (negatively), and 0 (I don’t know). Results indicate that, most of the respondents
(approximately 62%) said that the program has “positively” changed the way they are seeing or
treat terror suspects while 28% said it changed them “negatively”, and 9% “don’t know”
(Descriptive statistics output not shown).
Overall, to what extent if any, would you say that identifying terror suspects has
improved since the amnesty was announced? Coded as “identification”, this was an ordinal
variable measured as follows; 3 (yes, better off) to 0 (I’m not sure). Results show 38% of officers
said they were “not sure”, 24% said things were “about the same”, 30% said, “better off” while
7% said “things are worse” (Descriptive statistics output not shown).”
Preparedness
Police in Kenya operate under unique circumstances with limited resources including
personnel, and lack of proper training or capacity to fight crime. It is therefore important for
policy makers and practitioners implementing ARP to understand, police perceptions about their
state of preparedness in implementing policies within their departments. The dissertation
measured preparedness using two questions.
How well are you prepared to deal with them (returnees) after they surrender within your
jurisdiction? This variable was coded as “preparedness” and it was ordinal. Participants rated
each of the responses depicting their levels of preparedness on a 5-point Likert Scale ranging
from 4 (very prepared) to 0 (not prepared). Results (frequency table not shown), indicate that
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officers generally feel prepared. Precisely, 42.4% of respondents feel “prepared” to deal with
returnees when they surrender within their jurisdictions, while 23.4% feel “somewhat prepared”
and 12.4% feel “very well prepared”. 14.1% felt they were “not prepared” while 7.3% felt “less
prepared”. Lurigio & Skogan (1994) used a similar approach in assessing CAPS capability. In
their study of CAPS, participants scored each of these questions on a scale of 1 (very
unqualified) to 4 (very qualified) to rate their own ability to perform CAPS-related activities.
They found that 42% felt either qualified or very qualified to use the CAPS model to analyze
problems (p. 328).
Do you think more resources should be allocated to the program? This was coded as
“resources”, a binary variable with responses coded as 1 (yes); 0 (no). Interestingly, (260 of 267
or 97.4%) of officers agreed that more resources should be allocated to the program (Frequency
table not shown). Lurigio & Skogan (1994) also assessed police perceptions on CAPS resources.
Respondents scored these questions on a scale from 1 (none) to 4 (a large amount) to rate their
opinions regarding the amount of resources that department should commit to CAPS-related
police activities. On average, officers felt that a moderate amount of resources should be devoted
to such activities (p. 328).
Risk Assessment
Understanding police perception about risk was necessitated by the fact that police work
is dangerous/risky. As a result, police officers are constantly concerned about their security and
that of the communities they are sworn to serve and protect. In a previous police study, Jerome
Skolnick studied the police in Westville California by engaging in police ride alongs. He used
participant observations of police conduct during routine performance of their duties. He found
that police officers have a “working personality” which entails three elements namely; danger,
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authority and efficiency (Skolnick, 1966). In their effort to control crime, surveillance or
monitoring becomes a key tool. In the case of ARP, ATPU and NIS are entrusted with the
responsibility of monitoring returnees during and after their reintegration to prevent recidivism.
In this regard, dissertation used nine questions under this theme to assess police perceptions
about risk associated with ARP.
Should police worry that participants can seize this opportunity to infiltrate their
ideologies into the program participants by strengthening their ideologies to go back to
terrorism? This was coded as infiltration and it was ordinal with three responses ranging from 2
(definitely) to 0 (not really).

Number of Officers

Figure 11: Perception of Infiltration by Designation

60
40
20

32%

3%
21%

11%

0

25%
8%

Not really
Somewhat yes
Definitely
Perception about ideological infiltration into the program
Formation

General Duty

Figure 11 is a Chi-square of Independence between “designation and infiltration” (that is,
whether police should worry that participants can seize this opportunity to infiltrate their
ideologies into the program participants by strengthening their ideologies to go back to
terrorism). Results show that they generally agree because 43% answered “somewhat yes”, 34%
answered “definitely”, while 24% said “not really”. The relationship between these two
categorical variables was statistically significant, χ2 (2, N=265)= 77.069, < .001.
To what extent, if any, does it concern you that the amnesty can be a platform for
convergence of like-minded suspects to further their terrorist schemes? Coded as “convergence”,
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this was an ordinal variable with responses as follows ranging from 3 (very concerned) to 1 (less
concerned). Overall, 80% of respondents were “very concerned” that this amnesty can be a
platform for convergence of like-minded suspects to further their terror schemes, 11% were “less
concerned” and 8% were “not concerned” (frequency table not shown). All officers, irrespective
or rank, were “very concerned” that that the amnesty can be a platform for convergene of likemided suspects to further their terrorist schemes). There is a statistically significant relationship
between “rank” and “radicalization”, χ2 (8, N=247)= 21.481, p=.006.
“Is it likely that Kenya could face more challenges because of the burgeoning number of
returnees in the program?” Coded as “number”, this was an ordinal variable with responses
measured on a three-point Likert Scale ranging from 2 (likely) to 0 (unlikely). Over half
(54.89%) of the respondents feel that Kenya could face more challenges because of the
burgeoning number of returnees in the program compared with 31.2% who feel that is is “very
likely” so, and 13.91% that fell it is unlikely.
“Do you think this “soft” power approach could lead to less recruitment by al-Shabaab
within Kenya?”. Coded as “recruitment”, this was nominal variable coded as 1 (yes); 0 (no).
59% felt that “yes”, this soft power approach could lead to less recruitment by al Shabaab within
Kenya compared with 41% of the respondents that feel “no”. Figure 12 is chart from Chi-Square
test of independence between “designation” and “recruitment”. Formation commanders (25%)
do not think that “this soft power approach could lead to less recruitment by Al-Shabaab within
Kenya”, while GD commanders 44% think that it could.
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Designation

Figure 12: Perception of Recruitment by Designation
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What aspects of the program do you consider difficult to implement? Coded as
“implementation”, this was a categorical variable with three responses; (identification of genuine
returnees), 2 (making decision about referral for reintegration), 3 (follow-up on returnees). Per
results, majority of officers (55%) consider “identification of genuine returnees” as difficult,
38% of the respondents consider “follow-up on returnees” as being difficult, while 7% consider
“making decisions about referral for reintegration” as difficult. However, the relationship
between “gender” and “implementation” was not statistically significant; χ2 (2, N=263) = 5.242,
p =.073.
To what extent do you find the program helpful? The question was coded as
“helpfulness” with a four-point ordinal scale response ranging from 3 (better off) to 0 (no, things
are worse). Results indicate that over half (109 of 188 or 58%) of officers find the program
“helpful”, 57 or 30% find it “very helpful”, while 22 or 12% “don’t know” (frequency table not
shown). In brief, majority rated the program as being helpful.
What factors do you think motivate them to surrender to the police? This was coded as
“motivation”, and it was nominal variable with three responses; 1 (fear of arrest), 2 (confidence
in community leaders), and 3 (confidence in the amnesty). A cross tabulation output (Table 9)
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shows that within the Formation row, E=59.3, O=28 regarding “Fear of arrest”. In addition,
E=76, O=32 for officers who chose “Confidence in amnesty”. Similarly, among GD officers,
E=118, O=86.7 for the “Fear of Arrest”. Likewise, O=32, E=64.2 for “Confidence in amnesty”
category. Due to the large residuals, the differences between E and O is not due to sampling error
hence the null hypothesis that E equals O is rejected.
In other words, among Formation commanders, most of the officers (76 out of 108)
believe that returnees were motivated to surrender because they had “confidence in the amnesty”
compared with 32 of 108 among GD officers who think so. In contrast, most of the GD officers
(118 of 146) believe they were motivated by “fear of arrest” compared with 28 of 146 Formation
commanders who said so. Further, there was χ2(2, N=266) = 67.733, p < .05, indicating a
statistically significant relationship between the two variables. The null hypothesis of no
relationship is thus rejected. The relationship between “gender and “motivation” was however
not statistically significant; Pearson Chi-Square, χ2 (2, N=268)= 5.652, p=.059.
Table 9: Crosstab for Motivation by Designation

What is your
designation?

Formation
/Unit

General
Duty

Total

Count
Expected Count
% within What is
your designation?
Count
Expected Count
% within What is
your designation
Count
Expected Count
% within What is
your designation?

What factors do you think motivate
them to surrender to the police?
Fear
Confidence Confidence
of
in
in the
arrest
community amnesty
leaders
28
4
76
59.3
4.9
43.8

Total

25.9%
118
86.7

3.7%
8
7.1

70.4%
32
64.2

100%
158
158.0

74.7%
146
146.0
54.9%

5.1%
12
12.0
4.5%

20.3%
108
108.8
40.6%

100%
266
266.0
100%

108
108.0
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Do you think the amnesty is proportionate to the terrorist offences as much as amnesty
has been applied to other crimes such as illegal firearms? This was coded as “appropriateness”
with four possible responses measured on a four-point ordinal scale with 4 (strongly agree) being
the highest and 1 (strongly disagree).
An Independent Sample-Test (Table 10) compared Mean differences in perceptions about
proportionality (“appropriateness”) of amnesty to the terrorist offences, between GD and
Formations. This tested the null hypothesis, H0: µ1 = µ2 (the two population means are equal).
There was a significant difference in perceptions for Formation (M=2.49, S. D=.91) and GD
(M=1.80, S. D=.87) designations; t (262) =6.202, p = <.001. Specifically, results suggest that
when designation is taken into consideration, perceptions of police officers regarding
appropriateness of amnesty to terrorists differs. In other words, the Mean for Formation=2.49 ±
.91 and is higher than the Mean for GD = 1.80 ± .87), meaning that Formation commanders were
more likely to say that amnesty is appropriate to terrorism, compared to GD officers. We are thus
95% confident that the mean differences are not due to standard error or chance variation.
Is it possible to know if they have changed? This was coded as “reform”, a binary
variable with responses coded as 1 (yes), 0 (no). A Chi-Square test of Independence between
“designation” and “reform” generated a Pearson Chi-Square, χ2 (1, N=263)= 147.836, p<.001,
indicating a statistically significant relationship between the two variables. In other words, much
fewer (6%) GD officers were likely to believe it is not possible to know if returnees have
changed while Formation commanders were more likely (35%) believe it is not possible (graph
not shown). In contrast, approximately 52% of GD officers believe it is possible to know if
returnees have changed/reformed, compared with 5% of Formation commanders that think so.
Apart from secondary/high school leavers who overwhelmingly answered to the affirmative, the
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rest of the officers believe it is not possible to know if they have changed. The relationship
between length of service and “reform” variables however was not significant, χ2 (3, N=265)=
5.181, p=.159.
Table 10: T-Test for Appropriateness by Designation
Group Statistics

Do you think
amnesty is
proportionate to
the terrorist
offences as
much as
amnesty has
been applied to
other crimes
such as illegal
firearms?

What is your
N
designation?
Formation/Unit 107

Mean

Std. Deviation

Std. Error Mean

2.4860

.91491

.08845

General Duty

1.7962

.86779

.06926

157

t-test for Eqality of Means
t

Do you think amnesty is
proportionate to the terrorist
offences as much as amnesty has
been applied to other crimes such
as illegal firearms?

Equal variances
assumed

df

6.202 262

Sig.
Mean
(2Difference
tailed)
.000
.68980

6.140 219.710

.000

.68980

Equal variances
not assumed

Ethical Considerations
This study involved a survey. As such, the subjects were all afforded protections like
human subjects of research within the US. This was in tandem with the CUNY Human Research
Protection Program (HRPP) (formerly IRB) regulations. To gain entry, the author obtained three
approvals: letter from the D-IG KPS issued in September 2016 (appendix C). The issuance of the
letter by the D-IG however did not translate to having a total access because it was not a lawful
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police command. The IRB approval was granted in May 2017 (appendix F). Lastly, Research
Permit from the National Commission for Science and Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI)
in Kenya was granted on December 2017 (appendix G). Notably, NACOSTI permit costs $20
(Kshs. 2,000) for Kenyan citizens, paid through the Kenya Commercial Bank and the receipt
attached to the application. After the approval, a police driver collected the Permit from
NACOSTI offices in Nairobi, then a scanned copy was texted to the investigator through
WhatsApp.
Besides, participants in this study were briefed and debriefed by either the investigator or
research assistants (RAs) before and after administering the survey respectively. The investigator
briefed RAs via phone/email about protection of data and human subjects. The briefing was
meant to assure the potential participants that their selection was based on their professionalism
and not politics. They were also requested by RAs to sign informed consent forms at the
beginning of the survey. However, due to the paramilitary nature of KPS, signing consent forms
was a slippery slope, as some officers signed forms without indicating their names while others
did not sign at all. The paradox is whether the signatures meant their willingness to participate in
the study as was intended by the investigator, or them feeling 'encouraged' (coerced) because the
survey was administered by their commanders. The “NCTC Sample” however was more difficult
to access than the police and received non-signature consent forms.
Besides, participants in the study remained anonymous. IRB raised the question as to
whether it would be possible for local police chiefs who acted as RAs to read their officers'
responses, and reconstruct some respondents' identities thus risking the subjects' employability.
Arguably, the D-IG would not have approved the study if it could risk the subjects’
employability. Similarly, police commanders may have propagated the survey, but they were not
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expected to 'encourage' (coerce) staff enrollment because this was not an order from above. To
minimize this risk, questionnaires did not bear the identities of the participants. Maxfield &
Babbie clarified that “we talk of anonymous research when the researcher cannot associate a
given piece of information with a given person” (Maxfield & Babbie, 2001, p. 192). It thus
became impossible for the investigator to know participants for the police survey and partly, the
NCTC Sample because they were administered by RAs.
For purposes of privacy, RAs ensured that printing and storage of all questionnaires took
place within police offices. Records of participants were locked in police cabinets to minimize
the risk of access by unauthorized persons (Bachman & Schutt, 2011). Data in custody of the
investigator were in turn stored at the Criminal Justice PhD Students Lounge at John Jay under
lock and key of the researcher. The data entered in the investigator’s laptop and computer were
equally protected with passwords accessible to the investigator only (Bachman & Schutt, 2011).
Finally, confidentiality the idea that the researcher can link information with a given
person’s identity but not publicly (Maxfield & Babbie, 2001, p. 192). While the researcher did
not anticipate any risks to participants, they were informed prior to their participation that there
was a risk related to breach of confidentiality. To minimize this risk, participants were instructed
not to write their names on the questionnaires. Completed consent forms and questionnaires were
equally sealed in separate envelops. Likewise, all possible identifying data like date of birth or
Force/Service Numbers that could be used to identify subjects indirectly were altered or removed
from the sampling frame (Bachman & Schutt, 2011). Upon graduation, the data will be destroyed
after 3 years.
Data Quality Issues
Scarcity of data on ARP prompted the inclusion of newspapers in the study.
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Unfortunately, media reports tend to be inherently subjective and inaccurate (Silke, 2001).
Likewise, validity - the concern as to whether the researcher is measuring what he/she says they
are measuring was a matter of concern. Unfortunately, there is no standard for evaluating the
validity of conclusions in a qualitative study (Bachman & Schutt, 2011).
Table 11: Codes Co-Occurrency Table
Document Families

Codes

“Newspapers”
Document Family

conduct research
pulling levers
reintegration
conduct research
pulling levers
reintegration

“GK-related”
Document Family

Communication Problem
Identification
0
0.23
0.05
0.01
0.03
0.05
0.03
0.11
0.03
0.02
0
0.06

Totals
0.25
0.15
0.14
0.19
0.17
0.12

To ensure confirmability, the external reader Mr. Kiraithe due to his expertize on policing
in Kenya audited the dissertation. Essentially, he checked for discrepancies and validated
information in the literature review section. Furthermore, the study tested for co-occurrence of
quotations and found many codes that were co-occurring. This implies that there is consistency
in the qualitative data. In qualitative research however, these "quasi-statistics," as Howard
Becker calls them, only tell us a little bit about the overall shape of the data which allows us to
use statements such as “some,” “usually,” and “most” more precise (see Maxwell, 2010).
In this regard, Table 11 shows the number of times one code is co-occurring with another
code. For example, the “conduct research” code co-occurs with all “problem identification”
(0.11) within the “GK related” documents. Generally, the table shows that there were some
corroboration and consistency in the content suggesting that the data is reliable. Nevertheless,
this is qualitative analysis based on small a convenient sample and a very subjective coding
process, and as such interpretive.

109

The police survey questionnaire had most individual items were gauged on a 3-point
Likert Scale ranging from lowest to highest where lower values represented stronger agreement.
While this was a deliberate strategy by the investigator to have a relatively shorter questionnaire
considering the tight work schedules of the cops, some of the responses were not exhaustive. As
Stewart & Morris (2009) noted in their study which suffered from a similar limitation, future
researchers may “expand their responses to improve construct validity by using filtering
contingency questions” (p.298).
Another issue is researcher’s bias/reflexivity. Maxwell (2013) argued that qualitative
research is primarily concerned with understanding how a researcher’s values and expectations
may have influenced the conduct and conclusions of the study and avoiding the negative
consequences of these. While the researcher is a GO in the Kenya Police, her absence from
active duty in the last five years meant that she had no conflict of interest nor bias attitude to
favor GD over Formations in her interpretations of the findings. Besides, Jenkins (2015) asserts
that “qualitative methods can improve the external validity of police research findings and
enhance the research relationships of police academics and practitioners” (p. 502). As such, the
police survey findings are generalizable to Kenya Police (Bachman & Schutt, 2011) albeit
cautiously considering that the study was exploratory in nature.
Despite the flaws, triangulation involving data collection from different individuals and
settings, using a variety of methods, as well as different research assistants substantially reduced
systematic biases due to a specific method (Maxwell, 2013; Yin, 2013; Baxter & Jack, 2008;
Guba, 1981). Moreover, triangulation ensures credibility and confirmability of the qualitative
studies (White and Marsh, 2006, p. 38).
Limitations
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The methodological approach to this dissertation presented various limitations. To begin
with, the bulk of the content analysis materials were newspapers, which typically are subjective.
Besides, the author conducted content analysis without an intercoder which further rendered the
analysis subjective. While the researcher had limited qualitative research skills on the use of
Atlas.ti, she consulted via email, with Dr. Ervin Kosta and Dr. Valli Rajah due to their expertise
in using Atlas.ti. Besides, time constrain was a key challenge to data collection for the police
survey. The period coincided with the general elections in Kenya while lasted from April to
October 2017. Consequently, recruiting cops was difficult as majority were engaged in election
coverage. Moreover, convincing cops to participate in a study touching on government policy
was equally slippery, more so because they were required to sign consent forms. Worse still,
some commanders declined to participate in the study because they did not receive the survey
through the normal chain of command. One research assistant reported that the language used in
the questionnaire was complicated for police.
The fact that ARP falls under the docket of ATPU also implied that most of the GOs
were not conversant with the program. It was also a bad idea giving computer-based survey to
police officers considering that most KPS police offices neither have computers nor internet.
Compared with police, recruiting the “NCTC Sample” was the most difficult as shown by their
low response rate. Having such a small convenient sample is subject to informer bias. The
questionnaire for “NCTC Sample” was equally very long which might have discouraged some
from participating.
Contribution to Public Policy and Practice
The major point of departure of this dissertation with previous studies on CVE, is the use
of primary data from Kenya Police. Thus, it has contributed to literature in Africa where studies
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utilizing primary data on CVE from police officers are lacking. This incorporation of police
officers in terrorism and criminal justice research is a significant contribution on terrorism
literature which disproportionately focuses on ex-terrorists. The study thus provides a great deal
of guidance to both practitioners and researchers interested in CVE strategies in Africa.
Future Research
As APA states, “a study that solves a problem, whether theoretical or practical, once and
for all is a rare occurrence” (APA, 2011, p 83). Considering that the present study was based on
a process evaluation, future studies may consider collaborating with NCTC in a rigorous
outcome evaluation to measure success/effectiveness of ARP. As Butts (2011) explained,
process evaluation helps us to determine if there is program integrity in the way a program is
implemented according to the intended theory and model before those interventions are subjected
to a more rigorous outcome evaluation” (p. 10). NCTC however should share such findings with
researchers to inform public policy debate about CVE in Africa. Secondly, the NCTC Sample
was meant to offer primary data for a comparative analysis of how perceptions of implementers
vary on certain aspects of ARP. However, low response rate for this group hindered a
comprehensive analysis. It is one area that future researchers may explore to establish the
implementation feasibility of ARP.
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CHAPTER SIX
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter is a summary of key findings, policy implication, limitations and
recommendations for future research. This was a study about terrorism Amnesty and
Reintegration Program (ARP), a CVE strategy launched by the Government of Kenya in 2015.
The aim of the program was to reintegrate ex-terrorists (returnees) back to the community.
Targeted returnees included youths that had been to Somalia as members of Al Shabaab terrorist
group and had returned to Kenya, and radicalized youths who never left the country. However,
returnees who have perpetrated violence against Kenya were excluded. The initiative was a
response to the increase in terrorist attacks in the country, from Al Shabaab following the 2011
Kenyan military invasion Somalia to fight the militia.
The insecurity situation thrusted Kenya into a dilemma of how to deal with the over 700
returnees that were already in the country, as well as the counter-productivity CT operations.
Consequently, the government advised willing returnees to surrender to the national security
agencies in Coast, North Eastern and Nairobi Regions. In exchange for their surrender, the
youths were provided with social services and psychological counselling to aid in their
reintegration process. ARP was a radical paradigm shift from the country’s hard military
operations to “soft” approach to VE. The National Counter-Terrorism Centre (Kenya), a multiagency composed of the military, police, intelligence service, is the sole implementer of ARP.
Together, the agency is pulling levers with international donors and members of community to
provide returnees in the program with pro-social skills.
ARP makes a good case study for couple of reasons. Due to the increase in radicalization
and recruitment into al Shabaab, and terrorist attacks on Kenya by Al Shabaab over the last six
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years, the need for evidence-based research to inform government policy and practice on CVE in
Kenya remains crucial (NCTC, 2016). Of course, there is plenty of research on CVE around the
world but “CVE is context specific” (Farsight, 2016; Romaniuk, 2015; Holmer, 2013; Denoeux
and Carter, 2009).
Central to this dissertation is the relatively biased focus of terrorism research on terrorists
compared to law enforcement, yet police play a critical role in counter-terrorism. Specifically,
there are a few articles on front line officials as implementers of CVE measures. Basia Spalek for
example uses the term "connectors" to describe the role of police in terrorism prevention (Spalek,
2014). After three years since Kenya launched ARP, important gaps still exist in our
understanding of its implementation process, and what police as implementers think about it.
Such information is important for determining the utility of government youth intervention
programs for terrorism and policy improvement in CVE. Arguably, success of ARP largely
depends on police perceptions about CVE. The dissertation has partly filled these gaps by
examining the implementation process of ARP, and perception of Kenyan Police Officers about
CVE using primary data from police.
In so doing, two objectives guided the study. First, a process evaluation was conducted to
determine if there was program integrity in implementation of ARP, and its theoretical
similarities with focused deterrence technique. Due to the sensitivity of the program, it is
important to emphasize that the dissertation neither measured the effectiveness of the program
nor sought any identifying information about the returnees. Instead, process evaluation
framework was the lens used to assess the ongoing process of Kenya's move from hard to “soft”
power approach to determine if there was program integrity on the ground. In other words, if FD
is the mechanism that makes it work, how does the on-the-ground implementation of ARP
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measure up to the National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE) as a CVE model,
and what barriers stand in the way of its broader acceptance by the police doing the work?
Program implementation was the dependent variable. Process evaluation was achieved through
content analysis of 150 documents. Due to lack of standard procedure for FD process that has
been systematically documented in the literature, or through empirical research, content analysis
materials were coded into five themes (problem identification, pulling levers, conducting
research, reintegration services, and communication) based on FD framework provided by David
Kennedy. The coding details are shown in the subsequent paragraph.
According to Kennedy (2006), an FD framework begins with the selection of a particular
crime problem (“problem identification”) in this case, VE. This is followed by convening an
interagency working group of law enforcement practitioners who conduct research to identify
chronic offenders or groups of offenders (“conducting research”). Then, they frame a response to
offenders and groups of offenders using all available tools for sanctions to stop their continued
engagement in violent behavior (“pulling levers”). After this, focus social services and
community resources on targeted offenders and groups to match law enforcement prevention
efforts (“reintegration services”). Finally, implementers directly and repeatedly communicate
with the offenders so that they may understand why they are receiving this special attending and
the consequences if their subsequent behavior or misbehavior (communication) (p. 156).
The second objective was to assess perceptions of senior Kenya Police Officers (Gazetted
Officers) regarding CVE as a CT strategy. This involved an in-depth survey of a randomly
stratified sample of 273 police officers on their perceptions about appropriateness of offering
amnesty to terrorists. The key independent variable was designation with two strata (General
Duty and Formations/specialized police units). The dependent variable (perception/ what
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implementers think about the CVE) was measured as pessimism, optimism, risk, preparedness,
and autonomy/discretion. The author argued that if police officers as implementers don’t like
CVE as shown by their perceptions about ARP, then it won’t work owing to police culture of
resistance to change, and police discretion.
Based on the findings, programs adopting FD differ in their implementation processes but
share key theoretical features with ARP especially the social aspect of FD, and the paradigm
shift from hard to “soft” approach. Evidently, youths who surrendered were provided with
psychological counselling as well as social services to as part of their reintegration process back
to the society. The Anti-Terrorist Police Unit and National Intelligence Service being part of
NCTC, play a key role in the identification, interrogation and vetting of returnees to determine
their suitability before being referred to the program. This is a slight departure from FD where
police normally lead in conducting research to identify chronic offenders, and warning them
repeatedly about the consequences of their continued involvement in violence. Communication
within ARP also appears haphazard as government officials including County Commissioners
and Permanent Secretaries (PS) send these warnings via the media. Taken into context, this is
expected in Kenya because NCTC reports the results of its coordinating efforts to the National
Security Advisory Committee attended by such leaders.
The fact that ARP resembles FD interventions is important because FD is a promising
strategy with evidence of success in several US jurisdictions. Such interventions significantly
benefit from support of the US Department of Justice, example being the Strategic Alternatives
to Community Safety Initiative and Project Safe Neighborhoods. Other than drug and gun
violence however, application of FD to other criminals and context, in this case violent

116

extremists in Kenya, is unknown. This finding is important for future outcome evaluations
examining application of FD to CVE considering that CVE is going to stay for quite some time.
It can be argued that CVE programs are very ambitious. Romaniuk (2015) has argued,
CVE is a “field that has risen to prominence in a manner disproportional to its achievements”.
ARP for instance is premised on the theory of change, the assumption that evidence-based deradicalization efforts that encourage collaboration/engagement between the government and the
public can reduce or end radicalization and recruitment into violent extremist groups (NCTC,
2016, p. 17). No doubt, ARP presents an opportunity for NCTC to collect relevant data from
returnees during interrogation. Such data can help in improving de-radicalization programs in the
country. Arguably, “we cannot reliably predict if people will re-engage in terrorism without
knowing how or why they disengage and re-engage” (Horgan & Altier, 2012, p. 88).
It is not obvious how many returnees returned from Somalia due to the amnesty call.
Nonetheless, majority (at least 700) were already in the country prior to the launch. Their main
cause of return was disillusionment after they were lured by false monetary promises by the
militants, or distorted Salafi ideologies. Horgan & Altier (2012 observed that physical or
psychological disengagement from terrorism can be either voluntary or involuntary, but we do
not know how many terrorists disengage because of being apprehended, and how many volunteer
for help. So far, about 250 returnees surrendered for the reintegration program, a move GK has
touted as a success. This is not however unique to Kenya. Many countries with CVE programs
including the Saudi Arabia report “success” but don’t share the details of their evaluations. That
makes it hard for terrorism researchers to understand how governments measure their success.
Recidivism rates and arrests would be one way of measuring the success of ARP. As
Horgan (2008) asserts, disengagement does not guarantee deradicalization because terrorists can
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re-engage after going through the reintegration process. Likewise, criminologists argue that
offenders sometimes operate on a continuum where they “drift” between conventional and
criminal behavior according to Sykes and Matza, as opposed to total desistance from criminality.
Arguably, youths that were genuinely coerced into joining the terrorist group and willingly chose
to disengage might benefit more from ARP unlike those that joined terrorists’ groups willingly.
Horgan & Altier (2012) noted that “repentant and voluntary disengaged terrorist” can help
counter VE by reducing the attraction of new terrorists (p. 84). Identification of genuine
returnees to admit into the program however is difficult and was a major source of concern
among police commanders as shown by the police survey findings.
There are myriad of situational factors that are facing reintegrated returnees. To begin
with, the reintegration program is running within counties like Kwale but prisons were equally
recommended as possible sites for reintegration. In fact, the Kenya - European Union Partnership
project proposal budgeted at EUR 5,000,000 for the operationalization of the NSCVE projected
that NCTC will support effective disengagement and rehabilitation of returning FTFs in prisons
(“Kenya - European Union Partnership”, 2017). While Prisons, as Horgan et al. (2016) observed,
afford physical separation from the violent extremist group and time for reflection necessary for
sustaining disengagement, they can also be “schools for crime” per Cesare Lombroso where
criminals get an opportunity to learn or toughen their criminal behavior. This calls for precaution
from NCTC considering that most police officers viewed ARP as a risky program which can be a
point of convergence for like-minded and insecure returnees to advance their terrorism activities.
Put into context, reintegration is occurring within communities where drivers to
radicalization (marginalization, poverty, youth unemployment) that first pushed youths to join
militant groups still thrive. While GK has taken precautionary measures by providing returnees
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with reintegration kit to for their survival upon reintegration, members of public are not
necessarily prepared to embrace ex-terrorists in their backyards. A situation pits returnees into a
disarray of fear and insecurity meaning, they are still vulnerable to Al Shabaab and Mombasa
Republican Council rebels who are aggressively recruiting youths to join their groups. In fact,
“reformed” militants are widely viewed as traitors by the militia and some have been murdered
under unclear circumstances. An example being Subira Sudi Mwangole who surrendered to the
authorities in 2016 but was soon shot dead in Ukunda by killers who fled with his motorcycle,
presumably his reintegration kit (“Police Manhunt Operation for Killers of Reformed AlShabaab Launched in Kwale – Strategic Intelligence Service,” n.d.). Left with no legitimate
options such as securing a job, frustrated returnees might choose to re-engage in terrorism
activities.
In other words, like ex-offenders, reformed returnees might experience primary and
secondary deviance due to labeling theory (Becker, 1963). This was evident with the Uganda
Amnesty for Lord’s Resistance Army returnees who faced stigmatization upon their reintegration
despite the initial public demand for the amnesty. Undoubtedly, Kenyan security agencies have
played a commendable job in CT while working under unique conditions with limited resources
necessary for monitoring returnees as a way of preventing recidivism but as has been shown like
in other jurisdictions including the UK and America with CVE programs, such close surveillance
of returnees has always evoked public criticism that Kenya Police are targeting/labeling Muslim
communities as the vulnerable groups to radicalization and VE.
Besides, there was program integrity as ARP was implemented in tandem with the
National Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism (NSCVE). Accordingly, GK developed the
amnesty policy framework and launched the reintegration program. While there is no amnesty
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law, GK launched NSCVE as its implementation plan one year after granting the amnesty.
Moreover, the NCTC as the lead implementer of CVE, is responsible for monitoring returnees to
ensure that violent extremists do not penetrate the initiative. In so doing, NCTC is coordinating
with various security agencies and non-state actors. During reintegration process, returnees are
provided with psychological support and counselling programs. While NCTC shares information
with the involved national security agencies about the status of returnees, there is poor
coordination between NCTC and the communities involved in the program due to mistrust. The
issue of mistrust has been discussed into detail in the subsequent paragraphs.
CVE interventions have expanded tremendously around the world with countries like
Yemen, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UK and Columbia taking lead in implementing similar
disengagement programs. The emergence of CVE in Kenya however can be attributed to donors
which have been implementing these programs through Non-Governmental Organizations. CVE
programs including the Kenya Transition Initiative (KTI) launched by USAID Kenya between
2011 and 2013 in Nairobi and Coast (Khalil & Zeuthen, 2014), or Strengthening Resilience to
Violent Extremism Horn of Africa programme project implemented in Nairobi by Royal United
Services Institute from 2014-2017 (Zeuthen, 2015) were donor driven. ARP is however, a
departure from the previous CVE projects because GK took the frontline to roll it out.
It is not clear whether young democracies like Kenya are under donor pressure to
embrace CVE policies though there is significant donor contribution to CVE. Notably, ARP
developments have occurred in a political context wherein foreign government have been eager
to advance CVE and the Kenyan Government has more-or-less gone along with that. The
implication here is whether such policies will be effective and sustainable in Kenya. Importantly,
if we view Kenya in a regional and even global context, it is now something of a "critical case"
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for CVE, given the extent of donor interest (and government effort) in advancing CVE. In this
regard, there are no doubt lessons that can and should be learned from Kenya for those
supportive of CVE in other part of Africa and the developing world.
The police survey findings revealed interesting findings that were mainly consistent with
previous police perceptions studies. To begin with, the government made progress in engaging
with civil societies including SUPKEM in implementing ARP (see “SUPKEM Countering
Violent Extremism Workshop,” 2016). Notwithstanding, there is poor coordination between
security agencies and the community due to mistrust which might hinder the progress of ARP.
This observation links to Cure Violence Health Models that inherently suffer from involvement
from faith-based community organizations and community embeddedness (Butts et al., 2015)
due to mistrust. Since 2011, GK participated in high stake global CVE conferences that informed
ARP during which time, trust was a major theme of discussion. Specifically, it was agreed that
governments should place CVE under a “trusted institution”. Thus, GK must have preferred
NCTC as the “trusted” institution to implement the program compared with police, which suffers
from a strained relationship with minority communities that feel targeted for CT operations.
A possible source of mistrust in ARP relates to historical practices in the country. It can
be argued that the long history of political/ethnic intercommunal tensions in Kenya manifests in
various ways including periodic ethnic land clashes considering that Al Shabaab is a novel
Kenyan problem that emerged in 2011. Of course, after 9/11, Kenya took a hard-military
approach to CT like the 2015 “Operation Sanitization of Eastleigh” that was meant to flush out
al-Shabaab adherents and deter terrorism (“IPOA report on Usalama Watch operation in
Eastleigh, Kenya.pdf,” n.d.) where 4,000 people were arrested and some deported or sent to
refugee camps (“Deepening Foundations for Peacebuilding and community security,” n.d., p. 7)
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Police crackdowns have concentrated in predominantly Muslim/Somali community
neighborhoods like Eastleigh and refugee camps widely perceived by law enforcement as a
hideout for illegal immigrants (IPOA, 2014) and recruitment centers for al-Shabaab members
(UN Security Council, 2011). Clearly, CT operations will continue alongside CVE efforts
because of the threat Al Shabaab presents to Kenya. The problem with such place-based police
crackdowns is the public perception that police are targeting certain communities, and that
increases the mistrust.
Taking this further, the militia has promised to continue attacking Kenya as long as KDF
remains in Somalia. Evidently, no East African country has faced the brutality of Al Shabaab
outside Somalia, other than Kenya. Ironically, Uganda has contributed more troops (over 6,000)
to AMISOM compared to Kenya (over 4,000). Clearly, the alleged retaliatory attacks of Al
Shabaab on Kenya since 2011 after Kenya launched operation Linda Nchi in Somalia should be
put into a historical context beyond the public discourse as to whether Kenya should withdraw
her troops from Somalia. Traditionally, Kenya has been a home to refugees, playing a host to
over 600, 000 refugees in Daadab and Kakuma refugee camps and it was not until recently that
the government tightened security and attempted to close refugee camps arguing that they have
morphed into “nursery for terrorists” (Republic of Kenya, 2013).
Observers have argued that the ‘securitisation’ of refugee policies and repressive
treatment of Somalis at the Kenyan refugee camps, has resulted in the increase in migration of
Somalis from Kenya to the neighboring Uganda because Somalis are relatively better off in
Uganda than in Kenya (Iazzolino & Hersi, n.d.). Uganda has become a safe haven for the
increasing number of Somalis migrating from Kenya to Uganda (“A safe haven for Somalis in
Uganda? | Rift Valley Institute,” n.d.) due to favorable refugee laws like Uganda has Refugee
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Act implemented in 2010 that gives refuges the right to identification cards. Foreign
governments urging GK to address inequality including land issues, national identification cards,
and marginalization to address violent extremism (European Commission, 2015; UNDP, 2016;
“SUPKEM Countering Violent Extremism Workshop,” 2016 have echoed similar sentiments.
Besides, mistrust must do with organizational culture of police. Obviously, ARP is a
radical paradigm shift from the country’s heavy-handed anti-terrorism strategies to the “soft”
power CVE approach. This approach presents a potential conflict between the paramilitary and
closed nature of police organization and the demand of CVE interventions. Police have a culture
of resistance to change. They also exercise enormous discretion to arrest, charge or not act when
dealing with returnees. While police discretion is good, it can be abused. Moreover, police are
isolated from members of public, such that they maintain an “us vs. them” mentality that
reinforces their mistrust in the community. These are factors that are nuanced, and policy makers
and practitioners within NCTC should not ignore otherwise CVE won’t work. As Lurigio &
Skogan (1994) argued, initiatives in police such as community policing initiatives must be
compatible with the existing organizational culture and climate in a department as well as the
basic concerns and needs of police personnel (p. 329).
Of course, GK has made deliberate efforts by adopting community policing, and most
recently after the 2013 Westgate attack, Nyumba Kumi Initiative to enhance information sharing
and build trust between police and public (“How ‘Nyumba kumi’ model works,” n.d.;
“Deepening Foundations for Peacebuilding and community security,” n.d.; “Nyumba Kumi has
little to show,” n.d.). Arguably, Nyumba Kumi might have worked in Tanzania due to Ujamaa
(socialism) culture, but its impact in Kenya remains unclear. Culturally, police focus on fighting
crime as opposed to problem solving which is a central component of community policing. As
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such, application of community policing or Nyumba Kumi remains a challenge in Kenya as has
been in other countries. An example is the UK where critics of UK’s CVE strategy know as
Prevent maintained that it to “greater mistrust of the police” (Klausen, 2009) and
labelling/spying of Muslims as ‘suspect communities’ or susceptible to terrorist involvement
(Choudhury & Fenwick, 2011; Thomas, 2010).
Another interesting finding was the parallel distinction in perceptions between
Formations and GD officers on appropriateness of ARP to ex-terrorisms. Unlike Formation
commanders, GD commanders don’t think this “soft” power approach could lead to less
recruitment by al-Shabaab within Kenya. Further, GD were more likely to report that the
program is limiting their discretion at work compared with Formations. There was also a general
sense of skepticism in ARP, as GD officers widely think insecurity of returnees from other
terrorists is high, while Formation commanders widely think that it is difficult to authenticate the
sincerity of returnees. This finding lends support to previous studies on police perceptions that
found distinctions in police perceptions. Systsma & Piza (2017) for example found that Toronto
Police Officers attached to the Community Oriented Policing unit were more likely to rate higher
on perceptions of performing job duties in a procedurally just manner compared to the reactive
unit (also see Stewart and Morris, 2009; Lurigio & Skogan, 1994).
A possible explanation for this distinction emanates from their roles. Ideally, GD officers
deal with all types of criminals and may not appreciate the importance of specialized units. In
contrast, Formations are more receptive of amnesty because from their work experience, they
know that following the hard approach simply makes it difficult to prosecute ex-terrorists.
Ironically, members of public don’t necessarily distinguish police along their designations.
Instead, they castigate police officers in general as being unfair to them.
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The fact that support for the program differs across subsets of officers (GD and
Formations) speaks to the potential effect of the program. Considering that deployment in KPS is
subject to transfers between Formations and GD, the way to prevent a leadership vacuum when
an officer is transferred is to win hearts and minds of all commanders to support CVE. This calls
for training of GOs about potential benefits of CVE and entrusting the GOs with the task to
disseminate the information to their junior officers. As Sytsma & Piza (2017) have stressed, it is
important for the upper management to communicate the benefits of community driven policing
to rank-and-file police officers delivering these services. Thus, if police as implementers do not
understand or don’t know what they are doing in CVE, then it won’t work, or it won’t work as
fast as expected by implementers. Whereas ARP currently has the support of the government, it
must be noted that the success of ARP/CVE largely depends on commitment of police
commanders because they are involved in the implementation of the program.
It should be noted that most officers perceived the program as risky, with majority
worrying that participants can seize the opportunity to infiltrate their ideologies into the program
participants or that Kenya is likely to face more challenges because of the burgeoning number of
returnees into the program. Equally, there was a relative sense of resistance to the program as
majority viewed the program as lenient on terrorists. This consensus in perceptions of GD and
Formations about risk have a bearing on the overall success of CVE in Kenya as it reinforces
their preference for hard CT, which in turn casts doubt on the sustainability of CVE efforts.
In conclusion, this study is one of the first to independently explore ARP, and perception
of Kenyan police officers. The dissertation has demonstrated that programs adopting FD differ in
their implementation processes but share some key theoretical features with ARP, especially the
social aspect of FD and the paradigm shift from hard-militarized CT to “soft” CVE approach.
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There is also program integrity in the manner ARP has been implemented in theory and on the
ground. The policy implication of these findings suggests that ARP can be helpful in the
reintegration of ex-terrorists within the Kenyan context, but there is need for a rigorous outcome
evaluation to determine its success. The police survey has demonstrated that Formations were
supportive of CVE than GD were. This implies that policy makers and practitioners should train
all police commanders (GOs) about the potential benefits of CVE bearing in mind that police are
a rigid paramilitary organization with a culture of resistance to change. Such training can change
their perceptions about CVE, otherwise it won’t work if they don’t like CVE. Considering that
there are a few articles on front line officials as implementers of CVE measures, this dissertation
has contributed to CVE literature by using primary data from Kenya Police. The need for policy
makers and practitioners to involve police commanders as part of their research remains
important because it is the police doing the job.
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APPENDIX A
QUALITATIVE STUDY QUESTIONNAIRE
Problem identification
1. When was the amnesty program initiated?
2. What is the aim of the amnesty and the rehabilitation program?
3. Is the amnesty timed? If yes, for how long is the amnesty expected to last?
4. Was any formal announcement made publicly about the commencement of the Amnesty
and Reintegration program?
5. Did you hold any meetings to brainstorm before the program was initiated?
6. Is there a written implementation plan?
7. In your estimate, how many have surrendered so far since the amnesty was announced?
8. Why do you think they are surrendering the way they do?
9. In your opinion or based on your experience so far, what do you think influenced their
return into the country? For instance, did the announcement influence their return? Was it
after hearing the announcement or before?
10. Who identifies/picks returnees or groups of offenders?
11. Which government agency receives the returnees? In other words, whom do they
surrender to?
12. During the interview, what kind of data do you collect? Am thinking of data such as
where they were recruited from, how they travelled, when they left and returned to the
country, their demographic factors etc.
13. What aspects of the program do you consider difficult to implement?
14. Do you know whether they have changed or not?
15. How do you feel about the policy overall?
16. In your observation, what are some of the key opportunities in this program?
17. What are the main challenges of this program?
18. Is there anything you feel should be done to improve the program?
Pulling levers
1. What agencies are involved in implementation of the program? (Check all that apply).
2. How regularly, if any, does the team hold meetings?
3. What is the advantage of pulling levers (involving all these government agencies?)
Conducting Research
1. What is the role, if any, of the police in the program?
2. How do you define your target area that qualifies as returnees? (check all that apply).
o youths who have fled to Somalia and returned to Kenya?
o radicalized youth who never left the country?
o those that are radicalized and on the brink of joining violent extremist organizations.
o members of violent extremist organizations who have not committed or facilitated
violent attacks in Kenya?
o individuals who have voluntarily left violent extremist and terrorist organizations
with the wish to no longer support violence or radicalization. Do they qualify?
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o I know there are those that are responding to the amnesty and probably form the bulk
of the returnees, is that true?
o individuals convicted of terrorist-related crimes and who pose a risk of radicalizing
fellow inmates or who voluntarily seek to assist de-radicalization efforts while
serving their sentences.
o individuals ordered by courts to participate in de-radicalisation and reintegration
efforts.
Reintegration services
1. What is the waiting period if any, do the returnees meet before they can be placed in a
reintegration center?
2. What are the rules for inclusion in the program?
3. Once they surrender, what happens next?
4. The media reported that there is reintegration kit offered to the returnees, what does the
kit entail
5. What kind of role does the community/religious play if any, in the implementation of the
program? Please explain.
Communication
1. What warning message, if any, do you emphasize in your communication with the
returnees? For example, do you tell them to stop it? Do you warn them of swift and
certain prosecution?
2. What kind of follow-up, if any, do members of the Working Team make with the
returnees in the program?
3. Do you communicate with the returnees through meetings or phone?
4. Are there any specific phone numbers assigned to returnees to call?
5. Do you have any specific cadre of security officers that are authorized to receive
information from returnees? Please expound.
6. Do you make any direct communication with the returnees warning them of the
consequences of breaking the reintegration rules? If affirmative, what is the message you
send them?
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APPENDIX B: QUANTITATIVE STUDY QUESTIONNAIRE
Demographic factors
1. Please state your gender (check)
o Male
o Female
2. What is your highest completed level of education?
o Secondary/High School
o Diploma/Higher Diploma
o Bachelor Degree
o Post Graduate studies
3. Please indicate your Rank
o Senior Assistant Inspector-General
o Assistant Inspector-General
o Commissioner of Police
o Senior Superintendent of Police
o Superintendent of Police
o Assistant Superintendent of Police
4. Designation (chose the best that describes you).
o General Duty
o Formation/ Specialized Unit
5. What is your length of service?
o Less than 10 years
o 10-15 years
o 16-20 years
o 21 years and above
Resistance

Discretion/ Autonomy
16. How do you think the Amnesty and Reintegration
program is changing things especially decision making
at work?
o Highly limits police discretion/autonomy
o Somehow limits police discretion/autonomy
o Does not limit police discretion/autonomy

6.

What is your view of amnesty for terrorists in terms of
proportionality to terrorism?
o Lenient
o Not lenient

7.

Do you think this program should be handled solely
by NCTC?
o Yes, because it is a multi-agency
o Yes, they are better trained and prepared to
implement the program.
o Yes, they are likely to be trusted by public.

19. How well are you prepared to deal with them after they
surrender within your jurisdiction?
o Very well prepared
o Prepared
o Somewhat prepared
o Not prepared
o Less Prepared
20. Do you think more resources should be allocated to the
program?
o Yes
o No

17. How does it change if any, the way you are seeing or
would treat terror suspects?
o Positively
o Negatively
o I don’t know
18. Overall, to what extent if any, would you say that
identifying terror suspects has improved since the
amnesty was announced?
o Better off
o About the same,
o No, things are worse
o I’m not sure

Preparedness

Skepticism

Risk assessment

8.

How confident are you that this program will reduce
terror attacks?
o Confident
o Somehow confident
o Not confident

9.

To what extent are you optimistic that the amnesty is
helpful in disengaging or rehabilitating terrorists?
o Very optimistic
o Optimistic
o Less optimistic
o Not optimistic

21. Should police worry that participants can seize this
opportunity to infiltrate their ideologies into the
program participants by strengthening their ideologies
to go back to terrorism?
o Definitely
o Somewhat Yes
o Not Really
22. To what extent, if any, does it concern you that the
amnesty can be a platform for convergence of likeminded suspects to further their terror schemes?
o Very concerned
o Not concerned
o Less concerned
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10. To what extent are you pessimistic that the program is
helpful in disengaging or rehabilitating terrorists?
o Pessimistic
o Less pessimistic
o Not Pessimistic
11. How do you feel about the policy overall?
o Optimistic
o Not optimistic
o Less optimistic
12. What are opportunities in this program?
o Makes surveillance of terrorism easy
o Reintegration of terrorists prevents terror
o Corporation with other agencies
o Moral obligation of community to help reformed
returnees to desist from terrorism
13. What are the challenges of this program?
o Insecurity of the returnees from other terrorists is
high
o Death of reformed returnees causes fear and
prevents other returnees from surrendering
o Recidivism/reoffending of reformed returnees
who fail to reintegrate in the society
o Difficulty to authenticate the sincerity of
returnees that surrender
14. Is there anything you feel should be done to improve
the program?
o Police should have a much direct involvement in
the implementation
o There should be a legal framework to work with

23. “Is it likely that Kenya could face [more]challenges
because of the burgeoning number of returnees in the
program?”
o Very Likely
o Likely
o Unlikely
24. “Do you think this “soft” power approach could lead to
less recruitment by al-Shabaab within Kenya?”
o Yes
o No
25. What aspects of the program do you consider difficult
to implement?
o Identification of genuine returnees
o Making decision about referral for reintegration
o Follow-up on returnees
26. To what extent do you find the program helpful?
o I don’t know
o Helpful
o Very helpful
27. What factors do you think motivate them to surrender
to the police?
o Fear of arrest
o Respect for community leaders
o Confidence in the amnesty
28. Do you think the amnesty is proportionate to the
terrorist offences as much as amnesty has been applied
to other crimes such as illegal firearms?
o Strongly disagree
o Disagree
o Agree
o Strongly agree
29. Is it possible to know if they have changed?
o Yes
o No
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APPENDIX D: CONSENT FORM
THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
The Graduate Center/John Jay College Criminal Justice
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH STUDY
Title of Research Study: Process Evaluation of Terrorist Amnesty and Reintegration program, and
perceptions of countering violent extremism among police officers; A case study of Kenya Police
Principal Investigator: Resila Onyango-PhD Criminal Justice Student
Faculty Advisor:
Prof. Eric Piza, PhD- Assistant Professor
You are being asked to participate in a research study because you are an expert in police work or counterterrorism.
Purpose:
The purpose of this research study is not only to complete my PhD study, but to contribute to literature on
amnesty-driven countering violent extremism (CVE) and reintegration strategy. This research thus seeks to
explore Kenya's CVE activities, specifically the Amnesty and Reintegration (Youth Disengagement) Program.
This is a process evaluation of the program to better understand factors that led to the creation of this
program as well as police officer perceptions of the program.
Procedures:
If you volunteer to participate in this research study, we will ask you to do the following:
• Sign a consent form voluntarily.
• Do not indicate your name in the questionnaire
• The survey questions are straight forward and you only need to tick your preferred optional
response. The questions are close-ended
Time Commitment:
Your participation in this research study is expected to last for a total of <5 – 10 minutes>.
Potential Risks or Discomforts:
This is a low risk study. We do not anticipate any risks to you. There may be a risk related to breach of
confidentiality, but we are asking that you do not put your name or identifying information on the survey so
that we can minimize this risk. Your signed consent form will not be connected to your survey responses.
Potential Benefits:
This study is not designed to benefit you, but will help us learn more about counter-terrorism in Kenya.
Confidentiality:
• We will make our best efforts to maintain confidentiality of any information that is collected during
this research study, and that can identify you.
• We will protect your confidentiality by keeping the questionnaires in separate envelopes from the
consent form to protect the identities of individual respondents.
• Besides, you have the approval of the Deputy Inspector General of Police to participate voluntarily
in this study.
• Publications and/or presentations that result from this study will not identify you by name.
• The research team, authorized CUNY staff, and government agencies that oversee this type of
research may have access to research data and records in order to monitor the research. Research
records provided to authorized, non-CUNY individuals will not contain identifiable information
about you.
Participants’ Rights:
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•
•
•
•

Your participation in this research study is entirely voluntary. If you decide not to participate, there
will be no penalty to you.
Your participation or non-participation in this study will in no way affect your employment the
National Police Service.
You can decide to withdraw your consent and stop participating in the research at any time, without
any penalty.
You can skip any questions that you do not wish to answer.

Questions, Comments or Concerns:
If you have any questions, comments or concerns about the research, you can talk to one of the following
researcher:
Resila Onyango, SSP on +19738836676. Resila is a Senior police officer (Senior Superintendent of Police
(SSP) in the Kenya Police and the Principal Investigator for this study.
If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, or you have comments or concerns that you
would like to discuss with someone other than the researchers, please call the CUNY Research Compliance
Administrator at 646-664-8918 or email HRPP@cuny.edu. Alternately, you can write to:
CUNY Office of the Vice Chancellor for Research
Attn: Research Compliance Administrator
205 East 42nd Street
New York, NY 10017
Signature of Participant:
If you agree to participate in this research study, please sign and date below. You will be given a copy of this
consent form to keep.
_____________________________________________________
Printed Name of Participant
_________________________________
Signature of Participant

__________________________
Date

Signature of Individual Obtaining Consent
_____________________________________________________
Printed Name of Individual Obtaining Consent
________________________________________
Signature of Individual Obtaining Consent

__________________________
Date

"If you agree to participate, please complete the attached survey and return it to Resila
Onyango via email (ronyango@gradcenter.cuny.edu). If you would prefer, the researcher
can contact you to ask the survey questions via telephone and record your answers for you."
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APPENDIX H

PD: List of Primary Documents and Associated Families
Associated PD
Families
1.rtf
• NEWSPAPERS
18 November 2015.rtf
• NEWSPAPERS
500 Kwale radicals back from Somalia.rtf
• NEWSPAPERS
56d68736741d1.pdf
• NEWSPAPERS
700 al Shabaab recruits return to Kenya 2.rtf
• NEWSPAPERS
700 al Shabaab recruits return to Kenya.rtf
• NEWSPAPERS
700 Kenyans Quit Al.rtf
• NEWSPAPERS
A partnership of HuffPost and the.rtf
• NEWSPAPERS
About National Counter Terrorism Centre.rtf
• NEWSPAPERS
Africa1.rtf
• NEWSPAPERS
Africa2.rtf
• NEWSPAPERS
Africa3.rtf
• NEWSPAPERS
Africa4.rtf
• NEWSPAPERS
Africa5.rtf
• NEWSPAPERS
Africa6.rtf
• NEWSPAPERS
Al-Shabab recruits return to Kenya after quitting group.rtf
• NEWSPAPERS
Al Shabaab returnee killed.rtf
• NEWSPAPERS
Al Shabaab returnees surrender.rtf
• NEWSPAPERS
Al Shabaab still a major security threat to Kenya.rtf
• NEWSPAPERS
Al Shabaab video text.rtf
• NEWSPAPERS
Al.rtf
• NEWSPAPERS
Al1.rtf
• NEWSPAPERS
Ambassador Speaks at Conference on Countering Violent Extremism
• GK-RELATED
in Kenya.rtf
amnesty add.rtf
• GK-RELATED
Amnesty for al Shabaab returnees key in fighting terror.rtf
• NEWSPAPERS
Amnesty for returnee Al shabaab militants hot topic at Counter
• NEWSPAPERS
Terrorism Conference By Nyambega Gisesa.rtf
Amnesty for Shabaab returnees extended.rtf
• NEWSPAPERS
Amnesty for youths misled to join Al Shabaab By Opinion Leaders
• NEWSPAPERS
on Posted on April 14.rtf
Amnesty Is a Positive Counter Terror Move.rtf
• NEWSPAPERS
Primary Documents
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Primary Documents
Amnesty Period For Radicalized Youth Extended By 14 Day1.rtf
Anxiety as police patrol Murang.rtf
April 24.rtf
BRICS East Africa - Project Proposal - March 2016.pdf
BRICS_Calls_for_Concepts_-__OCT2016.pdf
Church opposes amnesty for Al Shabaab followers.rtf
CONCEPT-NOTE-1.pdf
Counter terrorism boss outlines how to win war on terror By Daniel
Psirmoi.rtf
Countering_violent_extremism_in_Kenya-4.pdf
CTED-ICCT-1624-Workshop-Report-7-9-May-2014-Comments-byParticipants.pdf
CVE Conference Doc 2015 Outcome (2).pdf
CVE Summit in Kenya.rtf
CVE.rtf
eutf-hoa-ke-34-kenya-cve_en_0.pdf
Executive-Summary-The-Hague-Rehab-Conference-December2011.pdf
FF3LT - Support to the Prevention Violent Extremism in
Kenya_Final.pdf
Fresh policies to curb terrorism.rtf
Geeska Afrika Onlin1.rtf
Geeska Afrika Online.rtf
Government exploring giving amnesty to Kenyan youth in Al.rtf
Government names radicalisation hot spots and MRC training
grounds in Kilifi.rtf
Help us fight terrorism.rtf
Home.rtf
Home1.rtf
Home2.rtf
ICPC calls for responsibility in countering radicalization and
extremism.rtf
Integrating terror group fighters who return home is hard but
possible.rtf
Intelligence Ne10.rtf
Intelligence New2.rtf
Intelligence New3.rtf

Associated PD
Families
• NEWSPAPERS
• NEWSPAPERS
• NEWSPAPERS
• GK-RELATED
• GK-RELATED
• NEWSPAPERS
• GK-RELATED
• NEWSPAPERS
•
•
•

NEWSPAPERS
GK-RELATED

•

GK-RELATED
GK-RELATED
GK-RELATED
GK-RELATED
GK-RELATED

•

GK-RELATED

•

GK-RELATED
NEWSPAPERS
NEWSPAPERS
GK-RELATED
NEWSPAPERS

•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•

•

NEWSPAPERS
NEWSPAPERS
NEWSPAPERS
NEWSPAPERS
GK-RELATED

•

NEWSPAPERS

•

NEWSPAPERS
NEWSPAPERS
NEWSPAPERS

•
•
•

•
•
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Primary Documents
Intelligence New4.rtf
Intelligence New5.rtf
Intelligence New6.rtf
Intelligence New7.rtf
Intelligence New8.rtf
Intelligence New9.rtf
Intelligence News.rtf
Intelligence NewsJanuary 20.rtf
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